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Thesis summary:
This thesis was an exploration into the implementation process in developing country cities. 
Western debates on implementation are usually not applicable in developing country cities and 
the question asked was why. The main reason has been found is that the characteristics of 
governments and people in developing country cities are different and therefore different 
approaches are required to make implementation successful. Of particular interest is waste 
management. Different approaches are employed in the management of waste in some 
developing country cities and the results have been mediocre with no real impact on the urban 
environment.
To this end, this thesis set out to understand implementation within these cities. In the 
course of this research, some very interesting factors were discovered about policy 
implementation in developing country cites. It is hoped that this thesis has been able to add to the 
body of knowledge in understanding implementation in developing country cities.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 8
1.1. Introduction to implementation........................................................................................ 11
1.2. Implementation challenges in developing country cities.................................................12
1.3. Waste collection management in developing country cities............................................ 13
1.4. Structure of the dissertation...............................................................................................15
1.4.1 M ethodology..................................................................................................................................... 15
1.4.2 Lagos State mega city: Politics and w aste .................................................................................... 16
1.4.3 Managing waste collection management in developing countries.........................................16
1.5.4 Governance and service delivery: challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa and Lagos....................17
1.5.5 Private-Public Partnership: Mixed benefits in local service provision.................................... 18
1.5.6 The informal sector: the underdogs of waste collection m anagem ent.................................. 18
1.5.7 Lagos State waste collection management: Introducing the Lagos PSP Programme: Phase I 
PSP program .................................................................................................................................................19
1.5.8 PSP redesigned: Phase II................................................................................................................. 20
1.5.9 Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................20
1.6 Academic Value................................................................................................................ 20
2. Theoretical Field and Methodology......................................................................................... 23
2. Topic.................................................................................................................................... 24
2.1. Theoretical field being investigated..................................................................................27
2.2. What is implementation?.................................................................................................. 28
2.3. Top-down school of Implementation................................................................................31
2.3.1. Skilful and committed officials:.....................................................................................................32
2.3.2. Clear and Consistent objectives....................................................................................................33
2.3.3. Support from sovereigns and key a c to rs .................................................................................... 34
2.3.4. Adequate causal th eo ry ................................................................................................................. 35
2.3.5. Changes in socioeconomic conditions.........................................................................................36
2.3.6. Implementation process legally structured to enhance compliance..................................... 36
2.4. Top-down implementation policy conceptual framework............................................... 37
2.5. Top-down critiques............................................................................................................39
2.6. Bottom-up school of thought............................................................................................ 41
2.8. Comparing the top-down and bottom-up schools of thought.........................................48
2.9. Lagos PSP Programme......................................................................................................52
2.10. Research Design.............................................................................................................. 53
2.11. Research Questions..........................................................................................................54
2.12. Hypothesis and research questions.................................................................................55
2.13. Case study Research........................................................................................................56
1
2.13.1. Research Strategy....................................................................................................................... 57
2.14. Case Study as a Research M ethod.............................................................................................58
2.14.1. Criticisms..................................................................................................................................... 60
2.15. Survey research m ethod...............................................................................................................62
2.15.1. Advantages of the survey m ethod........................................................................................... 62
2.15.2. Disadvantages of the survey method.......................................................................................63
2.15.3 Survey methodology vs case study methodology.................................................................63
2.16. Research F o cu s.............................................................................................................................. 64
2.17. Data Collection m ethods..............................................................................................................66
2.17.1. Interviews....................................................................................................................................67
2.17.2. Households (End Users)............................................................................................................ 68
2.17.2. Policy M akers............................................................................................................................. 69
2.17.3. Monitoring Officials....................................................................................................................70
2.17.4. PSP Service Providers................................................................................................................ 70
2.17.5. Cart-pushers................................................................................................................................70
2.18. Field Study...................................................................................................................................... 71
2.18.1 Field problems...........................................................................................................................71
2.19. Proposed research ......................................................................................................................... 75
3. Lagos State m ega city: Politics and w aste .........................................................................................76
3.1. Finding L agos...................................................................................................................................12,
3.2. Lagos, a H istory ............................................................................................................................... 80!,
3.3. Democracy, a History in N igeria .................................................................................................81
3.4. Relationships between state and citizens...................................................................................82
3.5. Federal A dm inistration.................................................................................................................. 84
3.5.1. Governmental structure of Nigeria............................................................................................84
3.6. State A dm inistration....................................................................................................................... 86
3.7. Lagos, a multi-functional c ity .......................................................................................................87
3.8. History o f  W aste M anagem ent in Lagos S ta te ........................................................................ 89
3.9. The institutions that run the States’ w aste ................................................................................ 92
3.9.1. Lagos Ministry of Environment (MoE).......................................................................................92
3.9.2. Lagos State waste management authority (LAWMA)..............................................................93
3.10. PSP W aste Programme in b r ie f .................................................................................................95
3.11. C onclusion...................................................................................................................................... 96
4. Managing waste collection in developing country cities...............................................................97
4.1. Waste Generation and M anagem ent........................................................................................... 97
4.2. Advanced waste management system s.................................................................................... 100
4.3. Developing waste management sy stem s.................................................................................104
4.4. Effects o f  population growth on waste generated................................................................. 107
4.5. More people, more income, more w aste ..................................................................................108
4.6. Country type, country w aste ....................................................................................................... 109
4.7. Waste Institu tions..........................................................................................................................I l l
4.8. Glamour work, local attitudes and effect on waste handling..............................................118
4.9. Consequence of inadequate waste disposal in urban centres........................................ 120
4.10. Health...............................................................................................................................120
4.11. Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 121
5. Governance and service delivery: challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa and Lagos..............126
5.1. Elements of the institutions of State in Sub Saharan Countries................................... 127
5.2. Authoritarian Rule Sub-Saharan Africa..........................................................................127
5.3. Democracy; what now ?................................................................................................... 133
5.4. Civil Society..................................................................................................................... 136
5.6. African Governance......................................................................................................... 140
5.6.1. Characteristics of African governance........................................................................... 140
5.7. Governance decentralization and policy creation within transitional countries..........141
5.8. Implementation.................................................................................................................143
5.9. Conclusions....................................................................................................................... 144
6. Private-Public Partnership: Mixed benefits in urban services provision.............................146
6.1. Methods of Private Sector Inclusion............................................................................... 147
6.2. PPPs, asset or public v ice................................................................................................153
6.3. SMEs, Informal Waste Sector, PPPs and the Lagos state Policy................................ 159
6.4. Literature Gap................................................................................................................... 164
6.5. Conclusion........................................................................................................................ 164
7. The informal sector: the underdogs of waste collection management................................166
7.1. Overview of informal sector involvement in waste management................................167
7.2. Activities and stages in the waste management process............................................... 169
7.3. Responses of government to informal sector waste operations.................................... 171
7.4. Relationships between informal and formal waste operators....................................... 173
7.5. Informal waste collection providers, their place in society.......................................... 175
7.5.1. Jakarta, Indonesia.......................................................................................................... 176
7.5.2. Case 2: Coopamare, Sao Paolo.......................................................................................177
7.5.3. Case 3: Zabaleen Cairo, Egypt........................................................................................179
7.6. Comparison of case studies.............................................................................................182
7.7 Gaps in literature..............................................................................................................188
7.8. Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 190
8. Lagos State waste collection management: Introducing the Lagos PSP Programme 191
8.1 Phase I: 1996-2004............................................................................................................191
8.2 Lagos PSP Programme..................................................................................................... 191
8. 3 Lagos State waste problem............................................................................................193
8.4 Solution.........................................................................................................   196
8.5 Phase I Lagos State PSP Programme: 1996-2004.......................................................... 198
8.6 Implementation schools of thought.................................................................................202
8.6.1 Objectives, and resources............................................................................................ 202
8.6.2. Conditions for policy implementation........................................................................... 208
8.6.3. Enabling legislation....................................................................................................... 213
8.6.4. Committed and Skilful Implementing Officers............................................................... 217
8.6.5. Support of stakeholder groups and sovereigns............................................................. 221
8.6.6. Socioeconomic changes:............................................................................................... 227
3
8.7 Problems faced by the PSP Contractors.........................................................................229, [ Dei
8.8 Problems in Phase I ....................................................................................................... 231
8.8.1. Politics..........................................................................................................................................232
8.8.2 Corruption:................................................................................................................................... 233
8.8.3 Infrastructure...............................................................................................................................235
8.8.4 Economics.................................................................................................................................... 236
8.8.5 Consultation.................................................................................................................................237
8.8.7. Legislation.................................................................................................................................238
8.8.8 Private Sector ability to provide a viable public service in Lagos....................................... 239
8.9 Conclusion..................................................................................................................... 240
9. Phase II: 2004- 2007........................................................................................................... 24£, (w
9.1 Phase II (2004 and on-going).........................................................................................246_ fpj
9.2 Phase I I ........................................................................................................................... 242, (w
9.3 Expansion...................................................................................................................... 251T
9.3.1. Contract:....................................................................................................................................... 251,. ^
9.3.2. Enlightenment Programme:.......................................................................................................253T [pj
9.3.3. Local Government Inclusion:......................................................................................................254t (j*
fw9.3.4 Financing:...................................................................................................................................... 255T 1—
I dq
9.3.5. Customer Complaints:..............................................................................................................259t —^
9.4 New Actors..................................................................................................................... 260T foe
9.4.1 Banks:.............................................................................................................................................261, fod
9.4.2 Billing PSP:....................................................................................................................................261,
9.4.3 Landfill PSP:..................................................................................................................................262,
9.4.4 Monitoring/Enforcement PSP:.................................................................................................. 263,
9.5 Effects of the Restructuring on the PSP Waste Collection Programme........................264, fod
9.5.1 Positive Outcomes of Phase II of the PSP Waste Collection Programme  264, ppj
9.5.2 Negative Outcomes...................................................................................................................... 265, (j*
9.6 Phase II implementation analyses   273, (j*
9.6.1 Clear and consistent objectives and adequate resources:...................................................... 274, fpj
9.6.2 Cause and Effect:......................................................................................................................... 276,
9.6.3 Enabling Legislation.....................................................................................................................281,
9.6.4 Committed and Skilful implementing officials........................................................................ 286,
9.6.5 Support of Interest groups and politicians............................................................................... 287,
9.6.6 Changes in the Socio-Economic conditions..............................................................................288,
9.7 Problems experienced during the Implementation of Phase II...................................... 289, fod
9.7.1 Corruption...................................................................................................................................289, fod
9.7.2. Agency clashes.........................................................................................................................290_
Del
Del
Dd
De
5
4
9.8 Informal Sector.................................................................................................................. 292, ( Delet
9.8.1 Effects of the informal waste sector on the S ta te .....................................................................293r f peiet
9.8.2 Methods of including the  informal Waste Collection Sector 298T Pelet
f Delet
9.8.3 PSP Truckers......................................................................................................................................301, [--------
9.9 Change of the informal sector ro le ...................................................................................302, {Peiet
9.1 0 ............................................................................................................................. Conclusion
 303t ( Pelet
10. Conclusions........................................................................................................................... 308T [ Deiet
10.1 Implementation................................................................................................................ 309t [oUet
10.2 Character differences in chosen geographic area.........................................................311T
10.3 What is missing in the theory........................................................................................ 313T
10.3.1 Leadership:.................................................................................................................................. 314t
[ Pelet 
( Pelet' 
[ Pelet
10.3.2 Clear Policy..................................................................................................................................... 315t [ p ^ e t
10.3.3 Local fac to rs................................................................................................................................... 315, f Pelet
Delet 
( Pelet 
( Pelet' 
( Pelet*
10.3.4 End User inclusion....................................................................................................................... 317t
10.3.5 Governance ty p e ......................................................................................................................... 317t
10.3.6 Corruption.....................................................................................................................................320T
10.3.7 Informal secto r.............................................................................................................................321,.
10.4 Implications for the thesis hypothesis...........................................................................32 1T ( Pelet
10.5 Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 323
Bibliography................................................................................................................................325T ( Peiet
Appendix 1, Questionnaire.................................................................................................... 357T { Delet
Appendix 2, PSP Price
List.................................................................................................... 357T6 1 ( Pelet
Appendix 3, Map of Lagos..................................................................................................... 367
5
News from  Lagos -  October 2008
Environment Nigeria: A face-lift for Lagos
“ Blocked drains, heaps of garbage in the streets, remnants of food and disused household items: these 
things have become a common sight in the Nigerian commercial capital of Lagos over the past few 
years, prompting some to label it the "dirtiest city in the world". The unsanitary conditions have 
reportedly led to cholera outbreaks, and in a suburb like Iwaya disease spreads quickly.
As with many other areas o f the city, it is densely populated. Residents live in what are called ’face- 
me-I-face-you’ single rooms with shared kitchen, bathroom and toilet facilities. In some buildings, 
these rooms can house as many as eight people. ’Some residents are very dirty and they are not 
worried about their...environments. I have often quarrelled with the residents of the house near ours 
over their dirty habits which cause blockage of the drains,’ says Caroline Oluwadare, who lives in 
Iwaya.
Starting this month, however, Lagos might just find itself turning over a new leaf. A programme 
called "Kick Against Indiscipline" (KAI) has been launched to clean up the city -  and the state in 
which it is situated, Lagos State. A similar initiative was tried in 1999, but it fell flat after residents 
complained that it was bad for business. On the days when clean up operations were scheduled, no 
company was allowed to operate during the three hours set aside for garbage collection. President 
Olusegun Obasanjo later cancelled the exercise, saying people should get into the habit of cleaning 
their own environments -  and not be forced to do so.”
Olori (14 November 2008) Environment -  Nigeria: A face-life for Lagos, IPS,
http://ipsnews.net/africa/interna.asp?idnews=21115, accessed November 2008
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Lagos awards Ikoyi and Obalande waste management to PSP
“History was made in Lagos at the launch o f a franchise deal on Ikoyi waste management and zero 
tolerance of waste last Thursday. The launch was by the Managing Director o f Lagos State Waste 
Management Authority (LAWMA), Mr. Ola Oresanya, at the Ikoyi-Obalende Local Government 
Development Council to Multi-purpose Oil Service & Supplies Ltd.
Welcoming guests to the event, the Executive Secretary o f the council, Mrs. Adeyemi Hamzat, said 
with over 17 million people and a daily waste output o f between 6,000 to 10,000 metric tonnes, the 
need for effective waste and environmental management in Lagos could not be over emphasised.
She praised Multi-purpose Oil Service and Supplies Ltd for its effort at making the axis clean and 
environmentally friendly; warning that, henceforth, cart-pushers will be arrested in and around the 
council area as their activities are illegal. Mrs. Hamzat urged residents not to patronise the cart- 
pushers so as to discourage their activities which have become a nuisance.
The Chairman, House Committee on Environment in the State House o f Assembly, Mr Shina 
Ogunkoya, spoke on the need for a healthy and aesthetically improved environment to reduce medical 
bills. He said the Assembly would work assiduously to come up with laws that will regulate waste”.
Source: The Nation, 14 October, 2008
http://www.thenationonlineng.com/dvnamicpage.asp?id=65894, accessed November 2008
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1. Introduction
From 2008 it is estimated that over half the world’s population will live in cities. In 
the continuing context of rapid urbanization, the provision of environmentally sound basic 
urban services becomes of crucial importance. In many large cities the focus is on the 
provision of water and sanitation, but adequate solid waste management is equally important 
to the health and welfare of city populations. As urban populations grow, the volume of 
waste increases, but the nature of the waste also changes as the wealth of its citizen’s 
increases. There is a fall in the proportion of organic and solid wastes, and increase in 
manufactured garbage such as plastics and paper.
In 2007, Nigeria had an estimated population of 148 million, with 70 million people 
living in urban areas, and had an urban growth rate of 3.8% per annum (World Bank, 2009). 
Only 65% of the city dwellers were estimated to have access to clean water, and 35% to 
sanitation (World Bank, 2009). Lagos, with a population of 12 million as of 2003, is amongst 
the world’s 20 largest mega-cities, and with an annual average growth rate from 1975-2000 
of over 6% which is the second highest in the world, only exceeded by Dhaka (Table 1.1, UN 
2003). Although declining, the growth rate in Lagos is predicted to remain high for the next 
15 years.
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Table 1.1: World Mega City Populations
Source: UN, 2003
Urban agglomeration Populations (Millions) Average annual rate 
of change(%)
1975 2000 2003 2015 1975-
2000
2000-
2015
Tokyo,Japan 26.6 34.4 35.0 36.2 1.03 0.33
Mexico City, Mexico 10.7 18.1 18.7 20.6 2.10 0.89
New York, USA 15.9 17.8 18.3 19.7 0.47 0.66
Mumbai, India 7.3 16.1 17.4 22.6 3.13 2.28
Delhi, India 4.4 12.4 14.1 20.9 4.13 3.47
Calcutta, India 7.9 13.1 13.8 16.8 2.02 1.68
Buenos Aires, 
Argentina
9.1 12.6 13.0 14.6 1.28 0.97
Shanghai, China 11.4 12.9 12.8 12.7 0.48 -0.12
Jakarta, Indonesia 4.8 11.0 12.3 17.5 3.31 3.08
Los Angeles, USA 8.9 11.8 12.0 12.9 1.12 0.59
Dhaka, Bangladeshi 2.2 10.2 11.6 19.9 6.17 3.78
Osaka Kobe, Japan 9.8 11.2 11.2 11.4 0.50 0.11
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 7.6 10.8 11.2 12.4 1.43 0.90
Karachi, Pakistan 4.0 10.0 11.1 16.2 3.69 3.18
Beijing, china 8.5 10.8 10.8 11.1 0.95 0.13
Cairo, Egypt 6.4 10.4 10.8 13.1 1.92 1.55
Moscow, Russia 7.6 10.1 10.5 10.9 1.13 0.53
Metro Manila, 
Philippines
5.0 10.0 10.4 12.6 2.75 1.59
Lagos, Nigeria 1.9 8.7 10.1 17.0 6.09 4.51
Within the city of Lagos, and nationally in Nigeria, there have been decades of
debates over the effective management of waste collection. Following the collapse of
colonial rule in 1960, the City entered a phase of rapid expansion growing from a population
of 1.9 million in 1975 to its current 17.2 million people 2006 (Muse, 2007). Privatisation of
the waste collection service in the 1980s largely failed due to corrupt government and
mismanagement of finances, and it was replaced by a myriad of small-scale operators known
locally as cart-pushers who became the main service provider to the City. At the instigation
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of the Ministry of Environment, a second major experiment in privatisation was initiated in 
1996, and the trials and tribulations of the Private Sector Participation (PSP) Programme 
form the focus of this research.
Although reported after most of the fieldwork for this research was undertaken, the 
boxes in the introduction to this Chapter reflect many of the debates explored in depth in this 
thesis, indicating that they are still hotly debated today. Concern remains over the poor 
quality of the Lagos environment and the provision of basic urban services in Lagos city. 
Various government initiatives including early attempts at privatisation, and more aggressive 
control, have until recently failed to meet policy expectation.
Yet, poorly managed solid waste has significant adverse environmental consequences, 
which can be broadly divided into three categories:
1) Environment and health:
Unmanaged waste can have a direct negative effect on urban environments 
with long-term harmful consequences; for example pollution of water supplies, 
creation of health hazards, and greenhouse gas, emissions from landfill sites.
2) Resources:
In developing country cities, waste can absorb up to 25% of municipal 
budgets, although if properly managed waste can also be a valuable source of energy 
and secondary raw materials.
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3) Aesthetics:
Rubbish dumping often takes place by roadsides, watercourses or drainage
systems, destroying the area’s natural or built aesthetics.
1.1. Introduction to implementation
The premise of policy implementation debates is simply, if all factors required for 
successful implementation are provided from the formulation of policy, then implementation 
will meet policy objectives. Implementation debates started in the 1970’s with the break 
through book by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) on policy implementation in Washington. 
This book sought to challenge how Policy Makers at the top made their decisions and 
suggested methods of making implementation more effective from the top. Two opposing 
schools of thought developed on implementation, top-down schools and bottom-up schools 
thought. Scholars such as Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Sabatier (1993) and Van Meter 
and Van Horn (1975) in favour of the top-down approach to implementation propose that 
implementation be formulated by the Policy Makers. The main reason this school of thought 
puts forward for policy maker control of implementation is because they create the public 
policy being implemented. They are able to maintain a complete over view of the policy 
being implemented, control resources, appoint the implementing tool (public agency or 
private firm) and reduce hindrances for implementation.
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The bottom-up school of thought proposed by authors like Lipsky (1980), Winter, 
(2002), Hudson (1989) suggest that because the street-level bureaucrats (street-level 
bureaucrats are defined as the agents of Policy Makers, either public servants or private 
contractors, who implement the policy and engage directly with the End Users) deal directly 
with the targeted End Users of policy implementations they constantly have to modify the 
parameters for the process of implementation to meet local circumstances (Taylor and Kelly, 
2006). The bottom-up school of thought proposes that street-level bureaucrats should both 
influence how policy is implemented and should be involved in the actual creation of policy 
(Winter, 2002). Street-level bureaucrats often argue that the managerial approach of the top- 
down school of thought precludes managers from understanding the needs of the individual 
targeted End Users (Barrett and Fudge, 1980).
There is a third school of thought which is not examined in the literature, which is the 
school of synthesizers (Hill and Hupe, 2002). This school of thought attempts to unify both 
the top-down school of thought and the bottom-up. It attempts to do this by taking the 
advantages of both schools and using their best characteristics to improve the outcome of 
implementation. This school of thought is not examined within this thesis as it proposes a 30 
year study of the implementation process.
1.2. Implementation challenges in developing country 
cities
Since the 1970s’ implementation has been widely debated in the context of developed
countries (mainly the United States and Europe) discussed above. The debates addressed
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conditions in the developed world, and were elaborated with developed-country studies. The 
literature on implementation takes certain factors for granted, for example governments 
committed to the sustained welfare of the End Users. However, certain factors found in the 
policy formulation and implementation process in developing country cities are not found 
within developed country cities. These factors limit or negate applying the two main schools 
of thoughts discussed in this thesis to implementation in developing country cities. These 
factors are discussed in more detail in Chapters 4-9, and include: corruption; a significant role 
for informal service providers; lack of adequate resources (man power, and materials); 
inadequate governance process.
The research is situated within the literature on waste management in developing 
countries, governance, public-private partnerships and implementation theory with a focus on 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches to implementation. The thesis provides a new 
perspective on the implementation debates, which in general has been applied only to 
developed countries where they were developed. These countries do not generally have the 
characteristics of some developing countries for instance, a high incidence of corruption in 
the delivery of urban services.
1.3. Waste collection management in developing country 
cities
Waste collection management in developing countries cities has been evolving over a 
period of time. Developing country cities have gone from low levels of urbanization to high 
levels of urbanization. This has meant rapid increases in urban populations due to rural-urban
13
migration. This increase in population has meant a corresponding increase in the types of 
settlements available and the amount of waste generated within urban environments. The 
amount of waste generated within these cities have gone from quantities easily managed 
through subsistence, to quantities which Policy Makers have fallen short in meeting supply to 
demand for waste services. Many developing country cities like Lagos, Jakarta and Mumbai 
have struggled to meet the waste management demands of a continuously growing urban 
population.
In many developing country cities, waste collection management and other waste 
services are provided predominantly by the informal sector. Policy Makers in developing 
country cities have struggled to provide adequate waste collection services within their urban 
areas, although some cities such as Jakarta may spend up to a quarter of the municipal budget 
on waste collection (Klundert and Lardinios, 1995). The types and quantities of waste 
generated within the urban environment in developing country cities have affected how 
efficiently their Policy Makers have been able to supply waste collection services. The high 
quantities of organic waste that is found within generated waste as discussed in Chapter 4 has 
limited the type of equipment that can be used within these areas.
The empirical part of this thesis will focus on Lagos, a State in Nigeria. The State in 
1996 launched the Private Sector Participation (PSP) Programme to deal with its growing 
waste problem. Lagos state has a history of struggling with the implementation of waste 
policies which have often meant that the waste collected within the urban areas has ended up 
being disposed off within the urban landscape. The aim of this policy is to reverse this trend 
and for collected waste to be disposed of at designated landfill sites. This programme has
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been carried out in two phases and it is the aim of this thesis to use both Phases to evaluate 
the useful of western style implementation models in the context of developing country cities.
1.4. Structure of the dissertation
The following paragraphs summarise the order and contents of each Chapter of the 
thesis. Following a discussion of methodological approaches, with a background Chapter on 
the character of Lagos State, the literature has been divided into four Sections, looking first at 
issues in waste management in developing countries, then at governance and service delivery 
in low-income cities, next at public-private partnerships and approaches to implementation, 
and finally considering the role of the informal sector in service delivery. The final two 
substantive Chapters report on the evolution of the PSP Programme in Lagos State, drawing 
on fieldwork.
1.4.1 Methodology
Chapter 2 sets out the methodology used for this thesis. The research design can be 
broken up into four stages which are what questions to study, what data is relevant, what data 
to collect, and how to analyze the results. A methodology was needed that would enable a 
detailed analysis of implementation and the factors that affect policy implementation in 
Lagos. The methodology chosen had to be flexible to be adaptable to local conditions without 
losing its academic value. The case study methodology gave the research the flexibility that 
was needed to adapt to the data gathering environment in Lagos. Data gathering especially
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when interviewing the End User required flexibility in approaching the households, as safety 
was an important issue for the fieldwork.
1.4.2 Lagos State mega city: Politics and waste
Chapter 3 gives a brief introduction for the reader to Lagos State, exploring the 
politics, the people, the culture, traditions and the prevalent attitudes that can be expected in 
terms of waste collection management within the state. This Chapter also covers the federal 
system and state administrative system in Nigeria, to help introduce the legislative and 
decision-making process within Lagos State. The Chapter gives an overview of Lagos State 
and introduce some of the challenges in waste collection management and its policy 
implementation in a developing country city.
Chapter 3 introduces some of the characteristics of urban services such as waste 
management found in developing country cities that are not necessarily found in developed 
countries. For instance, urban population attitudes to services providers, inadequate resources 
for implementation and a high incidence of corruption at all levels. These characteristics 
affect implementation directly or indirectly in cities like Lagos but are not mentioned within 
the implementation literature.
1.4.3 Managing waste collection management in developing countries
Chapter 4 considers the particular problems and challenges of waste collection
management in developing country cities, for instance the difficulties of maintaining service
equipment. The Chapter introduces the role of governance in waste collection management
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which is more fully discussed in Chapter five. This is a general waste Chapter that explores 
waste management and its characteristics in developed and developing countries.
The differences in between the characteristics of waste, and waste management 
collection methods in developed and developing country cities are profound as answers to the 
waste problems of both types of cities must match their problems. This Chapter introduces us 
to the limitations of the implementation theory debates and their applicability to developing 
country cities.
1.5.4 Governance and service delivery: challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Lagos
Chapter 5 considers the relationship between governance and service delivery in 
Lagos State. The form of government in the State has gone in the recent past from 
authoritarian rule to democratic rule, a transition that has had a dramatic effect on relations 
between government and people. Hybrid forms of governance develop within this type of 
systems that can incorporate both democratic and authoritarian characteristics of government. 
Chapter five seeks to understand these different types of governance and understand how it 
affects implementation of policy in Lagos State. Understanding the interaction between the 
Policy Makers and the people will aid in understanding policy creation and implementation, 
which are subsequently explored through the fieldwork in Chapters 8 and 9. Characteristics 
of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa are used to explore implementation arguments.
Implementation arguments are developed in countries with stable and usually 
transparent governments. This makes it difficult to apply them to countries where the
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governments are not stable and good governance is an idea as opposed to a practised form of 
governance.
1.5.5 Private-Public Partnership: Mixed benefits in local service provision
Chapter 6 discusses the implementation literature, focussing first on the 
characteristics of different forms of Public Private Partnership. Although Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPP) in developing country cities are an increasingly popular method of service 
delivery especially for those with limited resources, the literature draws heavily on developed 
country approaches. Chapter 6 explores the implications of this literature for developing 
countries cities, as a basis for evaluating the research findings on the PPP method adopted in 
Lagos State. This Chapter also explores partnerships with small and medium sized enterprises 
in developing countries and how the implementation debates apply to partnerships of this 
size.
The impact of PPPs can have varying impacts on implementation in different 
countries. The literature on PPPs rarely take into consideration SMEs’ like those found in 
developing countries with limited resources and access to credit. They also do not consider 
partnerships with the informal sector that are sometimes responsible for the large scale 
provision of urban services in some developing country cities. This therefore limits the 
applicability of implementation literature in developing country cities as some PPPs may 
need as seen in the Lagos context to be formed with SMEs and the informal sector.
1.5.6 The informal sector: the underdogs of waste collection management
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The informal private sector is an important waste collection management service 
provider in a many developing country cities. The PPP in Lagos State impacts significantly 
on the large informal waste collection sector, which has developed in urban areas of the State 
to accommodate the need left by inadequate government services. Chapter 7 explores the 
rather limited literature on the role of the informal sector waste collectors in developing 
country cities. Implementation debates do not take the informal sector in to account as 
providers of urban services.
The informal sector in many developed country cities is viewed as illegal. In 
developing country cities, they can be a vital source of urban services. Implementation 
literature however does not acknowledge this sector within their theories, thereby reducing 
their applicability in the area o f urban services in some developing country cities.
1.5.7 Lagos State w aste collection management: Introducing the Lagos PSP 
Programme: Phase I PSP program
Chapter 8 deals with Phase I of the Lagos State Private Sector Participation (PSP) 
program. This Chapter looks at the policy as it was initially designed and implemented 
covering the period from 1996-2004. This Chapter will help to understand the 
implementation process in waste collection managment in Lagos State. It also serves as 
background analysis for Phase II of the Lagos State PSP Programme which is discussed in 
Chapter 9. This phase of the implemenation of the PSP waste collection policy allows us to 
apply the implemetation theories and observe where they fall short in the case of Lagos state 
waste collection.
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1.5.8 PSP redesigned: Phase II
Chapter 9 looks at how the implementation process of the PSP Programme evolved 
from Phase I. The implementation process in phase two of the PSP Programme changed in 
Phase II. Chapter nine looks at the conditions which mitigated the change and the effect it 
had on the Lagos State PSP programme. The PSP waste policy has been reviewed and more 
factors have been introduced to make the policy more efficient. However the thesis argues 
there are still elements within the implementation process not catered for within 
implementation theories for instance, corruption. This limits the applicability of the theories 
to the Lagos context.
1.5.9 Conclusion
Chapter 10 is the conclusion of the thesis. It looks at the findings from the data 
analyzed and draws conclusions from it, then returning to the research questions and 
hypothesis. This Chapter has three major findings and proposes further areas of research 
related to developing country cities.
1.6 Academic Value
The academic value of this thesis is threefold.
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1) This thesis looks at service delivery and implementation in a developing country city. 
Very few implementation studies are set in developing country cities, as in the past 
most have been carried out in the past have covered in western Europe or North 
America - for instance see Sabatier (1993); Pressman and Wildavsky (1983); Hill and 
Hupe, (2002); Barrett and Fudge (1981); Winter (2002). This thesis thus presents an 
academic opportunity to study implementation within a city with different 
characteristics to most existing research. It is important to understand implementation 
in developing country cities where the governance, power relations and financing 
mechanism are different to those of the developed world. Based on western 
parameters, it is easy to say that implementation is not working or has not been 
properly constructed. In examining the literature and carrying out the case study, a 
fundamental factor that emerges is that in developing country cities such as Lagos, 
policy and implementation processes are created differently due to the characteristics 
of the State/End User relationship. And for this reason, it is important for there to be 
an academic insight into implementation in developing country cities like Nigeria to 
add to the general body of knowledge.
2) This thesis looks at implementation from the perspective of different urban actors. It
first considers the view of Policy Makers who form the top-down aspect of
implementation debates. It also examines the middle men who interact with and are
directly affected by decisions made at the top and by the behaviour at the bottom of
the implementation sphere. An important contribution of this thesis is that it also
covers the End Users including households in upper and middle class areas, and lower
income households in Lagos’ many slums. For example, the end use End Users
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refusal to cooperate during Phase I of the PSP Programme made implementation 
highly unsuccessful as discussed in Chapter eight.
3) In carrying out the field work for this research, circumstances were encountered 
which were not necessarily unique to Lagos, but not commonly found in western 
societies, so the methodology that has been devised provides opportunities for other 
researchers to circumvent data gathering difficulties and still acquire the required data 
for research. In particular, interviewing the household members (End Users) proved to 
be a challenge, due to the defensive layout and walls around many properties in richer 
areas, and lack of security in slum areas. The methodological approach is discussed in 
Chapter 2.
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2. Theoretical Field and Methodology
In order to understand public policy implementation within a developing country city 
like Lagos, it is important that an investigation be carried out. This investigation should begin 
from a history of the problem being investigated, the policies which have been created in the 
State in the past to tackle the problem and the results of past implementation attempts. It is 
also important not to view the city or its problem in isolation but to compare it to other cities 
with similar characteristics and problems to enhance the thesis understanding of the problem.
This broader understanding of how implementation works within these countries will 
then aid in testing the hypothesis within this thesis that western style implementation models 
are not applicable or directly transferable to developing country cities. In order to achieve 
this, a deeper understanding will need to be developed in implementation in developing 
country cities and the unique factors which affect it.
Methodology is a vital component of research in organizing the study and gathering 
information. It is also necessary to ascertain factors and actors within the policy being 
investigated and determine how they directly or indirectly affect the achievement of policy 
objectives. This will enable us to further test the hypothesis being examined within this 
thesis. This Chapter is structured into three parts. The first Section covers the theoretical 
background of the thesis hypothesis. The second Section covers the actors and their role with 
the PSP Programme. The third part of the Chapter covers the, research strategy, data 
gathering methods, and how they were applied in the field.
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2. Topic
The policy chosen for evaluation in this thesis is the Private Sector Participation 
(PSP) Programme of Lagos state, Nigeria. This policy is designed to improve waste 
collection management and fill the gap of the shortfall in formal waste collection service 
provision within Lagos State Nigeria. This policy was chosen for two reasons:
1) The Lagos State PSP Programme presented a unique opportunity to observe and 
examine the two schools of thought in implementation in a developing country 
setting. Most studies on implementation done previously in the past have centred in 
European and North American settings which have similar characteristics in how 
policies are created and implemented and the actors which surround them, based on 
an assumption of reasonably transparent and comprehensive provision of government 
services, and reliable data of the outcome of policy. The Lagos setting has 
characteristics not found in the European and North Americans settings, in particular 
less well-established systems of governance, which makes it an ideal location to test 
the relevance of the arguments on implementation in a developing country setting.
2) While the PSP Programme in Lagos is a relatively new policy, it had been 
implemented for fourteen years and had undergone two phases by the time the 
fieldwork was undertaken. This period of time allowed for an effective overview of 
the impacts to be observed by the researcher, as suggested as important by Spillane, 
Reiser and Reimer (2002).
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The data collection covered a period of eleven weeks (eight weeks in 2007 and three 
weeks in 2008). The data collection process encompassed six different urban actors, an 
important approach as indicated by Testa and Coleman, (2006). These included State Policy 
Makers; local governments; monitoring agents; PSP Contractors; informal sector operators; 
and households (referred to in this thesis as ‘End Users’). These groups have been selected to 
give the researcher a comprehensive view of the way that implementation of waste collection 
policies function within the state.
1. State Policy Makers
The respondents of this group were identified by enquiring from the Ministry of 
Environments (MoE) and Lagos State Waste Management Authority (LAWMA) about the 
main participants in the creation of the PSP Programme. This group represent the Policy 
Makers, a key top-down group.
2. Local Government Ministry of Environment (MoE)
This group were chosen because they represent a mid-way point between the Policy
Makers and the End Users. At the time of the interviews, the Victoria Island Local
Government’s Ministry of Environment had acquired the backing of LAWMA to deal
directly with the PSPs working in their local government area. This department has no direct
influence on the creation of policy within the state, but did however serve as an extra
monitoring agency separate from the MoE. The Local Government Authority (LGA) MoE
were chosen on the basis of the LGA visited had the PSP service and an active MoE
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department. Their role aids the street-level bureaucrats in carrying out their tasks as they aid 
enforcement.
3. Monitoring agency
The monitoring agency respondent was selected by the MoE officials as the individual 
who had the greatest experience and had just been promoted to the head of the monitoring 
department. He was able to give information from both the administrative and field 
perspectives. Monitoring is put forward by both the top-down (Sabatier, 1993) and the 
bottom-up perspectives (Hogwood and Gunn, 1993) as an essential aspect of successful 
implementation.
4. Private Sector Participants
The respondents interviewed in this group were identified with the help of LAWMA 
officials who identified respondents who have been contracting for the MoE since the PSP 
Programme began in 1996, because they would possess a broader experience of 
implementation in the State than Contractors who had recently joined the programme. The 
bottom-up school of thought views those who interact directly with the End Users as the most 
important actors in successful implementation (Winter, 2004).
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5. Informal sector
These respondents were chosen because they used to be the main waste service 
providers for waste collection services in the state prior to introduction of the PSP 
Programme, which made them illegal. They represent an ousted implementing service and are 
viewed as key participants in terms of the bottom-up approach (Fahmi, 2005), although many 
cart pushers still operate in parts of Lagos. Three group interviews were carried out with cart- 
pushers, and the aim was to attempt to meet cart-pushers who had been in the informal waste 
collection sector since 1996, to investigate the claim that the Policy Makers had tried to form 
partnerships with cart-pushers to deliver waste collection services.
6. End Users
The End Users are a key part of the PSP Programme as they are expected to both use 
and largely pay for the service. The way in which they respond to the policy will go a long 
way towards the MoE and LAWMA Policy Makers realizing their policy objectives.
2.1. Theoretical field being investigated
The theoretical field being investigated as introduced in Section l.l  and 1.2 is the 
school of thought on policy implementation. The term ‘policy implementation’ relates to 
how policy is created and implemented. The analysis investigates who the main actors are in
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the policy process and how to ensure that implementation has at least a semblance to policy 
objectives.
2.2. What is implementation?
Mazmannian and Sabatier (1989), define implementation as;
“The carrying out o f a basic policy decision, usually incorporated within a statute but 
which can also take the form o f an important executive order or court decision. Ideally 
that decision identifies the problem(s) to be addressed, stipulates the objective(s) to be 
pursued, and, in a variety o f ways, ‘structures ’ the implementation process. The process 
normally runs through a number o f stages beginning with passage o f the basic statue, 
followed by the policy output o f  the implementation agency, the compliance o f target 
groups with those decisions, the actual impacts -  both intended and unintended -  o f those 
out puts, the perceived impacts o f agency decisions and finally important revisions (or 
attempted revisions) in the basic statue. ”
Implementation simply means to put something or a process into effect according to, 
or by means of, a definite plan or procedure. In this regard, ‘policy implementation’ can be 
interpreted to mean ‘putting into effect public policy through an agreed method’. Some 
scholars of policy implementation have attempted to separate the policy formulation process 
from the implementation process, dividing them into two distinct processes (Rein and 
Rabinovitz, 1977; Matland, 1995). They generally regarded policy creation as guidelines 
from Policy Makers for the implementing agencies to use for administrative purposes (Rein
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and Rabinovitz, 1977). This view has been greatly discounted by both proponents of the top- 
down and bottom-up schools of thought as not being a holistic view of policy creation and its 
implementation (O’Toole, 2000).
Implementation and policy creation is viewed as intrinsic to a successful outcome of 
intended goals. The general consensus between most scholars of implementation is that 
policy creation and implementation are inherently linked and the policy process does not end 
when the implementation process commences (Bardach, 1977; McLaughlin, 1975). Bardach 
(1977) argues that the policy and implementation process is a continuously interacting 
process. Majone and Wildavsky (1978) advocate that implementing bodies should not have 
the power of ability to change the content of policy during implementation. They also 
advocate that policy and implementation are intrinsically linked, with lessons learnt during 
implementation used to strengthen the scope and content of policy. Policy creation leads to 
implementation, however, implementation leads to policy evolution as aims and objectives 
may change to better accommodate changing needs (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989; 
Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984).
The main actors contributing to policy implementation can be divided into three 
central groups: (Policy Makers), implementing agencies (public or private) and the End 
Users. The policy-maker perspective involves how efficiently they are controlling the 
implementing agencies, the result of which is judged by the reaction of the End Users to the 
policy (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989). The yard stick used by the Policy Makers is carried 
out by how well the policy objectives are met and the reasons for success or shortfall in the 
implementation process.
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The main focus of implementation studies is to evaluate how programmes have 
achieved or not, their policy objectives. The criteria employed can either be focused on the 
outputs or outcomes of policy. This would usually begin by examining the goals and 
objectives of the Policy Makers (Van Horn and Van Meter, 1975). These goals and objectives 
could be defined either by Policy Makers or by the courts ordering action from the Policy 
Makers. This will set the yard stick for the re-evaluation of goals during the implementation 
process and at the end of the policy life span (Sabatier, 1986). A cost benefit analysis tool 
could also be employed where the cost of the programme (and who pays for it) is weighed 
against benefit to the End Users and achievement of policy objectives. The cost benefit could 
also be weighed against public sector provision and provision for the same services from the 
private sector (Hill and Hupe, 2006; Ingram and Mann, 1980).
A secondary focus of implementation analysis could be the output or outcome of 
policy (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989). Some implementation authors are concerned mainly 
with how implementation agencies meet the policy objectives of the Policy Makers. This is a 
highly limited view as some Policy Makers may simply aim to deliver a service with other 
mitigating factors affecting the service being ignored by the authors. However, most scholars 
of implementation like Sabatier (1993), Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, 1984), and Bardach 
(1977) advocate that implementation analysis should encompass both policy objectives, 
intended and unexpected outcomes and negative consequences of policies implemented.
The public or private agencies on the other hand being used to implement policy will
judge the result of the implementation by how well they managed the disruptions from
outside Policy Makers to their normal work routines. For example, how the insertion of
policy from the Policy Makers aided or disrupted their ability to provide their mandated
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services have been studied by Mazmanian and Sabatier, (1989); Browning, Marshall and Tab, 
(1981), and the coping mechanisms developed by street-level bureaucrats (Street level 
bureaucrats are the agents of government public servants or private contractors tasked with 
implementing policy and usually interact directly with the End Users) in order to carry out 
their mandated tasks have been analyzed by Lipsky, (1980) and Winter, (2002).
Finally, the effects on End Users can be considered as the yardstick against which 
implementation is gauged. The effect felt of the policy implementation on End Users can give 
a fair idea of the impact of the policy (Hill and Hupe, 2006). The first criteria for this group 
would be if the service was actually delivered to them. The second criteria for evaluating the 
benefits or disbenefits for this group are to understand what conditions necessitate their need 
for the policy. For instance, with education policies targeted at the most vulnerable students, 
what puts the child in this category and is it possible for the child to join the main student 
body or will the child remain in this group? A positive effect for this group will increase their 
participation in education, while a negative effect however will achieve reduced or non­
participation (Matland, 1995). The two main focuses for most implementation studies 
however, have been the Policy Makers and the implementing agencies for the policies, with 
little or no attention paid to policy recipients (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989).
2.3. Top-down school of Implementation
Top-down implementation can be described as the ability of Policy Makers to control 
the implementation of policy. This perspective is usually strong in giving prescriptive advice
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to Policy Makers (Matland, 1995). It is also viewed as the influence of central government 
policy on implementation or as a pyramid with the Policy Makers at the top of the pyramid 
and the street-level bureaucrats at the bottom (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989; Caimey, 
2009). The relationships could be as simple as a waste agency telling its collection staff how 
to collect waste and it could be as complex as state legislators trying to implement a waste 
policy which requires the input of the environmental ministry, the waste agency, the ministry 
for commerce and the ministry for roads and transport (for an example). In countries like 
America, some policies have been sent to institutions for implementation from the Federal 
appellate courts (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989).
Top-down implementation sets out preconditions which are applied in Chapters 8 and 
9 of empirical study for this thesis. While no process is given on how to accomplish 
implementation, these preconditions from Mazmanian and Sabatier, (1986) are suggested as 
necessary for implementation to meet policy aims and objectives. Caimey, (2004) and Marsh 
and Rhodes (1992) list these as skilled and committed official, clear and consistent 
objectives, support form sovereigns and key actors, adequate causal theory, strong legal 
backing, stable economy which are further discussed below;
2.3.1. Skilful and committed officials:
The policy to be implemented usually has an implementing arm selected by the Policy
Makers. The selected implementing agency needs to be committed to the policy objectives
(Hill and Hupe, 2002; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). They must have the skills required to
implement the policy and a desire, personal or otherwise to see that implementation of the
policy gets the required resources within their level of authorization (Sabatier, 1986). These
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consist of two parts, first, the importance of the policy to the implementer and second the 
ability of the street-level bureaucrat to go beyond his/her mandate to realize the objectives of 
the policy (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1983). The level of discretion afforded to the street- 
level bureaucrats from the policy also affects how the policy is implemented. The attitude of 
the street-level bureaucrats to the policy can also be affected by personal values, religious 
beliefs, normal working parameters, and external support from politicians and interest groups 
(Lipsky, 1971; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989). The continued support for the policy will 
depend on how inclusive the Policy Makers are able to make the street-level bureaucrats, and 
interest groups feel in the attainment of policy objectives.
2.3.2. Clear and Consistent objectives
The stipulation of objectives and its clarity is viewed as an important aspect of policy 
implementation. This is because policy states what is expected of the implementers and 
provides the implementers with the tools to achieve policy goals (Van Meter and Van Horn, 
1975). These objectives are usually stipulated within statute or law. The stipulation of 
objectives within law or statute gives the policy the legal backing required by implementers 
to carry out their work (Sabatier, 1986). Thus allowing Policy Makers have the tools required 
to monitor and evaluate implementation. This also gives the implementers the basic standards 
for which their work will be judged.
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2.3.3. Support from sovereigns and key actors
The sovereigns here are the creators of the policy to be implemented and the 
politicians. They include the executive arm of government, legislative arm and heads of 
institution (Sabatier, 1986). They control the resources and legislation which are allocated to 
policy after they have been created. They are also usually the instigators of policy. 
Sovereigns support policy objectives through four avenues; The first is the amount of micro 
managing provided to the street-level bureaucrats, the second being provision of adequate 
resources, the third being ability to handle dissent within the ranks and lastly, the amount of 
conflict which arises between new policy and ongoing policy (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 
1986; Caimey, 2009). The sovereigns also need to be politically astute in order to generate 
political support from other sovereigns who could have an interest (positive or negative). 
They must also be able to convince the targeted End Users of the policy that it is in their best 
interest and acquire their support (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979; Kendal, 2006).
Some agencies can sometimes find themselves in a situation where they have more 
than one sovereign to whom they are answerable too and who are pursuing different policies. 
The street-level bureaucrats in these instances will usually engage with the Policy Maker with 
the most resources (Caimey, 2009). Sovereigns can however, affect the change they require 
through legal and financial oversight as well as inserting themselves into the implementation 
process.
Desire for the implementation of policy isn’t sufficient for policy implementation to 
meet policy objectives. The sovereigns must also be willing to provide the necessary 
resources for the policy to be implemented and if it is necessary, take a personal role in the
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implementation of the policy and monitor the policy closely (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989; 
Bardach, 1977; Sabatier, 1975).
The implementers and Policy Makers must also make the effort to continuously 
generate public support for the policy from both sovereigns and the major actors involved or 
affected by the policy (Sabatier, 1986). This will go some way in ensuring that the policy gets 
the resources it needs to achieve its objectives.
2.3.4. Adequate causal theory
In the creation of policy, the causal linkages and principal factors which will affect 
the policy must be identified (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; 1984; Sabatier and 
Mazmanian, 1983). During the creation of the policy, an adequate assessment of target 
groups should be made in order to judge how they will respond to the policy. This gives the 
Policy Makers a fair idea of the type of legislation that will be required for the 
implementation of the policy. The Policy Makers need to incorporate a theory of how they 
intend to achieve the social change that the policy is aimed at introducing or correcting within 
the target groups. Sabatier and Mazmanian (1989) believe that if the implementers are given 
adequate authority and instruments to carry out their mandate, they could be able to establish 
or disprove the causal theory (Sabatier, 1986). Gunn (1978) specifies that the policy to be 
implemented must be structured around sufficiently centred action and consequence in order 
to try to achieve policy goals (Kendal, 2006). Technical competence and support from the 
target End Users are essential for causal theory to have a practical effect on implemented 
policy (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979; Bardach, 1977).
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2.3.5. Changes in socioeconomic conditions
The socioeconomic conditions of any society can have a direct or indirect impact on 
the implementation of policy. Stability of the society’s socioeconomic condition will usually 
mean that the policy can be implemented without much trouble. For instance, resources will 
not be diverted from the policy to meet other more pressing societal needs (Sabatier, 2002; 
Hill and Hupe, 2002). However, a change for the worse in the socioeconomic fabric can mean 
that some policies will lose or not attain the resources which they require for implementation. 
It could also mean that the policy could find itself shelved or discontinued completely 
especially where a loss of political support has resulted from the socioeconomic problem 
(Sabatier, 1986).
Over time, conflicting policies could be created, which could undermine 
implementation. The social need which required the creation of the policy could change or 
not exist anymore, which would undermine the need the need for the policy. The political 
rhetoric which led to the creation of the policy could have shifted to another policy or 
political bias could arise against the policy (Kendal, 2006).
2.3.6. Implementation process legally structured to enhance compliance
The legal structure which backs the policy can enhance or retard the implementation of 
the policy. The legislation can include veto powers, sanctions and incentives to remove 
implementation obstacles. It can also assign a policy to its choice of implementing agency 
and give the policy priority over other policies (Sabatier, 2002; Pressman and Wildavsky,
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1973; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1986 and 1993). The strength of the legal backing of the 
policy grounds the policy into the state or federal statute (depending on the society) making 
the policy stronger and more effective. This is mainly because the implementers are given 
more legal powers and it is easier to prosecute offenders making implementation more 
efficient. The statue or policy must be unambiguous in its directives, and the policy must be 
formed in such a manner as to maximize compliance within the target groups (Bardach, 1977; 
Kendal, 2006). The importance of statue within policy implementation cannot be 
overestimated especially within the top-down models of implementation as the Policy Makers 
have the greatest control over this aspect of implementation (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989).
2.4. Top-down implementation policy conceptual 
framework
Efficient implementation analysis must a) be fully aware of the societal characteristics 
within which the implementation is occurring, b) understand the areas within which policy 
formulators and their implementers can effect change within implementation, and c) accept 
that cross over social and institutional issues cannot be effortlessly influenced through current 
practices (Van Horn and Van Meter, 1975).
A critical objective of implementation analysis is identifying factors as they affect the 
accomplishing of policy objectives during the implementation process. These factors as listed 
by Sabatier and Mazmanian, (1989) can be classified as;
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1) Tractability of the problem: Social problems have varying degrees of difficulty in 
proffering solutions to deal with them. For instance the reduction of noise pollution 
could be easier for Policy Makers to deal with than the safe generation of electricity 
from nuclear energy (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989). This has to do with the level of 
technical knowledge and resources required dealing with both problems. In the 
former, the solution is clearer and more straight forward in its requirements while the 
other is more cumbersome (Sabatier, 1991). In terms of co-operation form target 
groups, it would be easier to get compliance as minimal change in behaviour could be 
required from them. Communication of what is expected of the target groups on the 
latter problem and the resources required for its implementation could make it more 
difficult to implement. This could be further complicated by the need for multi­
agency implementation (Caimey, 2009).
2) The ability of the Policy Makers to create an implementation process which is 
difficult to alter. Policy Makers can structure the policy in such a manner as to leave 
the street level bureaucrats with little room to deviate from main policy objectives. 
The policy structure can be used to choose which agency or public body will be 
utilized within the implementation process and who can be legally included within 
implementation (Sabatier, 1991). This can be done by prejudicing the policy direction 
of agency officials through strict regulation on external participants introduced into 
the implementation process. In short, the Policy Makers can use policy, creation of 
legislation and financial resources to direct policy implementation (Caimey, 2009).
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3) Political variables being in line with the statutory objectives. The commitment of the 
implementing agency is required in order for policy implementation to meet policy 
objectives. The Policy Makers can control to an extent the level of commitment of the 
implementing agency. For instance, an agency that has the same objectives as the 
policy created can be assigned by Policy Makers to implement the policy. An agency 
could be created specifically to implement a particular policy, making the policy the 
agency’s only or main priority (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989).
Top-down implementation proposes that the central government or the Policy Makers are 
the most powerful tools for the implementation of policy. The Policy Makers are able to put 
into motion policy that will have a lasting durability on the social problem to be tackled 
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Bardach, 1977).
2.5. Top-down critiques
The top-down school of thought has come under strong criticism from the proponents’ 
of the bottom-up school of thought. These criticisms have included the misplacement of 
power for the decision makers. It has also included a purposely diminished role for other 
actors within the implementation process. And finally the evaluation of policy in favour of 
Policy Makers at the expense of the street-level bureaucrats (Hjem and Hull, 1982; Barrett 
and Fudge, 1981; and Elmore, 1978, 1979). The following are some of the major criticism of 
the top-down school of thought:
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1) Assumption that Policy Makers are the principal actors in the implementation process. 
This assumption constricts the view of the evaluator of an implementation policy and 
allows them to over look contributions to implementation from the street-level 
bureaucrats and the private sector (Hjem and Hull, 1982; Barrett and Fudge, 1981; 
and Elmore, 1978, 1979).
2) In the case of policies which are created through multi agency collaboration with no 
dominant policy, the top-down model becomes difficult or cumbersome to apply. The 
ability of the top-down school of thought is very limited in its ability to predict the 
outcome of complex multi agency policy implementation even with the use of 
inadequate causal theory and poor hierarchical integration (Sabatier, 1986).
3) The street-level bureaucrats’ role and function are most likely to be underestimated by 
the top-down school of thought. The coping mechanisms used by this group for policy 
implementation has a significant impact on the outcome of implementation. The target 
groups are also likely to be ignored even though this group can be quite ingenious in 
circumventing the legislation which backs policy (Weatherly and Lipsky, 1977; 
Elmore, 1978; Berman, 1978).
4) Some top-down models of implementation distinguish between the policy formulation 
process and policy implementation. This distinction can often neglect those policies 
which are created with the input of the street-level bureaucrats and target groups. The 
critics say it is preferable to concentrate on the actions and reactions that stem from
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the policy and implementation process than to try to distinguish the policy process 
from the implementation process. This is because in the case of some policies, as 
implementation is occurring, the policy is being modified to achieve the policy 
objectives (Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Hjem and Hull, 1982; Hjem, 1982).
5) The importance of legal structuring can sometimes be over emphasized by the top- 
downers. It is argued by the bottom-uppers that while legal structuring is important in 
the introduction of policy, some legal institutions have varying powers which affect 
their ability to enforce statute. The manner in which the institution to which 
implementation is tasked will also make it more difficult for Policy Makers outside of 
the organization to control street-level bureaucrat behaviour (Hjem, 1982).
2.6. Bottom-up school of thought
The bottom-up school of thought in contrast to the top-down school of thought starts 
its implementation methodology from the street-level bureaucrats and the actors which are 
involved in the actual delivery of service (Hjem and Hull, 1982; Hjem, 1982; Hjem and 
Porter, 1985, 1993). Some bottom-up approaches start from local networks who deliver the 
policy services. This network is then used as a platform to identify the local regional and 
national networks that participate in the delivery of policy implementation through planning 
and execution (Lipsky, 1980). This gives the researcher the different levels of policy 
implementation, starting from the bottom-up (street-level bureaucrats) to the top, the Policy
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Makers. This essentially turns the top-down hierarchy upside down (Hjem et al., 1978; Hjem 
and Porter, 1981; Hjem and Hull, 1985).
The bottom-up school of thought views policy implementation as a decentralized 
process. This school of thought believes the input from the street-level bureaucrats and their 
agency(ies) have a greater input in the implementation of policy due to the amount of 
discretion they are afforded in carrying out their assigned roles (Hjem and Porter, 1981; 
Lipsky, 1980; Long and Franklin, 2004). Lipsky argues that the street-level bureaucrats have 
to show a measure of discretion within their roles in order to implement public policies. The 
street-level bureaucrats have to administer the policy on case by case bases as End User 
needs varies within their interpretation of the policy being administered. They need to be able 
to administer the policies in some cases with insufficient resources and guidance from Policy 
Makers or even with the existence of a conflicting policy (Lipsky, 1980; Taylor and Kelly, 
2006).
Policy implementation is argued by proponents of the bottom-up school of thought
occurs at the macro implementation with the Policy Makers and the micro implementation
level with the street-level bureaucrats (Matland, 1995). Due to this factor, there is little
opportunity for policy implementation to be standardized across the board (Matland, 1995;
Winter, 2006). The environmental factors can have a dominant effect on the policy, allowing
for Policy Makers to have very little control over the implementation of the policy. It is
hypothesized by the bottom-uppers that if the street-level bureaucrats are not given enough
discretion to adapt the policy to prevailing conditions on the ground, the policy is likely to
fall short of policy expectations (Matland, 1995; Palumbo, Maynard-Moody and Wright,
1984). It is further argued that what drives the actors which include goals, strategies and
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actors must be understood for implementation to have a chance of succeeding (Matland, 
1995). The mitigating factors in the actions of street-level bureaucrats must be understood to 
predict the policies outcome (Weatherly and Lipsky, 1977). Hjem (1982) argues that the 
policies created by the Policy Makers rarely meet local demands. He argues that for 
implementation to have even a semblance of policy objectives, it must be adapted by the 
street-level to meet local needs (Hjem, 1982).
The bottom-up perspective, then moves on to evaluate the coping methods developed 
by the street-level bureaucrats in the execution of the roles. The bottom-up school of thought 
argues that the street-level bureaucrats have to develop means of coping with their work in 
order to deliver their service and achieve stated policy objectives (Taylor and Kelly, 2006; 
Lipsky, 1980). This perspective allows for the evaluation of the difficulties encountered by 
the street-level bureaucrats. It also expands on the importance of the street-level bureaucrats 
within the environment which they are being implemented (Hanf, 1982). Winter (2002), 
regards the street-level bureaucrats as the most important actors within the policy process, 
going as far as to say that policies are just paper without the street-level bureaucrats to 
implement them (Winter, 2002). The discretion afforded to the street-level bureaucrats 
dictates how they perform their role. The End Users targeted by policy seldom read or (in 
some instances) have access to the policies implemented and usually leam all they know 
about the policy from the street-level bureaucrats (Winter, 2002; Lipsky, 1980).
Three crucial elements of discretion have been identified by the bottom-uppers;
1) Rule discretion: This discretion has boundaries within statue, resource or institutional
constraints. These rules give the street-level bureaucrat a clear focus on what is
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required from the Policy Makers either in statute or rules and regulations. The amount 
of rules available within the policy being implemented will dictate the amount of 
discretion available to the street-level bureaucrats. The method of testing and 
interpreting of the rules however by the street-level bureaucrats will also influence the 
amount of discretion available to them (Taylor and Kelly, 2006).
2) Value discretion: This is usually determined by the individual street-level bureaucrats’ 
idea of equity, fairness and justice. These notions can be constrained by with 
professional or organisational code of ethics such as those affected by doctors 
(Hippocratic Oath). Discretion is left to the professional as they are generally 
expected to make value judgements based on their training knowledge and experience 
within their professions (Lipsky, 1980).
3) Task discretion: This is usually prescribed by the organization in regards to individual 
client cases. This type of discretion has a higher level of managerial monitoring 
especially when there are strict targets to be met by the street-level bureaucrats. 
However, the street-level bureaucrats can still operate with some level of discretion in 
order to accomplish their tasks (Lipsky, 1980).
Lipsky (1980) identifies three key issues which allow the street-level bureaucrats 
discretion within their roles.
1) Understanding client needs and using their discretion within available policy to meet 
those needs.
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2) Increase in managerial approach due to service decentralization.
3) Self monitoring professionals who may work in isolation from others. The motivation 
of the professionals which could be self serving i.e. professional advancement. This 
encourages the street-level bureaucrats to use their discretion to interpret the policy to 
suit their needs.
There is a need however, to mitigate the amount of discretion afforded to street-level 
bureaucrats and make them more accountable for their actions (Taylor and Kelly, 2006; 
Winter, 2006).
2.7. Bottom-up critiques
A major criticism of the bottom-up school of thought is that there is little 
accountability. Especially within democratic systems where sovereigns are accountable to the 
voters. It is argued that allowing control over implementation to reside with the street-level 
bureaucrats, then control is taken away from the voting electorate who would hold (all things 
being equal) the elected representative to account over implementation decisions. This 
control is severely limited if implementation resides with the street-level bureaucrats 
(Matland, 1995; Sabatier, 1986). As most street-level bureaucrats are public servants and not 
elected officials, and some have the option of discretion when interacting with clients, a 
measure of control is required to keep the street-level bureaucrats within the boundaries of 
their mandate (Linder and Peters, 1987).
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The street-level bureaucrats should be allowed greater discretion in situations where 
their goals and objectives are the sarnie as or in-line with those put forward by the Policy 
Makers. When the goals and objectives of the Policy Makers are not in sync, reduced 
flexibility should be given to the street-level bureaucrats as the differences in goals and 
objectives could lead to a poorer performance of the policy than intended by the Policy 
Makers (March and Simon, 1958; Maitland, 1995). This is because the street-level bureaucrats 
if given too much discretion could address their own goals and agendas at the expense of 
policy goals and objectives (Matland, 1995; Kendal, 2006).
The second critique of the bottom-up school of thought is the amount of weight given 
to the amount of local independence the street-level bureaucrats have. A heavy reliance in 
some studies is given to the perceptions of the street-level bureaucrats; with little emphasis on 
external factors not registered by the street-level bureaucrats as these are not factored into 
their arguments (Sabatier, 1986; Matland, 1995). Policy Makers rarely intervene in specific 
cases; they can structure the goals and objectives of the policy to cover the general needs of 
the target population (Matland, 1995; Sabatier, 1996). Sabatier, (1986) argues that the 
structure given to the policy allows gives the End Users the ability to challenge (or not) 
policies which affect them.
A third critique of the bottom-up perspective is that some authors exclude policy
goals and objectives as a valid evaluation measure (Winter, 2003). The analysis of these
authors such as Elmore (1982) departs from the overall problem that policy was created to
intervene such as youth unemployment and focuses more on the tasks of the street-level
bureaucrat such as getting specific youths into work (Winter, 2003; 2006). The methodology
employed by the bottom-up school of thought can be quite cumbersome and confusing as
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some authors attempt to map all the actors which may have cause to interact with the street- 
level bureaucrats involved in the implementation of a specific policy. For instance, in the 
study of youth unemployment, examining schools and training facilities, business which offer 
internships, social organizations in charge of children, ethnic minority organizations (Hjem 
and Hull, 1982). The analysis can become quite cumbersome as the author attempts to cross 
organizational borders in an attempt to create a more holistic view of the study (Winter 
2003).
Fourthly, bottom-uppers assume that the street-level bureaucrats have the ability to 
always frustrate the Policy Makers (Sabatier, 1986). They are quick to judge only the centres 
direct influence over the street-level bureaucrats with little regard for the centres indirect 
influence over the institutions of the street-level bureaucrats (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982). For 
instance, Policy Makers or the centre usually control resource allocations to the bottom 
(street-level bureaucrats and their institutions) and this can be used to frustrate the bottom 
into towing centre lines (Sabatier, 1986; Bardach, 1977).
Top-down proponents, generally criticize the ability of the street-level bureaucrats to 
influence the decisions made by Policy Makers. The bottom-up arguments limits the centres 
ability to influence institutional operations (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982). The bottom-up school 
of thought neglect how implementing agencies are selected and how resources which are 
used in the implementation process are allocated (Sabatier, 1986). This it is argued, gives the 
Policy Makers more control over the street-level bureaucrats than the bottom-up school of 
thought allow within their arguments (Sabatier, 1986; 1993).
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The bottom-up school of thought reduces the importance of adequate legislation in the 
implementation of policy (Sabatier, 1986). While the bottom-up school of thought put 
forward that legislation can be used by the street-level bureaucrats to implement policy, they 
do not query how or why the legislation was created (Sabatier, 1993; Bardach, 1977).
The bottom-up school of thought usually fail to give a holistic view of the entire policy 
process as they mainly focus on the results of certain street-level bureaucrats and their 
networks. This limits it application with policies which are instigated at the centre and cover 
more than one area of jurisdiction or local area (Caimey, 2009).
Finally, some bottom-up theories commences from the actions and the insights of the 
street-level bureaucrats, there is a very strong possibility that the factors which affect the 
conduct will be missed by the bottom-up school of thought. The ability to identify participant 
networks within the policy needs to be linked to the causal theory surrounding the policy and 
the actions of the street-level bureaucrats (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Sabatier, 1986).
2.8. Comparing the top-down and bottom-up schools of 
thought
The literature on implementation gives the two of the main schools of thought 
developed so far. The top-down from its policy or statutory stand point and the bottom-up 
from its street-level and bureaucratic stand point. Both schools of thought have very valid 
points in regards to policy implementation. However, when the type of policy, the area of 
implementation and external factors to the policy is considered, one school of thought might
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have greater applicability than the other. It would therefore be pertinent for the purposes of 
this thesis to compare the strengths of both schools of thought being examined to determine 
the most appropriate for the thesis.
1) The top-down school of thought begins its analysis from the creation of the policy. It 
asks questions like; what are the policy aims and objectives? Who is the targeted 
recipient of the policy? And what resources are available for the policy to be 
implemented? These questions are important in order to access the possible impact the 
policy is going to have as it is being implemented (Sabatier, 1986; Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1983). This school of thought also looks 
at who has the ability to introduce policy into the society and the rights of the target 
recipients in regards to those policies (Sabatier, 1986). The bottom-up school of 
thought in contrast, starts from the interaction of the street-level bureaucrats’ 
interaction with the target recipients, and how this affects how implementation is 
carried out (Winter, 2003). The bottom-uppers observe the amount of discretion 
available to the street-level bureaucrats and the effect this has on the implementation 
of policy (Sabatier, 1986). The bottom-uppers also try to focus on the networks 
around the street-level bureaucrats as they affect positively or negatively the work 
being carried out by the street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980). In developing country 
cities like Lagos, The above questions are very important as they impact the 
implementation of public policy. Mainly because the policy and implementation 
networks found in places like Lagos are usually not as developed as their Western 
counterparts as will be observed in Chapter 8.
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2) The top-down school of thought usually takes a holistic view to the end result of 
policy implementation. For instance, the top-down school of thought looks at the 
overall result of an education policy designed to encourage more children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds to go to school. The evaluation would start from how 
many children from disadvantaged backgrounds of school age were unable to go to 
school. It would then choose an evaluation point and observe how many children 
since the inception of the policy have been able to go school (Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier, 1986). The bottom-up school of thought on the other hand 
would not evaluate the same policy from the stand point of how many have gone to 
school but on the individuals who have been able to go to school and the reasons why 
the individuals left behind have been unable to go to school. The top-down school of 
thought are also able to have a holistic view of the entire area(s) where the policy has 
been implemented but the bottom-up school of thought is usually restricted to the 
areas under the influence of the particular street-level bureaucrats being studied (Hill 
and Hupe, 2006; Matland, 1996).
3) The top-down school of thought focuses on the origin of a policy i.e. is the policy 
handed down from the courts, state or federal executive or head of institution? What 
legal backing does the policy have? Have policy reviews been carried out and 
included within policy? Are the evaluation criteria worked into to the statute for the 
implementation of the policy? What if any, are the consequences for non-participation 
with the policy by the target End Users? These are critical questions asked by the top- 
down school of thought in analysing policy. Legal structure is important in Sabatier’s’ 
frame work for analyzing public policy (Hill and Hupe, 2006; Sabatier, 1986;
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Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983). The bottom-up school of thought is not as particular 
about the legislative backing of policy and more interested in the discretion afforded 
to the street-level bureaucrats. How this affects their ability to meet the needs of target 
End Users (Winter, 2002; Lipsky, 1980). As will be observed in Chapter 8 and 9, in 
developing cities like Lagos, legal backing is essential in the implementation of policy 
because gaining End User co-operation with policy could be cumbersome. Strong 
legislation is likely to increase participation than harm implementation.
4) The bottom-uppers lay emphasis on the coping methods of street-levels bureaucrats 
and the reasons for which they are developed (Lipsky, 1980; Winter, 2002). The top- 
downers lay more emphasis on the resources provided for the implementation of
policy (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981).
5) The top-downers are prescriptive in their approach to policy implementation. For 
instance, using policy to limit the number of agencies that can be involved in the 
implementation of policy. Using the policy to create veto points as it were for other 
agencies and/or policies which may be prejudicial to the implementation of the policy 
(Bardach, 1977; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981; Sabatier, 1986). The bottom-uppers 
are more descriptive in nature. They map out the networks and possible networks that 
affect the policy (Barrett and Fudge, 1980).
6) Both the top-down and the bottom-up schools of thought have been unable to develop 
universally applicable theories which can be applied to all policy implementation
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processes in all societies (O’Toole, 2000). The top-downers have had the most 
success in constructing a generalizable theory (O’Toole, 2000; Matland, 1995). 
Mazmanian and Sabatier, (1989), have created the most comprehensive top-down 
model of implementation (Matland, 1995). The bottom-uppers have not been as 
successful as the as successful as the top-downers in creating a theory that could be 
generalizable. This is possibly because an element of the researcher could be easily 
inserted into the research when viewing it from the point of view of the street-level 
bureaucrats and the policy effect on the targeted End Users (Matland, 1995).
2.9. Lagos PSP Programme
In reviewing the literature on the top-down and bottom-up schools of thought, this 
thesis mainly uses the top-down school of thought for its analysis. The reasons for this choice 
are;
1) The top-down school of thought takes a holistic view of the entire area in which a 
policy is implemented and is not restricted to the area in which the street-level 
bureaucrats are operating.
2) The policy being studied needs to be understood from the need for the creation of the 
policy, the reasoning behind policy maker decisions to implement policy as they have 
and using them implementation instruments that they have.
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3) It is important to analyse the legal backing of the policy and how much effect it has 
had on the implementation of the policy.
4) The Policy Makers/state government in the area being studied have the largest 
influence in attempting to change the attitudes of the End Users. This is because of a 
history of failure on the part of the local governments and agencies tasked with 
delivering public services in the past.
5) In the case study area, an urban service is being studied and it is usually the Policy 
Makers who introduce innovation into urban/social services.
6) From initial interviews, the decisions made by the Policy Makers have had the most 
impact on the implementation of the policy in regards to the behaviour of the street- 
level bureaucrats and the End Users.
2.10. Research Design
The aim of the research design is to act as a form of guidance for the researcher in the 
collection, analysis, and the interpretation of data collected (Yin 1984, 1998). The research 
design should help the researcher in minimizing ambiguity in correlating the results and 
guide the researcher in analyzing findings directly relating to the hypothesis (Yin 1993).
The research design should also ensure that the research has a bearing on the causal
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hypothesis (Section 1.2) of the study (Yin, 1993; Collin, 2002). The case study method has 
been chosen as the research method for this thesis. An important characteristic of the case 
study method is it does not have a specific approach which must be adhered to in carrying out 
the research, which allows for flexibility in the application of the method (Yin 1984).
Past records of waste policy implementation in the state have had varying or 
extremely limited success. Despite the public policy significance of the new PSP Programme 
(Private Sector Participation policy) introduced in 1976, there is surprisingly little 
documentary evidence available on either the policy or its effectiveness. Most of the data 
collected has had to be through interviews. The thesis thus tests the delivery of the new waste 
collection policy in the light of the top-down / bottom-up implementation debates discussed 
in chapter 5, to explore which concepts are applicable to Lagos.
2.11. Research Questions
Research questions form the basis of the research. They define the aim of the thesis 
and aid in the structure of data collection. Eisenhardt (1999) argues that research questions 
can be used to begin the formulation of theory on topics. Research questions also help in the 
selection of empirical data, and on the data acquisition process (Bassey 1999), for example, 
identifying the key actors, the type of questions that might be asked of participants (Punch 
1998). Research questions can also be used to identify related issues which even though not 
the focus of the research can be used to increase and enhance understanding of the research 
being under taken (Collins, 2002).
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2.12. Hypothesis and research questions
In recent years, the privatization of municipal service delivery has been a common policy 
response to the challenges of providing adequate basic services in very large cities facing 
rapid rates of urbanization. Services are often privatised through different forms of Public- 
Private Partnerships.
This thesis aims to study current schools of implementation theories and assess them 
using the criteria found in developing country cities, specifically Lagos, the case study area. 
The hypothesis o f this research is that current debates on implementation take insufficient 
account o f the complexity o f  policy implementation in developing country cities and the 
complex interactions between state, society and the private sector, particularly in contexts 
where large informal sector service delivery is common and effective.
The focus of this research is on solid waste collection management, based on a case study 
of Lagos State. The administrative area of Lagos State covers the whole urbanised area of 
the City of Lagos. Lagos State Policy Makers are the administrative arm (Governors office), 
ministry and department heads at the Ministry of Environment and LAWMA are the agencies 
responsible for waste collection and disposal. The research questions are as follows:
1. What are the implementation challenges in developing country cities? In other words, 
what characteristics are found in developing countries which are not found in 
developed nations which have a direct impact on implementation methods? This 
question is explored in Chapters 4, 8 and 9.
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2. What are the critical challenges in solid waste management in contexts of low income 
cities and rapid urban growth rates? More specifically this means, what is the role of 
the informal sector in urban services delivery, and what is experience of integrated 
service delivery systems which integrate both public, private and informal sector 
delivery? These questions are explored in Chapters 4, 7, 8 and 9.
3. How do the findings of this thesis inform academic knowledge on the current 
implementation debates? Is implementation a top-down or bottom-up process? Are 
any of the debates directly applicable to developing country public policy
implementation? This question is explored in Chapter 10.
2.13. Case study Research
In undergoing any research, the question of why research is being undertaken is of the 
utmost importance, and defines whether the research will be led in an empirical or a 
conceptual direction (Collins, 2002). The direction in which the researcher decides to take 
will then determine the most appropriate research method (Yin, 1994). The key theme for this 
research is the implementation of waste collection policies in Lagos State, Nigeria. This 
thesis is an empirically based study centred on the current Private Sector Participation 
Programme (PSP Programme) that started in 1996 in Lagos State. While it is important for 
the research strategy to be precise, it is also important, since it relies heavily upon the input
from individuals, for the strategy to be flexible and take into consideration people’s
temperament and the varied attitudes towards the policy that were encountered.
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2.13.1. Research Strategy
Yin (1984) identifies three main issues important in selecting a research strategy.
They are:
1) The research question(s) which is the purpose of the thesis investigation. The 
question(s) to be answered by the thesis is critical to defining the research 
method used. For example a question with multiple social variables might 
require a case study investigation.
2) The amount of influence that the researcher is able to wield over events. The 
ability of the researcher to influence the events being studied has the potential 
to introduce bias into the study. This potential for bias would need to be 
mitigated by the type of research strategy used. The inability of the researcher 
to influence the data collected limits some of the bias that can be introduced 
into the study.
3) Whether or not the research topic is contemporary or historical. If the study is 
happening in real time or if it is a study of past events. Real time studies 
require a different research strategy to historical studies. For contemporary 
research topics, for example, it is relevant whether the research question 
requires interviews be conducted and if so, how far back does the participant 
have to remember to answer the question. What type of information can be 
expected from the participants?
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In this research the questions being studied calls for the observation of a particular 
phenomenon (in this case ‘policy implementation’ and the wide range actors in 
implementation). The topic is contemporary as it is happening in real time and the study is 
centred on the phenomena occurring now, and the researcher has no influence whatsoever 
over unfolding events (Yin, 1994). The case study method was therefore deemed the most 
appropriate method for the study. The case study research method is considered the most 
appropriate when 'how' and 'why' questions need to be answered (Yin, 1994).
2.14. Case Study as a Research Method
A case is an observable phenomenon that takes place within a specific circumstance 
(Punch, 2005; Stake 1995, Bassey, 2000). A case is an entity of some kind which could be an 
organization (public or private), an individual, policy, policy action, processes, incidents, 
settings, communities, etc. (Yin, 1993; Stake, 1995; Punch, 2005; Bassey, 1999). The case 
study is an approach to research or a research method (Stake 1995) or strategy (Yin, 1984; 
Punch, 2005). The case study is a multi-dimensional empirical inquiry whose unique 
characteristics distinguish it from other types of research strategies (Yin, 1984; 1998). The 
main aim of the case study is to increase the perception and understanding of specific cases. 
This is achieved by three means:
1) It produces a holistic view of each case
2) It enables the researcher to employ different methods of data collection
3) And finally, the case under study retains its individuality (Punch, 2005).
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This method of research gives the added advantage of being able to include 
characteristics of research that might otherwise be overlooked or excluded with other 
methods of research (Theodorson & Theodorson, 1969). It aids in increasing our 
understanding of the different facets of the study and the end results and conclusions of 
the study (Stake, 1995).
The case study is a versatile form of enquiry which is demonstrated by its use in 
different disciplines which include social sciences, management and organizational studies, 
psychology, implementation, and business (Yin, 1984; Robson, 1993). Case studies are 
usually both active and inventive and consist of the researcher imagination of the case and the 
invention of the study (Collins, 2002). This means that research methods do not predetermine 
the case but the case predetermines the research method to be used for specific cases (Collins, 
2002).
The research questions identified above require the participation of different urban 
actors. The case study method provided a platform to view these varied participants as the 
contributed to the study (Punch, 2005). The case study offered a comprehensive strategy in 
understanding the PSP Programme, how it is implemented and the resulting effect of the 
implementation of the policy in a real life situation (Punch, 2005; Yin, 1993). The case study 
was therefore selected for this thesis as it was the most dynamic research method that could 
accommodate any changes that might occur during the course of the research.
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2.14.1. Criticisms
The advantages of the case study are varied, but there are four main criticisms of this 
method of research. First, the case study method is disadvantaged because of the possibility 
of it being a time consuming and lengthy process, possible resource requirements, and the 
amount of data required for a case study (Collins, 2002). This thesis was carried out within a 
limited time frame. The resource problem necessitates the strategizing of the data collection 
process as it is a real concern in the use of the case study method. Data requirements for the 
study were thus selected and prioritized prior to the researcher leaving for the field to place 
boundaries on the information collected.
Second the case study is considered to be rather ambiguous from an academic 
standpoint in the collection, construction and analysis of empirical material (Bassey, 1999; 
Yin, 1984; Collins 2002). The ambiguity allows the bias of the researcher and participants to 
influence the findings and conclusions (Yin, 1984). Yin (1984), however, further argues 
however that bias can also influence other research strategies. As much as possible, the bias 
within the study was kept to a minimum by continually reflecting on the nature of the data 
that was being collected who was providing the data, as the research was explanatory in 
nature.
Third, Yin (1984) argues that the probability of the research subject changing over 
time is more likely in the case study method, and the research design is subject to change to 
better accommodate research questions being answered. The possibility of research changing 
over time affects other types of research depending on the amount of time used to conduct the
60
research. The time available for this research mitigates drastic changes to the research 
methods.
Fourth, possibly the most important criticism is the inability of the case study method 
to provide adequate basis for the generalization of the phenomena being studied (Yin, 1984; 
Punch, 2005). On the other hand, Punch (1998), Yin (1984; 1998) and Stake (1995) argue 
that not all case studies are aimed at generalization but some are aimed more to increase our 
understanding of a particular phenomena. The study was conducted to understand the 
phenomena as it occurred in real time. While generalizations would be desirable from any 
research, adding to the existing body of knowledge is essential.
The case study remains a highly popular method of research in social science 
research, and practice-oriented disciplines for instance urban planning (Yin, 1984). Punch 
(1998) argues the case study method further in that it fills the gap in knowledge where 
knowledge is limited or does not exist in three ways. First, it allows for a deeper study in to 
the research topic allowing it to gain new levels of understanding and detailing of important 
issues (Yin, 1998). The knowledge gained from this thesis will further the understanding of 
how implementation is shaped and evolved in Lagos State. Secondly, in amalgamation with 
other research methods, the case study can contribute by investigating more in-depth into a 
particular topic which could make understanding more robust. Thirdly, it can aid in 
developing an in-depth understanding of a particular case by understanding the case and why 
its specific characteristics exist as they are.
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2.15. Survey research method
This research method is aimed at obtaining data for mapping populations, geographies 
and programme results. Geographical principles are used to map out the social world 
(Denscombe, 2007). Surveys are usually wide and inclusive in their applicability. It is an 
observant method of research that tries to include all facets of the phenomenon being studied. 
It aims to update any information available on the phenomenon being observed. The survey 
method is mainly an observation research strategy which could be both qualitative and 
quantitative in nature. It can be used to test a hypothesis or a combination of hypothesis 
(Neuman, 2006).
The survey method is adaptable to a variety of different scenarios and is used for the 
collection of diverse forms of information. It can be used in the evaluation of a programme 
with a wide range of projects affiliated with it. The survey method can be used to gauge the 
outcome of a programme on the intended End Users in specific area. The survey method of 
research can be used to gather more detail for qualitative research (Denscombe, 2007).
2.15.1. Advantages of the survey method
1) Used to gather information using a cross Section of the intended population at a 
specific period.
2) Can be applied to a wide variety of scenarios
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3) Can be used for both qualitative and quantitative research using a wide variety of 
tools such as structured interviews and sampling methods
2.15.2. Disadvantages of the survey method
1) Surveys are usually based on the value system which the researcher applies to the 
research and therefore, results might not really be indicative of the true phenomena 
being studied (Rea and Parker, 2005).
2) The sample size required for an accurate survey method research to be carried out 
needs to be proportionate to the target population. Where the target population is quite 
large, the sample size will be large. This can make the survey method quite 
cumbersome and expensive to administer.
3) Respondents to a survey might not necessarily give honest or accurate answers to 
questions asked. The response given in some instances could be conflicting or 
confusing (Neuman, 2006).
4) Potential of not getting enough respondents required for the survey.
2.15.3 Survey methodology vs case  study methodology
The case study offers a more holistic research method than the survey method as it
allows the research to draw up the respondents needed for the study. While they both require
particular type of respondents, the case study method allows the research to generate data
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from multiple respondents. Unlike the survey method, where a control group is needed to test 
a hypothesis, a case study only requires that the information collected from selected 
respondents be accurate. The types of research instruments available to the case study 
researcher are also more, while the survey researcher is limited to open and closed 
questionnaires. The case study researcher also has the option of adding real time observation 
to his study while the survey researcher must focus on the response from respondents.
The case study research method is the best method to use for the thesis because of its 
flexibility in methods of data collection. It also accommodates the use of quantitative and 
qualitative data in its analysis.
2.16. Research Focus
The flexibility of the case study in accomplishing research within a real life context 
makes it a valuable evaluative tool, as it allows the researcher to overcome real life issues. 
Yin (1993) and Collins (2002) both highlight that case study evaluations may come across 
some challenges, which must be noted in order to overcome them. They are:
1. A change in the intervention, which could require the need to redesign some or all of 
the cases study or evaluation design.
2. A change in participation which has a direct effect on the research design.
64
3. Poor retention and high attrition rates that may compromise statistical data, its 
analyses and evaluation.
4. Possible relationship problems that may occur between the researcher and the 
respondents of the study.
This thesis started gathering information in 2004 and with the main body of fieldwork 
taking place in 2007. 2004 marked the end of Phase I of the PSP Programme and the 
beginning Phase II of the policy. In 2004, a series of informal interviews were carried out at 
the MoE. This helped the researcher to gain an understanding of the PSP Programme and 
active participants in the policy, and refine the research design accordingly. It helped 
reinforce the focus of the thesis on the lines of implementation debates. These preliminary 
interviews help in shaping the data requirement, key actors and the type of information that 
may be obtained from them and how the data could be obtained in the field.
Starting the research in 2004 proved to be beneficial to the research since it had the 
advantage of occurring in the wake of the end of Phase I and the beginning of the Phase I. 
Participants’ memories of phase one were thus fresh and ideas of phase two were relatively 
readily accessible. Importantly it also, allowed for the researcher to observe any physical 
changes between phase one and two.
The research design for this reason has needed little or no alterations since the
research began as the proponents and the factors affecting the PSP Programme have remained
constant almost throughout the period of the research (2004-2008). The only minor change to
the policy was in the payment to PSP Contractors, but this did not affect the structure of the
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research, and so was not a problem in the light of Yin (1984) third’s criticism, because the 
change did not drastically alter the main research subject -  the PSP Programme.
2.17. Data Collection methods
The analysis of data collected is the most complicated aspect of the case study method 
(Yin, 1984, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1999). It is also essential in establishing study boundaries by 
eliminating unnecessary data and focusing on the essential information. This study is of the 
Lagos State PSP Programme which basically covers the collection of waste from the 
municipal households and their transfer to the central landfill. The focus was on six groups of 
urban actors as outlined in Section 2.5. Yin (1994) views the study of implementation 
processes as being a bit cumbersome because the boundaries are harder to set and the units of 
analysis are less clear. While he does argue that it is a harder case study to undertake 
compared to, say, the study of a laboratory experiment, it is possible to carry out a case study 
on the implementation process (Yin, 1994).
Yin (1998) puts forward two factors must be factored into an implementation study. 
The first is a possible programme variation from its original design and the second is the 
programme components that existed before it became a formal procedure (Yin, 1998). By 
explicitly recognizing program delivery dynamics it is possible to accommodate any changes 
(not too drastic) that may be required during the research process. In deed from an 
implementation perspective, these are the important elements of the study.
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A characteristic of Phase I of the PSP waste collection programme was the stability of 
the programme during the research period. No significant changes to the policy were made by 
any of the actors in the implementation of the PSP Programme. This stability meant that the 
research did not have to depart from the original research design. This research was also able 
to gather information on the recently completed Phase I of the PSP Programme which is used 
in a comparative analysis in Chapters eight and nine.
2.17.1. Interviews
The interview method has been selected as the most efficient method of collecting data 
from the groups of participants because it allows the researcher to not just be able to collect 
empirical information from the respondents but also to observe how the interviewees respond 
(Gubrium and Holstein, 2001). Interviews are important tools used by researchers to 
understand not just the issue that they are interviewing the respondents for but the 
respondents themselves from the way they give information and their body language, adding 
an extra dimension and depth to the empirical information collected from them (Yin, 1998).
Below is a table of the interviews to be carried and the types of interview methods to 
be used with the different participants.
Table 2:1. Interviews
Interviewees Number interviewed Interview Type
Households 169 Structured interviews
Policy Makers 4 Semi-structured interviews
Monitoring officials 1 Semi-structured interviews
PSP 16 Focus Group
Cart-pushers 18 Semi-structured interviews/ 
Focus group
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2.17.2. Households (End Users)
The structured interviews were utilized undertaken with the aid of a questionnaire in 
order to take advantage of the economies of scale that it allows for. This method allows for 
the stratified sampling of the population. The data required needs to establish the public’s 
willingness, or lack of it, to participate wholly or partially within the PSP process. Originally, 
the data from this group was intended to be collected from three sample areas to cover the 
three main income groups - upper income groups, middle income groups and low income 
groups. In practice, though this method of sampling the population proved to be too 
dangerous, because of political unrest during the fieldwork period, and time-consuming and 
had to be discontinued. The questionnaire used for this group is included in Appendix A.
High and middle income households and to a lesser extent, the low income 
households were inaccessible for the research process. This is because the high and middle 
income households usually have guards at the gate and attend to people they know mainly 
because of crime. Moreover, it was unsafe to enter the compounds as a lone researcher. 
There is also a lack of security in low income areas that prohibited collecting responses from 
a door-to-door survey. As an alternative strategy, the researcher decided to interview End 
Users at their place of work and social gatherings. These two areas allowed for access to 
household members from the three sample groups that make up the general population.
The places of work which were chosen included banks, oil companies and 
communication companies. The places of social gathering I chose were two shopping malls, a 
bar and two beer parlours. The sample criteria were levels of income and type of area of 
residence. The sample sizes were chosen based on their income groups and area of residence.
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At the places of work, the sample was based on the position of the individuals. The different 
positions of staff were an indication of their income group for instance, the manager would be 
of a higher income group compared to the security guard. Generally, most people answered 
my questions in the neutral environments.
The data collected from this group however was still not truly representative of the 
geographical areas of the state. This meant that the researcher still had a limited view of 
implementation from the point of view of the End Users. For this reason, there is a hesitation 
to generalize for this group and the data collected from them is used sparingly within the 
thesis.
2.17.2. Policy Makers
The semi-structured interview method was used for the Policy Makers mainly because 
there was a need for qualitative information to the data collected. The Policy Makers were 
able to discuss both the current policy and its historical development. The semi-structured 
interview also allowed the researcher to not just understand the policy but also to understand 
the policy maker’s role in the policy implementation. In a city like Lagos, especially when 
dealing with the public services, understanding the person aids in understanding the outcome 
of the person’s work as their personalities are usually reflected in the way they carry out their 
work.
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2.17.3. Monitoring Officials
A semi-structured interview process is used because it was pertinent that assumptions 
were not made about the monitoring of the PSP Programme. This group was interviewed in 
order to better understand the factors which assist or hinder effective monitoring of the PSP 
Programme.
2.17.4. PSP Service Providers
A focus group was used for the PSP Contractors for two reasons. The first was for 
convenience as the PSP Contractors are located all over the State with some having their 
offices in low rent premises on the outskirts of the city. The traffic in Lagos is very bad, and 
it would have been very difficult meeting them. The second reason is that, the PSP 
Contractors were reported as having similar issues in fulfilling their contractual obligations, 
and this proved to be the case in the focus group, It proved to be beneficial to the operation of 
the focus group that people who would not necessarily open up when interviewed alone were 
able to contribute to the group discussion with people where circumstances are shared. This 
group serve as the street level bureaucrats for this thesis.
2.17.5. Cart-pushers
The focus group and semi-structured method was used for this group to give more 
insight into the group. It was essential not to ask questions that gave one word answers and to 
try and encourage the interviewees to speak freely. The illegality of their services had made it 
difficult during the first round of interviews to meet a large number of respondents, and the
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researcher was only able to interview five individuals with the semi structured interviews. 
During the second round of interviews, the researcher was able to have focus group interview 
with cart-pushers as mentioned in Section 2. The first focus group interview was unplanned 
as in the process of trying to interview one practitioner, other practitioners joined in and it 
turned into a focus group interview with seven people. The researcher then arranged with 
them to meet a different group the next day and was able to another focus group interview 
with six.
The main reason for the combination of different methods is to be able to a) 
understand the topic being studied from different perspectives, and b) use the appropriate 
interview methods to the actors to get the most information out of the interviews.
2.18. Field Study
Data for the field study was gathered in Lagos State from the respondents listed in 
Section 2.5. The field conditions which expanded below required the researcher to reframe 
the distribution of questionnaires. As discussed in Section 2.5.2 above, members of the 
household had to be in other areas other than their households. Other field conditions are 
discussed below.
2.18.1 Field problems
Different field conditions were experienced by the researcher in the process of data 
collection in Lagos, some were favourable and some of the conditions were adverse to data 
collection. Below are details of the field conditions experienced.
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1) General Attitudes:
The general attitudes of people towards answering questions for the research 
varied depending on who was being interviewed. Some of the respondents were very 
forthcoming and co-operative, answering questions without bias or prejudice. 
However, in some interviews, the researcher had to adjust the approach to interviews 
or withdraw from interviewing some of the respondents. This is explained further 
below.
i) Policy Makers:
During the collection of data, the Lagos State government was in talks 
with the World Bank about grants for waste management in Lagos State 
(PI, P3, 2007). It is hypothesized by this researcher that one of the Policy 
Makers interviewed felt the research might be prejudicial to the grant in 
question and therefore gave misleading information during the interview, 
which was contrary to all other interviews the researcher had conducted 
prior to this specific interview.
ii) End Users:
End User attitudes ranged from the very co-operative to the very
distrustful. The very distrustful householders felt the research was a guise
to help the government increase their taxes. They had to be convinced that
the research was for academic purposes only. Some of the End Users
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approached refused outright and an interview had to be stopped because 
the lady in question looked increasingly distressed at the questions.
Informal sector operators:
Informal sector operators were very difficult to interview. The first 
problem was that, with the introduction of the PSP Programme, they were 
constantly being moved along by the local authorities and it was difficult 
to find them, as they often work very early in the morning. The second 
problem was, when the researcher was able to contact some of them, it was 
very difficult convincing them that the research was academic and not 
involved with local government moves to limit their operations. There was 
the prevalent fear that the research would prejudice to their livelihoods. 
The researcher had to convince them that the research would neither have 
a positive or a negative impact on their work. In all cases, the researcher 
had to have her NUS identification to show that it was academic researcher 
and leave un-cooperative respondents.
Traffic:
Traffic in Lagos is very heavy. Lagos has millions of cars on its roads 
daily, which makes moving around the city to interview in different 
locations difficult and time-consuming. This was a particular problem in 
interviewing the cart-pushers, as they work very early in the mornings.
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2) Accessibility to End Users:
A predominant feature in the urban and planning fabric of Lagos State is 
fenced housing. Income level usually determines how high the fences are built. The 
safety issue for the researcher was paramount and other means had to be devised to 
meet the householders to administer the questionnaires. The fences also contributed to 
a need to change the original sampling method which was based on meeting people in 
their areas of residence. The change meant that other areas where people congregate 
had to be targeted to meet people of all incomes types. The targeted areas where new 
sample populations were found, which covered all three income groups, were places 
of work and social places. Places of work were an easier place to meet respondents to 
answer survey questions. The difficulty in accessing this group means for the research 
that the information collected will not be as widely used as first anticipated.
3) Time (Policy Makers):
The Policy Makers who created the PSP Programme are very small number. 
This is indicative of the way policies are created in developing country cities like 
Lagos State. This also meant that the Policy Makers were always very busy and often 
in meetings for long periods of time. One of the Policy Makers kept postponing the 
meeting and when the interview was finally conducted, it was fraught with 
interruptions.
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2.19. Proposed research
The proposed research which is to be carried out in Lagos state is to investigate to 
what extent, western models of implementation are applicable in developing country cities 
like Lagos state, Nigeria.
The research will be carried out using the case study method to investigate the Public 
Private Partnership in domestic waste collection which has recently been re-evaluated and 
reimplemented within Lagos state.
This will enable this thesis to observe firsthand how public policies are implemented 
and to be able to investigate the factors which have the most effect on the implementation of 
public policy. This will be able to generate within the field of waste collection management 
an idea of which implementation school of thought will be the most beneficial in terms of 
result in Lagos state.
To carry out this research some contextual fields will need to be investigated in order 
to improve the overall understanding of the implementation process in Lagos. They include 
waste management in developing countries, governance in developing countries, PPP, 
informal waste collection in developing countries and a back ground on Lagos.
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3. Lagos State mega city: Politics and waste
The role of this Chapter in the thesis is to paint a picture of the history and the 
geographic area whose policy this thesis used as a case study. It is designed to paint a picture 
of the potential advantages and difficulties of implementation using western models in a 
developing country city like Lagos.
Rapid urbanisation in Lagos State has led to critical problems in the collection and 
disposal of waste. Lagos State is estimated to be the 11th largest urban population in the 
world by 2015 (United Nations, 2007). The population of Lagos State was estimated to be 
growing at the estimated rate of 8% per annum (LAWMA, 2006, Lagos State, 2007). Lagos 
State has a faster growth rate than the nation as a whole with Nigeria growing at 4-5% per 
annum and the world population growing at 2% per annum (Lagos State, 2007). The 
population estimate for the year 2015 is 27.9 million people generating approximatley 60,000 
tonnes of waste daily (LAWMA, 2007; Lagos State, 2007).
The role of this Chapter within the thesis is to paint a picture of the history and the 
geographic area whose policy this thesis used as a case study. It designed to begin to paint a 
picture of the potentail advantages and difficulties of implementation using western models in 
a developing country city like Lagos.
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3.1. Finding Lagos
Lagos State is located in the south west of Nigeria on the coastal flood plain of the 
Bight of Benin. Lagos State is boarded by the North and East by Ogun State of Nigeria, in the 
West by the Republic of Benin, and in the South by the Atlantic Ocean. Territorially, Lagos 
State encompasses an area of 358,862 hectares or 3,577sq.km. Lagos State is a coastal city 
consisting of a net work of islands connected to a mainland (Lagos State, 2007). The total 
developed urban area which houses 85% of the population is only 37% of the land area. The 
urban area is known as Lagos city or Lagos metropolis (Lagos State, 2006) and is the focus of 
the thesis. The total population of Lagos State was estimated at approximately 17million 
people in Lagos (Lagos State, 2006). Table 3.1 below shows the distribution of the 
population and the gender ratio. The local governments highlighted in yellow are the urban 
areas.
The location of the State gives it multiple port functions. Its location as a coastal 
city bordering the Atlantic Ocean, the marinas, lagoons and rivers allows it to function 
effectively as a seaport. Lagos State is referred to as an ‘environment of aquatic splendour’. It 
is so referred because of the water bodies that are abound within and around the state and the 
presence of fresh water and mangrove swamp forests. These forests were dominant before but 
due to city expansion and land reclamation, theses forests are greatly diminished (Lagos 
State, 2008). Nigeria’s main international airport is also located in Lagos State (National 
Geographic, 2008).
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Table 3.1: Population by Sex and Local Government Area. 
Source: Lagos State, 2006
Local Governm ent Male Female Total
Agege 564,239 468,825 1,033,064
Ajeromi-Ifelodun 723,644 711,651 1,435,295
Alimosho 1,099,656 947,370 2,047,026
Amuwo Odofin 301,012 223,959 524,971
Apapa 264,728 257,656 522,384
Badagry 187,427 192,993 380,420
Epe 153,360 170,274 323,634
Eti-Osa 460,124 523,391 983,515
Ibeju-Lekki 49,613 49,927 99,540
Ifako-Ijaiye 380,112 364,211 744,323
Ikeja 328,778 319,942 648,720
Ikorodu 364,207 324,838 689,045
Kosofe 527,539 407,075 934,614
Lagos-Island 461,830 398,019 859,849
Lagos-Main land 326,433 303,036 629,469
Mushin 684,176 637,341 1,321,517
Ojo 507,693 433,830 941,523
Oshodi-Isolo 514,857 619,691 1,134,548
Somolu 517,210 507,913 1,025,123
Surulere 698,403 575,959 1,274,362
STATE TOTAL 9,115,041 8,437,901 17,552,942
In 1968 under Edict number three Lagos State is divided into five Administrative 
divisions which were Bagadary, Epe, Ikeja, Ikorudu and Lagos (Lagos State, 2006). These 
administrative divisions are further subdivided 20 Local Government Areas (LGA). In 2002, 
the state executive body using the same edict, further subdivided the LGAs adding 37 more 
bringing the total number of local government areas to 57 (Lagos State, 2002).
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The drainage system of the state is consists of lagoons, a marina and gateways which 
constitute about 22% or 787sq, km or a fifth of the States’ total mass. The major water bodies 
are the Apapa Marina, Yewa River, and Ogun River, Ologe Lagoon, Kuramo Waters and in 
Badagry (rural Lagos) there are, Five Cowries Creek and Omu Creeks (Lagos State, 2008).
The state experiences two main climate conditions which are the rainy season which 
cover the periods between April and October and the dry season of little or no rain which 
covers the periods of November to march (Lagos State, 2008).
2.1 Map of Nigeria
(Source: C om m on W ealth , 2004)
2.2 Lagos w ith  w a te r  ways 
(Source: E n ca rta , 2008)
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3.2. Lagos, a History
tV i •Lagos State began its development in the 15 century as a trading post between the 
Yoruba’s, Benin and Awori people and the Portuguese traders, trading in ivories peppers and 
slaves (Lagos State, 2007, LIN, 2007). The state was colonized with the rest of the country in
iL
the 18 Century by Great Britain. In 1902, to add to its functions as a port, it became the 
administrative capital for the rest of the country.
Nigeria gained independence in 1960 with Lagos as its capital and was administered 
through the Federal Ministry of Lagos Affairs (Dibie, 1999 and 2003). The capital of both the 
State and the Federation was Lagos Island. Lagos officially became a state in 1967 under 
decree No. 14 of 1967 by the military dictator General Yakubu Gowon (Lagos State, 2007). 
In 1976, the Federal capital territory was created and the federal capital was moved to Ikeja 
in Lagos. In 1991, all federal offices were moved to Abuja making it the new political capital 
of Nigeria (Lagos State, 2007).
Since independence, Nigeria has had 7 military head of states; Lagos State has had 13 
governors 10 of the Lagos State governors being military administrators (Ogungbamila, 
2007, Lagos State, 2008). The military governors always tried to control the State hence, the 
continuous change in the military governors of the state. The military regimes were 
characterized by fraud and oppression (Joseph, 1996).
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3.3. Democracy, a History in Nigeria
Nigeria as a nation has been through different types of governments since its 
independence in 1960. The country inherited a parliamentary system of government from its 
colonial masters which was changed to the three tier Federal system of Government in 1963 
(Edeh, 1999). The landscape of it government would continue to change with the first 
military coup in 1966 by General Augyi Ironsi.
General Yakubu Go won officially made Lagos a State in 1967 as discussed in Section
3.2 above. The first governor of Lagos State, Brigadier Mobolaji Johnson, was appointed by 
General Yakubu (Lagos State, 2006). He was followed by three other military administrators. 
The first civilian governor, Mr Jakande was elected in 1979. This coup was followed by two 
other bloody coups in the Federation of Nigeria before a civilian government was restored in 
1979 led by Mr Shagari. The civilian government would only last for five years before being 
over thrown in another military coup in 1984 (Lagos State, 2006).
The civilian president was then replaced by General Babangida for nine years. State 
gubernatorial elections were held in 1991 as part of the transition to democratic rule and Sir 
Otedola was elected the governor of Lagos State (Lagos State, 2006). In 1993, another 
attempt was made to return the country to democracy; the presidential election was won by 
Mr Abiola (Edeh, 1999). However the presidential elections were voided, the Senate, The 
House of Representatives and House of Assemblies were suspended and an interim 
government was put in place by the military government of General Babangida in 1993. The 
cancellation of the elections led to violence in the south west region of the country (Lagos 
State, 2006).
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A military coup led by General Abacha in 1993 dissolved the interim government, the 
Senate, House of Representatives and the Houses of Assembly and dismissed the state and 
local governors (BBC, 1999). Lagos State had two military administrators during General 
Abachas’ dictatorship, Colonel Oyinlola and Colonel Maruwa. With pressure from within the 
country in the form of strikes by the labour union and the oil industry and pressure from the 
international community through dialogue, suspension from the commonwealth and 
economic sanctions, an attempt was made by General Abachas administration to transform 
him into a civilian president (Common Wealth, 1996). This transition was attempted by the 
systematic disqualification and arrest of all other presidential candidates and their 
sympathizers. This however ended with his death.
A military dictator General Abdusalam came into power in 1998 who organized 
elections within the country and finally returning Nigeria to fully democratic rule in 1999 
with the election of General Obasanjo (BBC, 1999). Lagos State had its third elected 
Governor Mr Tinubu in 1999.
3.4. Relationships between state and citizens
The changing nature of government has resulted in a situation of mistrust between 
government agencies and citizens. Citizens often feel that the administration is not 
trustworthy, and is ineffectual in the delivery of public services. While the citizens will pay 
income tax, they are generally unwilling to pay any other kind of tax and will only pay other 
taxes to stay out of trouble than because they feel it is their duty to pay extra taxes or levies 
(CSI, 2002). The collection of domestic waste is generally seen as the responsibility of the 
government.
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Past national and state Leaders of Nigeria and Lagos State (Source BBC, 1999)
Table 3.2
National 
Political Events
Year Lagos Political 
Events
Year Lagos State 
W aste Policy
Year
National
Elections
1964 Municipality
elections
1964 Lagos state refuse 
disposal board is 
constituted 
(LRWDB)
1977
Coup Is* Head o f  
State 
Major Gen. Agui 
Ironsi
1966 State created 
Brigadier Mobolaji 
Johnson 1967-75
1967 P.D Pollution 
control
1980-1985
2nd Coup Lt Col 
Yakubu Go won
1966 Lagos state waste 
disposal board 
(LSWDB)
1981
3rd Coup Army 
Brig. Muritala 
Mohammed
1975 Commodore 
Adekunle Lawal 
1975-77 
Commodore Ndubisi 
Kanu 1977-78 
Commodore Ebitu 
Ukiwe 1978-79
World bank loan 
used to procure 
equipment and 
create landfills
1988
1st Federal 
Republic 
Alhaji Sheu 
Shagari
1979 Mr Lateef Jakande 
1979-83
LSRDB became 
Lagos state waste 
management 
authority 
LAWMA
1991
4th Military coup 
Maj Gen Ibrahim 
Babangida
1984 Air Commodore 
Golahan Mudasiru 
1984-86 
Navy Capitan Mike 
Ahigbe 1986-88 
Brigadier General 
Raji Rasaki 1988-91 
Sir Michael Otedola 
1991-93
2nd Republic 
(annulled) Chief 
M.K.O. Abiola
1993 Colonel Olagunsoye 
Oyinlola 1993-96
Interim civilian 
government 
Chief Shonekan
1993 General Maruwa 
1996-99
PSP Programme 
phase one
1996-2004
5th military coup 
Gen Sani Abacha
1993
Interim military 
government 
Gen Abubakar
1998
3rd Republic 
Gen Obasanjo
1999 Mr Tinubu
4th Republic 2003 Mr Tinubu PSP Programme 
Phase two
2004 - to 
date
5th Republic 
Mr Yaradua
2007 Mr Fasola
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3.5. Federal Administration
Nigeria is a Federation of 36 states with Abuja as its Capital Territory. The Federal 
Constitution of Nigeria divided the administration of the country into three tiers of different 
constitutional powers. The administrative tiers are the Central Government, the State 
Government and the local governments (Dibie, 1999, 2003).
3.5.1. Governmental structure of Nigeria
The government structure of Nigeria is divided into three distinct categories, which 
are the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. These three structures perform 
predetermined functions (Dibie, 1999, 2003), which are as follows;
The executive arm (Office of the President):
The Executive arm of government serves as the government administration. This arm 
of the government consists of the presidency, state governors, local governors, federal and 
state civil servants, ministers, commissioners. These offices are responsible for proposing 
policy to be passed into law and the implementation of state and national policy (Dibie, 1999, 
2003). This sector of government is also responsible for national and state supervision, 
appointment of top ranking officials, national and state budgeting, maintenance of law and 
order (Dibie, 1999, 2003).
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The legislative arm (Senate and House of Representative):
The Legislative arm of government is responsible for the passing of bills proposed by 
the administrative arm of government into law. For central government, this function is 
carried out by two legislative bodies, the Senate which consists of three elected members 
from each state of the federation, and the House of Representatives which also consist of 
three elected members from each state (Dibie, 1999, 2003). Legislative bills can be initiated 
by either legislative house and there must be consensus between both houses for a law to be 
passed.
The Judiciary arm (Supreme Court):
The main role of the Judiciary is the interpretation and the upholding of the rule of 
law. The Judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, Appeal Courts, High Courts, Magistrate 
Courts and Customary Courts. The functions of the judiciary include the settlement of 
disputes citizens and the state, between individuals and corporations and other civil cases. It 
also includes safe guarding citizens’ rights, protection of the constitution, and the 
interpretation of the constitution where there is a dispute and the power of review of the 
activities of the executive and legislative arms of government, to sit over criminal cases and 
judge accordingly (Dibie, 1999, 2003).
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3.6. State Administration
The levels of government are classified by the federal constitution of Nigeria as the 
Federal (central) government, the State governments and the local governments (Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). The country is made up of 36 states. The states 
were created over time by different military administrations (Akinyele, 1996), 774 local 
government areas and the federal capital territory Abuja (Nigeria, 2008).
The State administration in Nigeria is also a three tier system: the central state 
government, local government and the wards that make up the local government areas (Dibie, 
1999, 2003). The three sectors of the state are as follows;
The governor’s office:
The Executive consists of the state governors, local governors, ward chairmen, 
and commissioners. They function at the state level like the executives of the 
federations as mentioned in Section 3.6.1 .i above (Dibie, 1999, 2003).
The law makers:
States have powers to pass bylaws, through the House of Assembly, an elected 
body. Bylaws cannot conflict or contradict Federal law. Central government 
legislative bills are debated on both levels and require a two thirds majority vote 
in both houses for any bill to be passed into law (Dibie, 1999, 2003).
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Other functions of the legislative arm of government include financial control, 
powers of investigation, amendment of existing state constitution and the power of 
impeachment (Dibie, 1999, 2003).
The state courts:
The Judiciary sector is charged with the interpretation of the law and inclusive at 
the state level are high courts and the customary courts. They perform the same 
functions as described in Section 3.6.1.iii (Dibie, 1999, 2003).
3.7. Lagos, a multi-functional city
In 1976 when it was decided by the then head of state General Muritala Mohamed under 
decree 6 to move the capital to the centrally located and sparsely populated Abuja (Moore,
1984). The move was to serve two functions,
i) To reduce the pressure on Lagos by relieving it of one of its function and
ii) To make the seat of the country’s central administration more accessible to all its
citizens (Moore, 1984).
However, Lagos remained the country’s largest city. In parallel with its functions as a
trading port and formal administrative centre, it also serves as the industrial nerve centre of
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centre of the country, with over two thirds of Nigeria’s industries being located within Lagos 
State (Abiodun, 2008). Despite the move of the seat of the Federal administration to Abuja, 
most commercial ventures still have their have their headquarters located within Lagos State 
(Forrest, 2004).
In recent times, under the new democratic dispensation, the federal and state 
governments have opened up the Nigerian markets and are actively encouraging foreign 
direct investment within the country (Business Conference, 2008). Lagos continues to 
function as the economic nerve centre of the nation. The popularity of Lagos within the 
country continues to grow as the top ranking state to invest in Nigeria. The functions of the 
state have continued to make it an attractive prospect for immigration from other states within 
the country, within the continent and the world at large which can be attested to by the 
multiethnic nature of the state and the continuous development which can be witnessed with 
Lagos State.
Governance within Lagos will be continually challenged to provide adequate 
infrastructure for the needs of a growing population. Implementation debates both prescribe 
that when policies are created, that the implementation be observed over a period of time then 
redrafted to meet changing needs (Sabatier, 1996; O’Toole, 2000). This would help 
governance in Lagos attempt to meet its policy objective. Chapters eight and nine further 
discuss policy implementation and review in Lagos.
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3.8. History of Waste Management in Lagos State
The history of waste management has been a long and chequered on in Lagos State. 
The state has gone from a period where its waste collection management was sustainable and 
self reliant without a formal public service to a stage where it struggles to meet up with the 
rising demand waste collection management. These issues are discussed below.
During the pre-colonial era Lagos was an established trading port under Portuguese 
rule and still consisted of small settlements. Community cleaning and waste collection 
management were managed by women and children, who collected the waste and disposed of 
it in the bushes at the out skirts of the settlements (Aboyade, 2004).
Waste collection management problems started during the colonial era as the Lagos 
settlements began to urbanize and expand. Indigenous methods of waste management were 
no longer sufficient to manage waste collection. The colonial response to the problem was to 
provide a solution for the colonial areas without providing one for the indigenous people 
(Odunaiya, 2001). In 1960, when Nigeria gained independence, waste collection management 
was a function of the Local Government Board and it was ill-equipped to handle the task it 
had been given (Wunsch and Olowu, 1990). In 1977 Lagos was host to an international 
cultural event and the worlds media proclaimed Lagos as one of the dirties city in the world 
(Raski, 1988; LAWMA, 2007).
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In the early 1980s waste collection management (see also Section 3.8.2) was 
contracted out by the Local Government Board to P. D. Pollution Control, paid for in full by 
the Lagos State government (Odunaiya, 2001). This company was in charge of waste 
collection management policy creation and its implementation. In 1985, the waste contract 
was terminated due to the increase in demand brought about by a substantial increase in 
population and poor administration of State funds, coupled with a change of government as a 
result of another military coup. The new administration found that the State budget could not 
fund the provision of waste services and this led to a significant deterioration in service as 
formal provision could not cope with demand. As a result, informal service providers took 
advantage of the gap in the provision of services (Aboyade, 2004).
In 1988, a World Bank loan was granted to improve the service through the 
acquisition of equipment, provided by the LSWDB. The LSWDB was then reorganized and 
re-launched as the Lagos State Waste Management Authority (World Bank, 1991; LAWMA, 
2005). The services were not improved (Wunsch and Olowu, 1990) and the decision was then 
made for the local governments within the State to provide waste management services for 
the residential areas while LAWMA retained responsibility for commercial and industrial 
waste (Aboyode, 2004). This system was still inefficient and encountered problems such as a 
lack of communication between the service providers which led to duplication of services and 
little progress in solving the waste problems within the state. LAWMA is now currently 
jointly managed by the sanitation units of the State government though the Lagos State 
Ministry of Environment and local governments. In 1998, the Lagos State Waste 
Management Authority Act was passed which gives legal backing to LAWMA for the
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provision of commercial and industrial waste services and the operation of transfer stations 
(Bamgbose et al, 2000).
By 1996 it was clear that the Lagos State’s Ministry of Environment and LAWMA were 
unable to adequately meet the demand for waste services. A new waste policy was 
established for the private provision of waste services in 1996. The Private Sector 
Participation (PSP) programme was designed to increase waste collection from municipal 
residential areas and transfer capacity. Ministry of Environment took an unprecedented 
decision, deciding that the population should pay for waste management and that market 
forces should decide the price for the services (PI, 2007).
By 1996, there was a predominance of informal sector waste service provision in the 
door to door collection of waste and scavenging. The sector it was noted was spread in a lot 
of areas which were not receiving formal provision and were adept at collecting user charges 
from the residents. The informal waste sector in Lagos State will be discussed further in 
Chapter 7.
The current PSP waste collection management programme which began 
implementation in 1996 and was reviewed in 2004 will be discussed in Chapter eight and 
Chapter nine.
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3.9. The institutions that run the States’ waste
State governments preside over institutions called Ministries which carry out the 
mandates of the state administration. These ministries are headed by commissioners who 
answer directly to the state governor. The ministries propose policies within their individual 
or combined institutions to the governor who presents it as a bill to the House of 
Representatives to be made into law. Lagos State currently has 29 ministries including the 
Ministry of Environment which is of interest to this thesis. Below are the institutions which 
are directly relevant to this thesis and their associated agency.
3.9.1. Lagos Ministry of Environment (MoE)
The Lagos State Ministry of Environment (MoE) used to be Section of the Ministry of 
Environment and Physical Planning. The department was given autonomy in 2003 due to the 
perceived increase in environmental degradation within Lagos State (PI, 2007; Lagos State, 
2008). The MoE determines environmental policy for Lagos State, while the Lagos State 
Waste Management Agency (LAWMA) serves as the implementing agency.
The MoE is mandated with the care and the protection of Lagos State and its
associated water bodies. The duties the MoE is required to perform include the maintenance
of a clean and aesthetically pleasing environment (Lagos State, 2008). The MoE was created
in 2003 as a result of the high profile given to ‘the environment’ during the 2003 election
campaign (Lagos State, 2003). The year 2003 marked the second-term election year for the
democratically elected government. The environment had been a major issue within the press
and the electorate, specifically the mountains of waste seen around the city (Olori, 2005). The
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major parties within the State campaigning for the governor’s seat all used the environment 
as campaign mantra especially the growing waste problem and its negative associated effects 
(PDP, 2003; AC, 2003; UNPP, 2003). Action Congress won the 2003 race for Lagos State 
Governor; with Governor Ahmed Tinubu staying on for a second term (Lagos, 2003). True to 
the campaign mandate, a ten step programme to improve Lagos State was developed, with 
solid waste management a high priority (MoE, 2008). The MoE was created to fulfil this 
campaign mandate (MoE, 2008).
3.9.2. Lagos State waste management authority (LAWMA)
The rapid urbanization of Lagos State in the 1970s’ compounded by Nigeria’s oil 
boom of the 1970s’ brought waste management to the forefront of state leaders. The local 
government councils were finding it increasingly difficult to manage their waste (Raski, 
1988; LAWMA, 2007).
This difficulty and the comments from the world press mentioned in Section 3.8 led to 
the creation of the first waste agency in West Africa in 1977, the Lagos State Refuse Disposal 
Board (LSRDB), which was created under Edict 9. It was a privately run organization under 
Powell Puffen Pollution Control Consultants from Canada as managers. This outfit was 
responsible for the collection and disposal of domestic waste within Lagos State (Aboyode, 
2004, LAWMA, 2007).
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The mandate of the Lagos State Refuse Disposal board was increased in 1981 to 
include industrial and commercial waste collection and disposal, drain cleaning and disposal 
removal and scraping of out of commission vehicles. The name of the agency was changed 
from the LSRDB to the Lagos State Waste Disposal Board (LSWDB). It remained with the 
private operator till 1985 when it was transferred to the local government council due to lack 
of funds (Aboyode, 2004, LAWMA, 2007).
The new agency the LSWDB found it almost impossible to deliver waste services at 
the level of the private operator. The agency had problems acquiring adequate funding and 
resources and more often than not, the LSWDB was unable to generate enough supply of 
waste services to meet the demand (Aboyode, 2004). The agency was reorganized and in 
1991 and moved to the Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning. It was reorganized 
into a new agency now known as the Lagos State Waste Management Authority (LAWMA), 
created under Edict No. 55, making LAWMA responsible for the collection and disposal of 
municipal, commercial and industrial waste within the state (Aboyode, 2004; LAWMA, 
2007).
In 1991, LAWMA obtained a loan from the World Bank to procure equipment for the 
provision of waste services within the state. By 1996, the agency was plagued with problems 
of inadequate resources and skilled man power, and most of the vehicles had broken down 
(World Bank, 1996).
In 1996, the Ministry for Environment and Physical Planning set up the PSP waste 
collection transfer programme. The creation of this programme saw LAWMAs’ role reduce
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from collecting all municipal solid waste, including household, commercial and industrial 
waste, to only collecting industrial waste. This was due to the inefficiency of the agency. 
However, following further negotiations with the World Bank, in 2007 the PSP Programme 
was transferred back to LAWMA, as part of World Bank funding conditions for new 
infrastructure (P2, 2007).
The characteristics of Lagos State which have been visited in this Section are aimed at 
understanding Lagos State and its inhabitants. And how these people and their characteristics 
affect waste management which is discussed in Section 3.9 below and in Chapters eight and 
nine.
3.10. PSP Waste Programme in brief
The PSP waste collection policy was put forward by the Policy Makers at the MoE in 
1996. A meeting with the Local Government Administration sold the policy to the chairmen 
of Somolu and Kosofe Local Governments. A proposal was put together by the MoE and the 
two Local Government Councils to create the pilot scheme for the PSP Waste Programme. 
The pilot was started with companies that were new to the arena of domestic waste collection 
and transfer (MoE, 2007). The MoE set parameters for the companies which wanted to enter 
into the private domestic waste collection arena. These parameters were that each company 
should own a minimum of ten 10 tonne trucks, tell the MoE how many wards they can cater 
for and create a routing map and schedule. A total of 624 collectors signed up in the first 
year, from 1996 -2004, approximately 1500 companies signed up to the program with more 
than 50% of them going out of business by 2004 (MoE, 2007).
95
3.11. Conclusion
The governmental structure in Lagos state has a long and checked history. The 
tradition of dictatorship and corruption has been observed to be handed down from one 
administration to the next. There is also a pattern of inadequate man power, misappropriated 
resources and personalization of public services. These characteristics will test further the 
hypothesis of this thesis as these characteristics of governments and street-level bureaucrats 
are not normally found in the western societies where implementation models are developed. 
There has also been no accommodation within implementation debates of how to 
accommodate these characteristics or avoid them within public policy implementation.
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4. Managing waste collection in developing country 
cities
The purpose of this Chapter is to review general waste management in developing 
country cities. This is in order to provide a framework for evaluating/appraising policy 
intervention with regards to waste management, particularly waste collection and its 
implementation. This Chapter focuses on types of waste management and the differences in 
waste management in higher and lower income countries. It discusses contributing factors to 
inadequate waste management in lower income countries and the consequences of poor waste 
management within the urban environment.
The programme being used as a case study for this thesis is a waste management 
policy. It is therefore pertinent to testing the hypothesis that this thesis looks at the waste 
management in general and also explore the differences between waste management in 
developed countries where implementation debates are developed and where implementation 
debates are often taking place at the city level and also, waste management in developing 
country cities which is being used to test implementation theory.
4.1. Waste Generation and Management
Waste management is the way in which waste is handled and treated after it has been 
generated. Waste management covers the period from when an item is classified as waste by 
the possessor until the point of disposal (Zurbrugg 2003; Medina, 1997). Waste management 
covers four main areas, which include:
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• Waste Generation:
When a decision is reached that an object has no more use/value and must be 
disposed off.
• Collection:
This involves the collection of waste from the point of generation. There are 
two main methods employed which are door-to-door collection and communal 
collection where the waste is brought by the house holds to a central point for later 
collection to the point of disposal.
• Transfer:
This involves the transfer of waste from the point of collection to the point of 
disposal.
• Disposal:
An end for the waste collected. There are different methods of municipal 
waste disposal. The main methods of disposal include landfill, recycling, and 
incineration.
The amount of solid waste generated within a municipality depends on varying factors, 
which include the size of the urban population, the level of economic development, rate of 
consumption, seasons (areas of high precipitation which generate a lot of organic waste need
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higher collection rate due to the higher rates of decomposition of the waste and the odour 
pollution which results) and administrative systems (how efficiently the waste services are 
run) (Zurbrugg 2003; Medina, 1997).
The level of economic development refers to the average Gross National Income (GNI) 
per head of the population. In urban areas with higher per capita income, waste generation is 
significantly higher and contains higher quantities of inorganic waste than urban areas with 
lower GNI per capita (Zurbrugg, 2003). The amount and type of waste generated also differs 
from high wage areas to low wage areas (Wang and Nie, 2001). A very important variable in 
the generation of municipal waste is population but in fast growing urban areas, it is often 
quite difficult to establish accurate information on the size of the urban population due to the 
lack of recent census data and unrecorded populations such as seasonal migrants (Hockett, 
Lober and Pilgrim, 1995).
The approximate determination of the population characteristics, amount and 
composition of municipal solid waste generated is essential in order to create intervention 
policies which meet municipal waste needs (Qdais, Hamonda and Newham, 1996). This will 
give the planning authorities the information required to provide essential waste services 
required within the municipality e.g. to increase the frequency and capacity of waste 
collected to meet projected demand (Qdais et al, 1996).
Implementation debates usually both top-down and bottom-up are usually centred 
around key known variables. The debates become more difficult to apply to some developing 
country cities due to the key variables themselves being unknown. For instance, the city
determines its population to be x (legal and illegal residents), but in fact the actual figure is y.
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if y is less than x, there is an oversupply of the service to the detriment of other services. 
However, y is greater than x, there is an under supply of an essential service which will lead 
to excessive stress on the infrastructure provided. While the bottom-up debates argue that 
street-level bureaucrats will develop coping mechanisms to meet demand with limited 
resources (Winter, 2002), it still does not make adequate provision the unknown key 
variables which can occur in policy implementation in some developing country cities.
4.2. Advanced waste management systems
In order to better evaluate whether a particular waste system is efficient or not, it is 
essential to review briefly the methods being employed in more established waste 
management systems.
In the last decade in some developed countries, the thinking behind waste 
management has changed from an emphasis on collect and burying wastes in landfill sites to 
seeing waste as a potential resource (Wollam, 2005). Due to an increase in awareness of the 
added effects of waste on the generation of greenhouse gases for example methane which 
adds to the depletion of the ozone layer and lack of available space for land filling in 
countries such as the UK (Yasuda, 2002; Wollam, 2005). The reliance on landfill sites is 
becoming increasingly difficult in some countries because of a shortage of potential sites. For 
example in the Netherlands due to its unique geography (a major part of the land mass is - 
6.7m below sea level while the highest point is 321m above sea level), waste managers 
employ methods like incineration and exporting of their waste (Statistisch Jaarboek, 2000).
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The finite nature of natural resources such as crude oil has also pushed the drive to rethink 
the view of waste as waste.
The response to the adverse environmental effects of waste disposal and the 
increasing problems of finding landfill sites, throughout high-income European countries and 
North America has been to implement source reduction, reuse and recycling programs, and to 
diversify disposal options e.g. install sanitary landfills and incinerators with energy recovery 
(Wollam, 2005). The main emerging approaches can be summarized as follows:
• Waste Minimization:
This entails the reduction of waste produced by the creators of waste 
for example, encouraging manufacturers to reduce the amount of packaging 
for their products in European Union member countries (Dantus and High, 
1999).
• Reuse:
Consumers and/or manufacturers are encouraged to find similar/other 
uses for their waste before they are finally discarded (Tsai and Chow, 2004).
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Recycling:
Waste materials e.g. plastic, paper, iron, aluminium are used as raw 
materials in the production process for items like paper, plastic cups, staplers, 
instead of utilizing virgin materials.
• Other disposal options:
Sanitary Landfills:
These specially constructed landfills lined to stop/reduce leachtates 
from the landfill permeating the ground water or other water bodies (Singh 
and Murphy, 1990).
Landfills:
This method of disposal is a depression in the ground where waste is 
buried with no formal environmentally protective facilities.
Incineration:
This involves the large scale burning of waste. This process may 
include energy recovery (Sakai and Hiraoka, 2000).
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A waste hierarchy, as shown in figure 4.1 below, was developed to identify available 
options and put in order of priority the preferred options (Wollam, 2005). Figure 4.1 
represents the preferred waste disposal options within the European Union. The top of the 
pyramid is the most preferred waste disposal option which is the minimization of waste by 
the producers of waste (Wollam, 2005). This option is followed by reuse, recycling, 
incineration with energy recovery with the least preferred options being landfill and 
incineration without energy recovery (Wollam, 2005).
Within the European Union, legislation and taxes were created to discourage the land 
filling of biodegradable or recyclable/reusable waste by governments, municipalities and 
waste practitioners (Stephen, 2001). The intention of which was to force the consideration of 
other forms of waste disposal (Stephen, 2001) by making the use of land filling as a waste 
disposal option more expensive than other forms of waste disposal by using legislative 
instruments like landfill taxes (1994 EC Directive on Packaging and Packaging Waste; BBC 
News, 2002; European Communities, 2000; Adefuye, 2003). The level of waste awareness 
amongst both governments and the civil society in Europe and North America is high 
including awareness of the effects of waste disposal, its effects and the available disposal 
options. This high level of waste awareness within some high income countries has allowed 
for the diversification of waste disposal options within these countries (European 
Communities, 2000)
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energy recovery
Figure 4.1 (Source: Wollam, 2005)
4.3. Developing waste management systems
Compared to waste management in developing countries, there are a number of 
problems associated with waste management in urban areas in some lower income countries. 
These include or are related to the rapid increase in urban population, types of waste 
generated, lack of institutional capacity of waste management, the operation of a large 
informal sector and peoples’ attitudes towards waste management and waste management
104
practitioners involved in the sector (Thomas-Hope 1998). Other problems associated with 
waste management in some developing country cities include;
• The waste may contain faecal matter due to the provision of inadequate 
sewerage systems in low income country cities (Cointreau 1981; and 
Olowomeye, 1991);
• Waste may include industrial waste because small and medium sized 
enterprises may use the municipal waste systems to dispose of their waste 
which may be hazardous (Olowomeye, 1991),
• The waste often includes a high organic content, the decomposition of the 
organic waste can turn into chemical constituents which pollutes the ground 
water (Cointreau 1981; and Olowomeye, 1991), and
• Due to very low collection rates in some low-income countries, the waste 
generated is often discarded in open spaces in legal or illegal open dumps, 
vacant plots, roadsides, open drainages, water bodies’ e.t.c. (Olowomeye, 
1991, Onibokun, and Kumuyi, 1999).
In contrast to high income countries where waste management is dealt with at a 
national (or in some case supra-national level in the EU) and where attention is moving 
towards waste minimization and treating waste as a resource (Wollam, 2005), low-income 
country cities, remain a focus of activity and emphasis has remained on the collection,
transfer and burying of waste (Cointreau, 1981). Very few waste disposal options are 
available in developing country cities and when waste disposal options are available, they are 
usually limited to recycling and small scale composting (Zurburg, 2003).
The totality of the waste generated in low income country cities is usually not 
collected. For example, in 1994 the waste generated in Abidjan was estimated to be 921,000 
tonnes per annum but the authorities collected approximately only 509,000 tonnes per annum 
(approximately 55% in 1994) (Attahi, 1999). In Dar Es Salaam, the waste generated was 
estimated to be 1040 tonnes per day but approximately only 180 tonnes were estimated to 
have been collected and sent to landfill in 1991 (Yhdego, 1991). The implication of this 
collection deficit for some developing country cities is that a significant amount of waste is 
being left within the urban environment. Waste that is not disposed of in the appropriate 
manner or place will be disposed of at inappropriate places for instance water bodies and 
urban spaces (Attahi, 1999). In Dar Es Salam, as stated above, if only 55% of waste 
generated is collected annually, it means approximately 45%, 412,000 tonnes of waste will be 
disposed off inappropriately, for example in illegal dump sites. The amount of waste is 
significant enough to pose health and environmental risks as will be discussed later in 
Sections 4.7 and 4.8.
Table 4.1: Collection rates in some low income cities.
Source: World Resource Institute (1991)
City Waste Collection %
Dar Es Salam 40
Kinshasa 10
Jakarta 40
Karachi 40
Faisalabad 50
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4.4. Effects of population growth on waste generated
The highest growth rates of urban populations recorded by statistical organizations are 
in low income countries, where high proportions of the population lived in rural areas (World 
Bank, 1999; UN, 2003); African regions are experiencing the highest urban growth rates of 
5% per annum of all the world regions (World Resource Institute, 1998/99; Donkor, 2003). 
For example, the urban growth rate in Nigeria is currently estimated as 5.1% while that of the 
United Kingdom is 1.2% (World Resource Institute, 2006).
In low income countries cities with high levels of urbanization, rural to urban 
migration is an important factor fuelling urban growth. The move from rural areas to urban 
areas is due mainly to economic reasons. As incomes in urban areas are usually higher than 
rural areas and the choice of employment is more diverse (Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer, 
1995). The growth and expansion of urban settlements will mean that the urban infrastructure 
will need to be expanded over time as demand increases.
It is likely that increase in population will lead to a corresponding increase in waste. 
Quite quickly, given the rates of population growth, waste production can exceed the capacity 
that the city can successfully accommodate. For example, the population of Mumbai went 
from 8.2 million people in 1981 to 12.3 million in 1991. The waste generated per day showed 
a resultant increase going from 3200 tonnes per day to 5400 tonnes per day, a growth rate of 
approximately 67%. The city of Mumbai faced a capacity shortfall due to inadequate 
resources and manpower to deal with the increase in waste generation. The inability of some 
developing country cities to forecast their urban population growth rate effectively leads to a 
corresponding decrease in their ability to plan for urban services (Boadi, Kuitunen, 2003).
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4.5. More people, more income, more waste
Rapid urban growth rates with significant increases in population in cities have an 
effect on the provision of waste services (Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer, 1995). This has 
two possible consequences:
• Expansion of unplanned and often inadequately serviced settlements, which make it 
difficult to plan efficient waste collection and transfer services, and,
• Rapid population growth leading to increased pressure on urban infrastructure
These two factors have an effect on the ability of the municipal governments to plan 
for, or provide resources for the efficient management of urban services. Partly due to 
general increases of wealth in urban areas but also due to the shift of rural immigrants from 
subsistence to a waged livelihood, the increase in relative wealth of households usually 
leads to higher rates of consumption and a corresponding diversification and increase in 
waste generated (Achankeng, 2003). For example, higher wage incomes can lead to the 
consumption of more goods which are inorganic in nature such as microwave dinners 
instead of cooking.
In general, as incomes increase, the type of waste generated diversifies from mainly 
organic waste to include other types of materials like paper and packaging (Boadi, 
Kuitunen, 2003; and World Bank, 1999). The increase in the amount of waste generated 
needs to be matched with an increase in collection capacity along with a diversification of 
disposal methods and capacity.
108
The type of population within an area affects how governments can plan for those areas. 
Cities with large amounts of squatter settlements or resource deprived areas have to make 
provisions for areas which are usually difficult to access and could receive limited co­
operation from the people living there. Unplanned squatter settlements are the exception 
rather than the rule in western democracies and as such, implementation studies have so far 
not included them. Implementation literatures also do not consider a high illiteracy level 
within its Policy Makers target End Users. A high level of illiteracy can sometimes make it 
harder for Policy Makers and street-level bureaucrats to be able to achieve policy goals.
As the patterns of consumption changes due to changes in the general income level of a 
city, the Policy Makers need to be able to adapt their policies to meet this change. The 
implementation literature whether top-down or bottom-up doesn’t recognize that some 
Policy Makers and street-level bureaucrat are developing their methods of coping with a 
constantly changing demographics. Implementation debates do not take into account large 
squatter settlements which can develop sporadically and could be difficult to manage. 
These squatter settlements have their impacts on the amount of waste generated which 
affect the overall management of waste in the urban environment as a whole. As such, they 
need to be considered within any policy created.
4.6. Country type, country waste
There are significant differences in urban wastes generated between cities in high
income countries and those in low income countries both in type and quantity. High income
cities generate approximately twice the amount of waste generated per person in low income
cities (EPAT 1999; Boadi, and Kuitunen, 2003). Table 4.2 illustrates the differences in the
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amount and type of waste collected per person per year in developed and developing country 
cities. High income cities are shown to generate between 300-1000 kg (Krammer et al, 1994; 
Cointreau, 1982) of waste per person per year while low income cities were seen to generate 
between 100-220 kg of waste per person per year (Kramer et al, 1994; EPAT, 1999; 
Cointreau, 1982). The composition of the waste generated within low and high income 
economies also varies. Low income economies have a high proportion of organic waste, 
moisture content and sand (Cointreau, 1980; Olowomeye, 1991; Boadi, Kuitunen, 2003), 
while waste in high income countries contains less moisture and more paper, glass and metals 
(Cointreau, 1980; Olowomeye, 1991; Boadi, Kuitunen, 2003).
This difference in the type and amount of waste generated within the two types of 
cities implies that different approaches and equipment maybe required delivering waste 
services as will be discussed in Section 4.6 below.
Table 4.2: Municipal Wastes- Quantities and characteristics for Low, Middle and High
income countries (Source: Cointreau, 1982)
W aste Generation Low Income 
countries
M iddle Income 
Countries
High Income 
Countries
(Kg per person per year) 100-220 180-330 300-1,000
Moisture Content (% net 
weight at point o f  
generation)
40-80 40-60 20-40
Composition (% by net 
weight) 1
Paper 1-10 15-40 15-50
Glass, Ceramics 1-10 1-10 4-12
Metals 1-5 1-5 3-13
Plastics 1-5 2-6 2-10
Leather, Rubber 1-5 - -
Wood, Bones, Straw 1-5 - -
Textiles 1-5 2-10 2-10
Vegetables/Purescible 40-85 20-65 20-50
Miscellaneous inert 1-40 1-30 1-20
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4.7. Waste Institutions
In developing country cities, solid waste can absorb a significant proportion of the 
municipal budget, for instance in the late 1970s’, Kanpur and Calcutta in India allocate 
approximately 22% and 26% of their annual budget respectively to waste collection 
(Cointreau, 1981), while waste collection rates are typically low, often only 50-70% of that 
generated within their municipalities (Olowomeye, 1991; Swilling and Hutt, 1999). In cities 
in high income countries solid waste management absorbs a smaller proportion of the 
municipal budgets but collect 95% of the urban waste generated (Klundert and Lardinois, 
1995).
The differences in waste collection within high and low income country cities also 
extend to the funding of solid waste management services. In most low income country cities, 
the government usually funds solid waste management directly, while in a number of in high 
income country cities, the cost are transferred to the End User. In Chapter six, this thesis shall 
review how public private partnerships are used within selected countries to transfer the cost 
of municipal solid waste collection to the End User (Li and Akintoye, 2004)
Inadequate governance structures and limited resources restrict the ability of 
governments to provide adequate infrastructure (for example, water, sanitation, waste 
management services). This makes it difficult for some municipal governments to meet the 
needs of the urban population at the rate at which the population expands. This is especially 
true within slum areas (Medina, 2002, Olowomeye, 1991, Kuittunen, 2003, Buenrostro, 
Bocco, 2003). Chapter 5 on urban governance will look at the relationship between forms of 
governments and their urban population.
I l l
The efficiency of waste collection management services is directly dependent on other 
services to function effectively. The services which waste collection management depends on 
include; an adequate transportation network, appropriate waste disposal options and adequate 
service training of staff (Rabinovitch, 1992). Unplanned urban expansion accompanied by 
unplanned roads. This affects the mode of collection. For instance, if a city has a mechanized 
system of collection, the collection vehicles may not be able to access the unplanned 
settlements due to the conditions of the road which may be too narrow or are unmotorable.
Further problems faced by the waste institutions in developing cities include;
Inadequate Data
i. One of the most important factors in the effective management of 
waste, and perhaps most especially policy development is accurate 
data. This is a key feature in creating effective intervention or 
collection management schemes (Agunwamba, 1998). In most high 
income cities, the data available is fairly accurate, but in low income 
cities, data collection is sporadic, unreliable, or sometimes non-existent 
(Agunwamba, 1998).
ii. Problems of data collection are illustrated in the work of Onibokun and 
Kumuyi (1996) who used data from different specialists on waste 
generated in Ibadan, Nigeria, and it would appear that the data 
provided by the consultants over a period of time is not accurate e.g. 
McLaren International projected waste generated in 1970 as 0.53kg per
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person per day, Oluwande in 1982 projected it to be 0.42kg per person 
per day and PAI in 1982 estimated it to be 0.33kg per person per day 
(Onibokun and Kumuyi, 1996). The waste generation data collected 
would indicate that the waste arising has decreased over the stated 
period, without explanations for the attested drop in the amount of 
waste being generated per person (Onibokun and Kumuyi, 1996). 
These discrepancies would instil doubt in the data collected and raise 
questions as to whether the data was estimated or if research was 
carried out to reach these conclusions.
In order to effectively manage scarce resources and manpower, a range
of data is required for example, daily/annual tonnage of waste
generated, demographics of the people being served, composition of
waste being generated and, user tariffs if any (Agunwamba, 1998; Abu
Qudais, Hamoda and Newham, 1997). The analysis should also
distinguish between formal and informal forms of service provision. It
should be noted that there exists very little literature on the correlation
between accurate data and effective waste collection management.
This is an interesting point when considering urban centres which
struggle to provide adequate waste removal and transfer options. For
instance, where city x is experiencing a collection and transfer deficits.
Could inadequate waste generation data be affecting how city x
delivers its services? For instance, If city x is has estimated it only
generates 5 tonnes of waste per day but actual waste generated is 10
tonnes giving it a shortfall of 5 tonnes in its collection service and
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resource allocation. It is not a situation that will be quick or easy to 
resolve.
Waste collection technology
The choice of waste collection technology chosen to provide urban waste 
collection and transfer services could be the difference between an efficient 
service and inefficient service.
iv. The technological needs of high income and low income countries 
differ greatly because of the differences in the types of waste generated 
and the differences in their economic conditions as discussed in 
Section 4.4 above. Waste management technologies generally 
developed in high income countries which are fit for their purpose 
tends to low applicability and rarely achieve the same targets in 
developing country cities (Medina, 2002).
v. The technology that is sometimes adopted in developing country cities 
does not necessarily match their needs (Olowomeye, 1991). For 
example, the use of compactor trucks in high income countries usually 
achieves a final density of 400kg/cubic meter and a compaction ratio 
of 4:1, while in a developing country city the same compactors could 
achieve a compaction ratio of only 1.5:1 because of the greater 
proportion of organic waste and smaller proportion of paper and
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plastics (Cointreau, 1982). There may also be problems maintaining 
specialist equipment, due to a lack of man power and resources 
(Onibokun, Kumuyi, 1996; Medina, 2002; World Bank 1990).
vi. The availability of resources (infrastructure, man power and financial 
resources) in developing country cities has an effect on the kind of 
waste technology that can be used within the city for instance; the lack 
of accessible vehicular roads can affect the type of collection 
equipment that can be utilized within some areas (Ogu, 2000).
For instance, in Abidjan, the municipal authorities acquired six 
crusher trucks (24 m ), 3 fork-lift trucks for loading bins of 3-6 m , 
and 360 bins of 3 m (Attahi, 1999). The size of this machinery limited 
some of the areas that the equipment was able to access. The roads of 
unplanned settlements were to narrow and in conditions which limited 
the use of heavy machinery. In some cases, the machinery further 
worsened the conditions of the roads (Attahi, 1999). The municipality 
also found it very difficult to maintain the equipment purchased 
(Attahi, 1999).
A further example is in Manila in 1990, the Japanese 
government donated 300 compactor trucks but by 1992, only 120 were 
working due to the city’s inability to maintain and run the trucks 
(Medina, 2002).
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vii. It is very essential that the waste management authorities in any city be 
able to match equipment to urban infrastructure and needs to be able to 
provide an optimum level of waste services within the urban 
environment.
Waste financing
The current practice of waste management in many low income cities is problematic 
and expensive. Expensive methods of waste management e.g. incinerators which cost 
a lot of foreign exchange can add to resource scarcity (Schubeler, 1996).
External support
i) External support from aid agencies for solid waste management projects has 
mixed impacts. While some projects are able to keep meeting their design 
objectives after external support has been removed, others are unsustainable 
once the foreign funding has been exhausted, as arrangements are not made to 
meet future funding needs (Klundert and Lardinois, 1995).
ii) Very little consideration is given to the socio-economic characteristics of the 
country or municipality receiving the aid and their ability to sustain the project 
after the financial assistance has ceased by either the agency or the 
municipality (Ogawa, 1995).
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II. Informal Waste Sector
Failures of formal waste management processes had led to the development of 
informal responses to the problem of waste management. These are complex and extremely 
valid services and range from the door to door collection of waste to diversifying the disposal 
options such as recycling and composting within the urban environment (Fahmi, 2005).
The concept of an informal sector is used to describe the part of the labour force 
working outside the organized labour market (Hart, 1970, 1973). This sector of the economy 
is not regulated by the government and does not contribute formally to the GNP i.e. the 
economic value of services are hypothesized due to the non-regulatory nature of the sector 
(Gerxhani, 2004).
The impact of the informal sector in developing countries is high as it is a large source 
of employment within some cities. While the activities of sector are not criminal in so far as 
they provide valid services to the public, their legality is often in question. The sector 
according to the literature is viewed to fall in between legal and illegal activities (Gerxhani, 
2004).
In some developing country cities, the informal waste sector is integral to the delivery 
of waste collection management services in the urban area. This thesis recognizes their 
contribution (both positive and negative) to waste management collection within developing 
country cities and explores their contribution in general to waste management in developing 
country cities in Chapter seven. This thesis also focuses on their specific contribution to the
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delivery of waste collection management services in Lagos state in the analysis of the Lagos 
state waste collection PSP program.
Informal services provision in services like waste management can be a vital part of 
waste management services in some developing country cities. This variable of service 
provision is not found in implementation debates regardless of government stance on the role 
of the informal sector.
4.8. Glamour work, local attitudes and effect on waste 
handling
Attitudes to solid waste management differ in different contexts. In some sub-Saharan 
cities, in pre-colonial times, the collection and disposal of waste was seen as a communal 
duty carried out by women and children (Olowomeye, 1991). Over time, as cities expanded, 
the traditional management became inadequate to meet the city’s waste management needs 
(Olowomeye, 1991, Onibokun, and Kumuyi, 1999). Newly emerging governments were ill 
equipped to fill to fill the gap left by traditional methods of waste management and an 
informal sector developed to fill the gap in demand not met by government service provision 
(Attahi, 1999).
The conditions of work, especially for the informal practitioners working in the 
municipal solid waste collection sector are very hazardous and dangerous as a result of 
untreated waste contaminants in the waste stream and limited or no protection for waste 
workers (Schubeler, 1996; Cointreau, 1982). The social status of those working in waste
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management in both high income and low income countries is generally low. The public 
perception of the workers who collect their waste creates a prejudice against the workers 
which in turn impacts on workers and their attitude to their work. (Olowomeye, 1991, 
Ogawa, 1995, Onibokun, and Kumuyi, 1999).
People’s attitudes and habits have a corresponding effect on the waste generated and 
demand for effective services. The ability of the civil society to take responsibility for or 
participatory interest, in waste management as a whole has an effect on the type and level of 
waste management services that may be found in some country cities (Onibokun and 
Kumuyi, 1999). For example, the general belief that waste management services are the 
responsibility of the government and should be paid for by the government will result in a 
majority of the targeted end use End Users being unwilling to pay for the formal waste 
services. Even though the income generated from the waste bill could dramatically improve 
level of service received or area that can be covered (Olowomeye, 1991). Their level of 
interest and their ability to translate that interest into action for example, paying for services 
received, will often have a direct effect on the type and level of service received. (Schubeler,
1995).
The role of the End Users in the implementation of services will be further explored 
in Chapters eight and nine. Most implementation debates take for granted that if an effective 
service which is not cumbersome to use or understand (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1983), 
most if not all End Users will cooperate with the service providers. End Users are seldom 
mentioned except to argue that proximity to them is necessary (bottom-uppers). End Users 
satisfaction is usually a measure of if the policy is working as opposed to an actor that can 
directly or indirectly affect implementation.
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4.9. Consequence of inadequate waste disposal in urban 
centres
The inappropriate discarding of municipal waste in unsuitable areas can cause 
significant urban problems. For example, discarded waste can cause flooding as the waste left 
on some road sides finds its way into the drainage system and obstructs the free movement of 
surface water, or traffic congestion as waste left on the roadside overflows on to the road 
slowing traffic as motorists slow down to avoid the waste to avoid damage to their vehicles 
from sharp objects (Olori, 2005).
In some developing country cities where waste is collected, the main methods used in 
the disposal of waste in low-income countries are mainly land filling and open air-burning 
(Medina, 2002; Cointreau, 1981; Agunwamba, 1998). Burning as a waste management tool 
leads to air pollution and the likely presence of methane in most dump sites could also cause 
a significant fire hazard. For example, in Tampico Mexico, a fire started to manage the waste 
at a landfill burned for six months due to the presence of methane at the landfill site (Medina, 
2002).
4.10. Health
The indiscriminate disposal of waste in the environment can have an adverse effect on 
not just the psychological health but the physical health of the people who live in such areas 
(Achankeng, 2003). The two groups most at risk are the private, formal (public) and informal 
waste workers who deal directly with the waste, because the waste collected may include
120
faecal matter in the waste, medical waste and light industrial waste, which could be 
hazardous, within the municipal waste stream and people who live in the vicinity of legal and 
illegal waste dumps sites (through rodents, pests etc) especially children who might play in 
the waste deposited close to their homes (Schubeler, 1996, Cointreau, 1981, Olowomeye, 
1991).
Indiscriminate waste dumping also provides breeding places for pests such as 
mosquitoes, rats, and houseflies’ which spread sickness and disease, leachtates may 
contaminate the ground and surface water. Waste is also ascetically unpleasing and has a 
negative impact on the people that live in proximity to those areas and negatively affects the 
associated land values within affected areas (Medina, 2002; HABITAT, 1996; Cointreau, 
1981).
4.11. Conclusion
Implementation debates are centred mainly on formal provision of urban services 
because they are created in Northern American and Europe. In these countries, the informal 
sector are illegal and do not constitute major service providers as can be found within 
developing country cities. The informal sector service providers also constitute an unknown 
variable within the delivery of waste management services especially when governments are 
unable to regulate their activities. The control that Policy Makers have on them varies from 
city to city. In areas where formal provision has completely broken down, they constitute the 
main/only source of service delivery. Implementation debates (top-down and bottom-up) do
not recognize this sector as a source of service delivery. This makes the informal sector 
pertinent within this thesis as for a significant period of time, they represented the main 
source of waste collection services in Lagos state during Phase I of the PSP Programme and 
they were the inspiration for the PSP Programme.
The type and amount of waste generated within a city is determined by population 
growth, general income levels and patterns of consumption. Higher income cities in more 
developed nations have more varied methods of waste management due to the influences of 
the civil society and supra organizations like the European Union. The two groups are able to 
bring about effective change on the type of waste management services delivered in urban 
communities. In developing country cities, due to in effective formal provision of waste 
services, a strong informal sector has arisen to provide waste services. The informal service 
providers as will be discussed further in Chapter seven can have both a negative and a 
positive effect on waste services and the urban community.
Variables required for effective policy implementation within developing country 
cities can fluctuate due to a number of reasons, which make implementation debates more 
difficult to apply to these countries. Waste generated within municipal urban areas in some 
developing country cities are collected by two streams of waste collection service providers 
who are the formal (private or public sector) or the informal waste collection service 
providers.
The method used in governing an urban area plays an important role in the ability of
the urban area to meet its needs. Governance which is discussed in depth in Chapter 5 is a
key feature in the formal provision of waste collection services in urban areas. The method of
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governing employed by the governing bodies or authority determines whether or not the 
provision of formal services will meet policy targets.
In the case of waste management demographics are an important consideration 
because they are the generators of waste and directly affect the pattern of waste generation 
that might be observed within a municipal area. The demographic aspects like consumption 
which affect variables like amount of waste generated, types of waste will affect collection 
transfer and disposal of waste.
In high income cities an awareness which can be found in both the civil society and 
the government brings the issues of waste into the arena of public debate and allow for 
proactive measures to be implemented within the society leading to an ability to put pressure 
and translate willingness into action to pay for services enables the government to provide an 
adequate service.
The literature indicates that while there is recognition of the need for at the very least 
basic waste management services, i.e. collection, transfer and disposal, there seems to be a 
disconnection between acknowledging that the service is needed and providing the service. 
Although developing country cities usually have a designated authority within the municipal 
authority which is responsible for the collection management of waste within the municipal 
areas and a percentage of the municipal budget is often used for the management of waste, 
the evidence shows that the current practices are not enough to meet the growing populations’ 
needs.
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The literature also indicates that the general level of awareness of the civil society in 
developing cities is very low. This limits their ability to effectively demand for required 
services and input favourably in the creation of policy.
Finance is a major problem faced by low income countries in waste collection 
management. Inadequate and unpredictable resources make it difficult for effective waste 
collection management within some developing country cities. These developing country 
cities have few resources chasing many needs. It should be noted that the issue of resources is 
a multifaceted problem. The problem is not just the lack of resources, but the 
misappropriation of available resources.
Waste collection management is a service dependent on other services directly or 
indirectly to function effectively. The current state of the dependant services needs to be 
ascertained in order to provide services that are effective within local parameters.
Waste collection management is a sector which is still undergoing development in 
developing country cities. The different variables which affect it need to be understood before 
effective waste management policies can be created to intervene where they are needed 
effectively.
The biggest challenge faced according to the literature is the ability of urban 
governments in developing country cities to meet the requirements of waste collection 
management in some urban areas. The authorities charged with delivery waste collection 
management services in some developing country cities are unable to provide adequate
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resources required to deal with the increasing amounts of waste being generated within their 
urban areas.
A lack of co-operation is has been observed within the literature between the 
municipalities and the public. In some developing country cities, there seemed to be little or 
no interaction between the municipal population and the governing authorities. The 
predominant attitude to waste that is observed from the literature was it was a government 
responsibility.
An interesting factor of waste collection management in developing country cities is 
there exists a well established informal waste sector who are not necessarily providers of an 
illegal service. The informal sector is important in this thesis because it has been the main 
provider of waste collection of waste collection services in Lagos state for a long period of 
time. The informal sector is visited within the literature in Chapter 7 and is reviewed within 
the analysis in Chapters 8 and 9.
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5. Governance and service delivery: challenges in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Lagos
The roles of governments in modem times are constantly being redefined. 
Governance is a term often used to define the concept of the changing role of government and 
the decision making methods that portray the changes. However, what is becoming more 
apparent is the limited applicability of these ideas or evolving institutions to governments in 
sub Saharan Africa. The aim of this Section therefore is to look at the history of governments 
in sub Saharan Africa and attempt to access the type of government in this region. This 
Section is divided into authoritarian rule in sub Saharan Africa, and post authoritarian rule 
within this region. The objective of this Chapter is to understand the way in which sub 
Saharan governments operate and how their method of governing could possibly affect policy 
creation and implementation.
Most implementation debates have certain characteristics which are taken from 
granted, for instance, the stability of government and good governance practices to a large 
extent from the Policy Makers. The type of governance which is found within some 
developing country cities can tend to vary significantly from that found in some developed 
country cities. As governance is an important part of implementation (it demonstrates how 
governments and institutions are run), it is important to understand the type of governance to 
be found in a city and how it will affect the implementation of public policies within that city. 
This Chapter aims to paint a picture for the reader of the possible problems the application of 
implementation debates will encounter in some developing country cities.
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5.1. Elements of the institutions of State in Sub Saharan 
Countries
The political systems practiced in most sub-Saharan African states whether under 
authoritarian rule or democratic rule is the federal system. The institutional system of most 
sub-Saharan African countries has the prevalence of a dominant centre (Olowu, 1990; Ndulu 
and Connell, 1999).
The predominant characteristic of authoritarian rule within some of the governments 
of sub-Saharan Africa has encouraged the growth of a strong centre. This strong centre is 
predominant in sub-Sahara African nation states which have undergone military rule or single 
political party systems. These countries have shown a strong executive arm and mid-strength 
judicial arm of government which is usually in contrast with a weak legislative Section. This 
is because the legislative sector is usually the first institution to be abolished by authoritarian 
governments (Ndulu and O’Connell, 1999; Vallings and Moreno-Torres, 2005). Military 
rulers grant majority legislative and judicial power to the government. For example, during 
the military administration of Nigeria national and state law were passed by military decrees 
and state edicts which were not challengeable in a court of law (Olowu 1990, Dudley 1982; 
Ihonvbere, 1996).
5.2. Authoritarian Rule Sub-Saharan Africa
In order to understand the current mode or forms of governance within sub-Saharan 
African states, it is important to understand the history of governance within sub-Saharan
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African states and the possible reasons for the predominance of authoritarian rule within Sub- 
Saharan African states.
The history of authoritarian rule in sub-Saharan African states can be traced as far 
back as the colonial era where authoritarian rule was either applied directly to the locals or 
indirectly through established local rule systems. The colonial era enforced the tradition of 
forced rule and subjugation in all sub Saharan countries (Crowder, 1987; Olowu, 1990). 
Deschamps (1971) a French colonial officer describes the colonial governor as a totalitarian 
in charge of everything from the economy, infrastructure, fellow Europeans and everything 
and everyone else in between. This method of ruling is what was inherited by the nationalists 
of the time and the idea of the consolidation of power in the central government was bom 
(Crowder, 1987; Roth 1968). The late fifties and the early sixties symbolized for most sub- 
Saharan African countries the end of the colonial era and the beginning of independent nation 
states, for example, Ghana gained independence in 1957 and Nigeria in 1960 (Healy and 
Robinson, 1994).
The sub-Saharan African leaders at this time were faced with the responsibility of 
unifying dynamic people of diverse languages and cultures from countries like Cameroon 
with 8 different ethnic groups to countries like Nigeria with approximately 250 ethnic groups. 
The trend in these countries quickly went from one of democratic rule systems developed for 
them by the colonials to different forms of authoritarian governments.
Some of these independent Sub Saharan African countries by the end of the 1960s had
in one form of the other authoritarian governments or personal rule, for example President
Olympio of Togo (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984a), which was accomplished either through one
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party politics, military rule or both. Other examples of single party states have been are 
Senegal, Uganda and Ghana where there have been bans of opposing political parties and 
numerous coups by the military in between periods of civilian rule (Coulon, 1988; Diamond, 
1988).
The effect of authoritarian rule on these countries was the diminishing or complete 
elimination of constitutional rights, lack of political opposition, lack of accountability, 
centralized power based more often than not with the presidency or reigning military head 
(Remmer, 1985). The single party governments were either co-opted or forcefully installed 
for example; President Obote of Uganda in 1966 made Uganda a one party state. Military 
coups were common place in sub-Saharan Africa and were either bloody or bloodless for 
example, President Gowon of Nigeria bloodless military coup in 1966 (Jackson and Rosberg, 
1982; Healy and Robinson, 1994). Dictatorship spread to most of the sub-Saharan African 
states by the mid eighties with the exception of Botswana, Mauritius and the Gambia which 
have retained multiparty democracy since independence (Healy and Robinson, 1994).
The predominance of authoritarian in Sub-Saharan African states it is argued a form 
of inheritance from the colonial administrators. The colonial rule in Sub-Saharan Africa was 
authoritarian rule either directly as could be found in western Nigeria or indirect rule as could 
be found in northern Nigeria. The emphasis was control of the people to suit the colonial 
administrators as opposed to ruling for the benefit of the people ( Olowu, 1990; BBC News, 
2007). This need for control was pronounced in the merging of seemingly incompatible 
ethnic group into countries. The incompatibility of these ethnic groups resulted in civil wars 
in countries like Nigeria where some tribes have tried to separate from others (Ewaikhide and
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Isumonah, 2001). The inheritance of colonial rule and ethnic tensions have encouraged 
authoritarian rule within Sub-Saharan Africa.
The ease in which a number of the African governments came into power is observed 
by Lonsdale (1986) as a possible reason for authoritarian governments. The leaders opinions 
it is hypothesized was that they had the right to lead because they fought for independence or 
had stood for certain ideals. The military leaders organized coups with the intention of 
righting civilian wrongs (BBC News, 2000). The history of colonial rule also helped to 
propagate this belief as the colonial rulers felt it was their right because they were more 
developed than the indigenous people to rule them (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984a). The 
colonial administrators believed that their way and their way only was the best way for their 
African ‘subjects’ and allowed no inputs from the indigenous Africans (Wunsch and Olowu, 
1990).
Indeed this problem is still being felt acutely in some sub-Saharan African states more 
than others for example, at independence the Southern Sudan wanted autonomy from 
northern Sudan as an independent state but the colonials viewed it as administratively and 
economically ineffective for them and made both regions one country. The ‘country’ is still 
being ravaged by conflict with atrocities like ethnic cleansing occurring (Bleakly, 1998; BBC 
News 2004).
Democracy it is further argued by Roth (1968) was forced on the indigenous people,
was regarded as unnatural and hence led to the development of methods of authoritarian rule
(Roth, 1968). This last view is, however, challenged by Olowomeye (1991), Olowu (1990)
and Bleakly (1998). While not all the indigenous cultures in sub Saharan Africa had
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democratic systems before the advent of the colonials, some of the indigenous cultures for 
example the Yoruba’s and the Ibo cultures of Nigeria already practiced what could be 
described as a form of federalism which made it easier for it to be introduced as the form of 
government for countries like Nigeria (Olowomeye, 1991; Olowu, 1990; and Bleakly, 1998).
Diamond (1988) argue that the multi-ethnic nature of most African countries in 
countries like Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe have dominant ethnic groups looking for 
control over shared resources. The economic condition of the nation states at the time of 
independence was seen as having very limited growth potential and the public sector was 
viewed as a personal asset for their leaders enrichment (Diamond, 1988).
The histories of a number of sub Saharan governments are rife with allegations of 
misappropriation of public funds being embezzled for private use and in some cases being 
transferred or invested abroad. For example, approximately $500 million was returned to 
Nigeria from the formal head of states, General Abachas’ frozen account by the Swiss 
government (BBC News, 2004). Below table 5.1 high lights the political histories of a few 
sub-Saharan African countries. This table shows the predominance of authoritarian rule in 
these countries from 1960 till 2000 when some countries like Nigeria returned it is hoped 
permanently to democracy.
The top-down method of implementation should theoretically work well in
authoritarian countries. The policies created by the Policy Makers are easily passed into law
with targeted End Users forced to comply (Sabatier, 1996). The implementation top-down
school of thought prescribes the provision of adequate resources as key to successful
implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1983). A predominant characteristic of
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authoritarian rule is corruption (Ghura, 2002). While adequate resources might be allocated 
from Policy Makers for implementation, there is no guarantee that the resources will not be 
misappropriated. Both the top-down and the bottom-up do not make contingencies for 
misappropriated resources.
Table 5.1: Political Histories Source: Wikipedia.com (2006)
C ountry D em ocra
cy
1960s
A u th o rita  
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5.3. Democracy; what now?
The dictionary defines democracy as a government which is duly elected in a free and 
fair election for the people and by the people and where ultimate power rests with the electing 
majority as opposed to the ruling or privileged few (dictionary, 2007). Baker (1998) goes on 
to say that in a democracy peoples’ freedoms are unrestricted and the rule of law is 
paramount.
In Recent times, democracy has again become the trend in sub-Saharan African 
countries. From the mid to the late 1990s, authoritarian regimes have found it increasingly 
difficult to maintain control over the civil society. The clamour for democratically elected 
efficient governments from the indigenous population usually through mass demonstrations, 
and mounting international pressure, for example, through international economic sanctions 
created conditions in which democratic ideals have received a more sympathetic treatment in 
some of the sub-Saharan countries (Jackson and Rosberg, 1992).
Recognizing the risky democratic tide, authoritarian leaders through most of the
region were quick to become multi-party states and organize countrywide elections. What
was observed during these election processes however was an alarming majority of the
former dictators have been able to reinvent themselves as civilian leaders and were at
different points re-elected/manipulated back into office for example, Rawlings of Ghana, and
Kerekou of Benin (Jackson and Rosberg, 1992). While the authoritarian constitutions have
been substituted for democratic constitutions, authoritarian regimes have either survived as
they were or have been substituted for new elected authoritarian regimes. These regimes are
characterized by the continuous authoritarian behaviour of the elected leaders for example the
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dismissal of the Nigerian vice president by the president who is a former dictator without 
consulting the senate in 2006 (Sanni, Uwugiaren, Chesa, and Onoja 2006), and the 
misappropriation of food aid by the Zimbabwean government to only the ruling party 
supporters and neglecting the opposition at the height of food shortage in Zimbabwe (BBC 
News, 2002).
The opposition parties were usually either intimidated, bribed, a method of divide and 
conquer was applied and outright rigging of elections was used to ensure the return of 
authoritarian leaders into public office (Baker, 1998). A classic example the 1990s 
democratic wave was the systematic disqualification of opponents by the then military head 
of state of Nigeria in order to run unopposed in the presidential elections in 1997 (Ikelegbe, 
2001). Practices like this gave rise to a new form of regime in the 1990s which was identified 
by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way as competitive authoritarian regimes pseudo­
democracies. These governments had put on the garments of being democracies but still kept 
all the traditions of the authoritarian regimes with very little if any kind of change to promote 
the ideals of democracy which these sub-Saharan African countries had become.
In recent times, the trend is no longer just democracy but good governance. In the 
light of the kind of governments found in sub Saharan African countries this Section aims to 
find out if good governance is practicable within the government regimes and how this will 
ultimately affect implementation which will be covered in Chapters 8 and 9.
The type of governance found in a country/city is an important factor when reviewing 
implementation and how to make implementation effective. Most implementation literature
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as mentioned in Section 5.9 is written about/for western countries whom are mainly 
democratically led (Winter, 2002). These literature make a few assumptions which include 
and are not limited to 1) and possibly the most important which is the country has a 
governance system which is open and fair with a functioning democratic system and Policy 
Makers are open to criticism. This is evident from the pioneers of implementation studies 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984), continued in the works of Sabatier (1996) credited with the 
development of the first framework and continued by Lipsky (1976, 1980) who started the 
bottom-up school of thought. Reading through their work, it assumed that Policy Makers will 
the Policy Makers or street-level bureaucrats are seen as either short sighted in their views, 
essential to the role but with limited powers. It is still always assumed that the Policy Makers 
and street-level bureaucrats will always do the best for the targeted End User.
These literatures do not consider the Policy Makers found within countries that have 
dictatorships and where there is little accountability if any from Policy Makers and street- 
level bureaucrats (Juma and Clark 1995). The corruption is found within the bureaucratic 
systems from the Policy Makers to the street-level bureaucrats (Brautigam, and Knack, 
2004). There are no safeguards within implementation literature to deter or reduce corruption 
within implementation within these countries. If we assume that corruption is the siphoning 
of limited public resources by the bureaucrats who should be administering them, how can 
implementation be made to work if there is no guarantee that the resources will be used as 
allocated within municipal budgets? This thesis shall further look at corruption within post 
dictatorship administrations in Section 8 .7.2 and 9.7.1.
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5.4. Civil Society
The combination of non-governmental organizations and institutions that puts forward 
the interests and will of citizens; individuals and organizations across Sections of different 
sectors of the public whom are supposed to be independent of the government is known as 
Civil Society (Mule, 2001). Civil society is the site from which citizens can lobby their 
governments (Bratton 1989, Kasfir 1998). The most important role of the civil society is 
usually as regulators of the government (Bratton 1989, Carbone 2005, Mule 2001). Civil 
society are usually able to generate public support on different issues which include topics 
like democracy and forms of economic development and take affirmative tactics through 
actions like lobbying, protest (peaceful and violent) and boycotts (Boadi, 1996).
In sub Saharan African countries, civil society existed from the pre-colonial era 
(Bratton 1989), these groups increased in numbers in an attempt to resist what was felt by 
them as the intrusion of the colonials. The different civil groups were particularly strong in 
the fight for independence from colonial rule. The different groups consisted of peasants’ 
movements, religious associations, labour unions, student unions, professional associations, 
community associations (Obadare, 2007).
With the long established history of civil society in some sub-Saharan African 
countries, the question that needs to be asked is why is the civil society almost non-existent 
or weak in some sub-Saharan African countries? Amongst the theories that have been put 
forward include government manipulation of prominent associations, outright ban and 
financial dependency on the government (Obadare, 2007).
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Civil societies in some developing countries were seen as a threat to authoritarian 
governments (Bratton 1989). While governments who still viewed themselves as democratic 
were unable to dissolve or outright ban the association of civic groups, they created hostile 
legislation to ensure that the civil groups, for example NGOs, do not act contrary to current 
government policies. Examples of such legislation include the Kenyan NGO legislation act 
(1990) which has more government representatives on the NGO board than the NGOs and the 
decisions made within the board are final and unchallengeable in a court of law (Boadi 1996). 
Legislation and boards of this nature are very successful in curtailing the activities of 
organization members and forcing them to tow government lines.
If legislation is the noose around the neck of some NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa, then 
finance is the hangman. This is because what legislation is not able to take away from civil 
societies, resource needs are able to achieve. Boadi (1996) argues that the financial situation 
of so many organizations and institutions which make up the civil society in some Sub 
Saharan African countries have a financial dependency on either the government or 
international organizations (Boadi, 1996). This dependency makes them vulnerable to 
government interference and takes away from them their independence and ability to act on 
the citizens behalf. The government is also able to appropriate international funds meant for 
civil organizations when it’s routed through them thereby further limiting their capital base 
(Boadi, 1996). The lack of, or irregular, finances make civil organizations more susceptible to 
government manipulation and result for these organizations, is an almost complete loss of 
autonomy (Boadi, 1996).
As mentioned earlier in this Section, a large number of the civil societies have been in
existence to fight authoritarian rule from the colonial period till now. As a growing number of
137
Sub-Saharan African countries gain their independence and move from authoritarian rule to 
democratic rule, the key actors from within the groups begin to leave and join political parties 
(Boadi, 1996). This usually has the effect of weakening the organization especially when 
there is no official replacement for the departing person(s). The organizations usually find 
themselves losing credibility and purpose with the loss of their leaders (Boadi, 1996).
Direct government opposition to civil organisations has also been used to reduce their 
effectiveness. Decades of authoritarian rule and the repression of fundamental rights, for 
instance free speech, has given free rein to the governments to act as they please it would 
seem. For instance in 1989 and 1992, many students were shot and lost their lives protesting 
against government policies in Nigeria (Aluede, Jimoh, Agwinede and Omoregie, 2005). The 
threat of personal safety and the real possibility of loss of life reduce the government 
opposition and the size to which civil organizations grow thereby reducing opposition to the 
government (Aluede, Jimoh, Agwinede and Omoregie, 2005).
The ethnic diversity of some sub-Saharan African countries has added to the growing 
weakness of civil groups within sub-Saharan Africa. The inability of civil groups to 
transverse ethnic and religious divides has often had the actors lobbying for the same goals 
but on opposing sides. For example in Togo, the Ewes of the south were opposing the 
Eyadema Kabiyes of the north though both were campaigning for democracy but effectively 
ended up working against each other (Boadi 1996). The irony that can be observed here is the 
history of not just Togo but a number of sub-Saharan countries are that these were able to 
come together as one group to lobby the colonials for independence, but these groups have 
been unable to come together for common goals within their groups because of the ethnic 
divide since their independence (Obadare, 2007).
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The freedom of the press or the fifth estate as they are called is an institution taken for 
granted in more developed countries is lacking in some Sub-Saharan African countries. From 
independence till the early 1990s, most media due to the cost of set up were owned by 
government with very few owned by the private sector (Olukosi, 1997). The government has 
been highly successful in regulating the information which is distributed to the general public 
through its channels and the private sector through harsh legislation. For example, President 
Mugabe of Zimbabwe banned all news coverage on the evacuation of his political opponents’ 
supporters from their homes (BBC News, 2003). Another form of intimidation of the fifth 
estate was the sending of letter bombs to journalist, for instance the letter bomb which killed 
Dele Giwa in 1986 rumoured to have been sent by the dictator, General Babangida of Nigeria 
(Sahara reporters, 2009). The suppression of the news within authoritarian governments 
significantly reduces the effects that the civil organizations have as it reduces their ability to 
get heard by the groups they fight for and the governments willing to ignore them (Boadi
1996).
Political coercion, financial handicaps and structural distortions are a few of the 
problems that face civil societies in sub-Saharan Africa. However, authoritarian governments 
have found it increasingly difficult to suppress all civil groups. The opening of the economy 
to free market forces and external ideas and scrutiny has enabled civil organizations to begin 
to rebuild and remodel themselves into more effective lobbying groups. The awareness by 
authoritarian governments that they can no longer administer their countries like inheritances 
leading to growing political liberalization and the growing return of civic rights.
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5.6. African Governance
The development of the concept of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa has evolved 
with its own unique characteristics. These characteristics reflect mainly the history and the 
problems which have affected the region since independence. The emphasis of the concept of 
governance falls heavily on transparency, accountability, economic growth and development.
5.6.1. Characteristics of African governance
The role of governance within different nation states varies. While governance is a 
conceptual framework, the characteristics of governance are usually promoted within 
governmental regimes. The governance process should cover both political and economic 
dimensions. Mule (2001) puts forward three of the main characteristics that can be identified 
within the framework of African governance. These are 1) A capable and effective 
administration, 2) conflict prevention and 3) effective public institutions. Onibokun and 
Kumuyi (1999) go further to identify the following 1) legitimately elected government, 2) 
open and transparent administration, 3) progressive socio-economic policies and 4) a 
government accountable to the electorate as characteristics of African governance (Onibokun 
and Kumuyi, 1999).
As has been observed above, for the most part are democratic governments like
Nigeria, which became a democracy again in 1999, are democracies with some of the
characteristics of authoritarian rule. If a little scrutiny is paid to Nigeria, then the mixture of
democracy and authoritarian rule becomes more apparent (Diamond, 2002). An example of
personal rule within country would be the dismissal of the vice president as mentioned in
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Section 5.3 above (BBC News, 2007). What must be stated however in countries like Nigeria 
is that the legislative arm of the government is developing and within the new and developing 
democracies, they are beginning to have the authority to promote the rule of law. This could 
be seen, for example, by the Supreme Court ruling that the sacked vice president be reinstated 
to his post (BBC News, 2007).
5.7. Governance decentralization and policy creation 
within transitional countries
Since the 1980s’, some central sub-Saharan African governments recognized a need 
for decentralized government. Decentralization reforms were implemented in Uganda and 
Botswana from 1985 and Nigeria in the early 1990s’ (Olowu, 2001; Wunsch, 2001). In order 
to achieve decentralization within these countries there has been a need to create public 
policy and legislation which recognized the decentralized nature of public administration 
(Olowu and Smoke, 1992).
On paper, central governments were seen to be decentralizing power to the lower tiers 
of government. However the reality was power and resources were rarely relinquished to the 
lower levels of government (Olowu, 1990; Smith, 1996). The legislation created was usually 
inadequate for the local authorities to be able to carry out the tasks mandated to them by law 
and the local authorities policies could be overridden by the central government and its 
agencies (Wunch, 2001). Olowu, (1990) and Wunch (1991) believe that the nature of the 
reforms has been a way of retaining power and state resources within central government 
(Olowu, 1990; Wunch 1991). The lower tiers of government are usual given limited fiscal
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resources which are essential to carry out local services leading to a breakdown of local 
services and an opening for the central government to reintroduce itself within local 
government activities, thereby retaining power at the centre (Wunch, 1991).
As discussed in Section 5.3 above, some sub-Saharan African countries which have 
recently transitioned from military or single party authoritarian rule are yet to truly devolve 
power to local tiers of government. These governments use fiscal powers to handicap lower 
tiers of government to ensure compliance. For instance to recognise the growth of the city 
and improve administration in newly developed areas, Lagos state created additional local 
government areas. These areas were not contrary to national law but they were contrary to 
central government wishes. As a result, the state had its federal allocation withheld for two 
years even with the high court ruling in favour of the state to have its funds released from the 
federal government (Ogunleye, 2008). The funds held by the federal government ensured that 
the state was not able to meet its fiscal needs for that period (Lagos state, 2005), and 
undermined confidence within it.
It is necessary to understand decentralization in post authoritarian democracies to 
understand how the different levels of government function. This will help to understand why 
policy can sometimes been seen not to be implementable within lower tiers of government. 
Power concentrated at the centre reduces the effectiveness of the other tiers of government. 
The lower the tier of government, the less its effectiveness with the amount of autonomy 
given to the lower tiers of government being limited within transitional governments.
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5.8. Implementation
In order to understand governance within the waste management process in Lagos 
state, it is important to understand the implementation process of the waste management 
policy as implementation is directly linked to governance. How Policy Makers create and 
implement the waste mangement policy is a practical way of studying the governance 
process. If governance is the study of the interaction of Policy Makers with the key 
participants and End Users that policies are made for, then implementation studies are one of 
the most effective way of studying the effect of governance.
Implementation debates have raged on since the 1970s’ between those who favour an 
appraoch which is bottom-up (street-level bureaucrats) and top-down (Policy Makers). The 
two opposing sides of the debate have been unable to agree on what the preconditions for 
successful implamentation Eire. The top-down proponents like Sabatier (1993) claim that there 
are six preconditions which are required to be met for successful implementation which are 
discussed in Section 5.9. While the bottom-uppers like Hogwood and Gun (1993) believe 
there are eight preconditions which are discussed in Section 5.10.
Implementation theory is still being developed as proponents of both sides of the 
implementation debate are yet to agree on what constitutes the core of implemtation theory 
(O’Toole, 2004) . One reason for the ongoing debate could be because policies are created to 
meet different needs and no two policies or needs are identical. The variables involved within 
the creation of policy and its implementation are too numerous and too varied for the creation 
of one unifying theory (O’Toole, 1986; Gunn, 1978). For this reason it has been extremely
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difficult if not near impossible for any theories to be developed within the field (O’Toole, 
2004). With this in mind, this thesis does not aim to create a theory of implementation but 
engage the current debates to evaluate implementation in Lagos state and find which of the 
schools of thought is most applicable to Lagos.
5.9. Conclusions
In examining the literature, especially in regards to this thesis, two very strong elements 
that will need to be observed during the data collection process have emerged.
1) Democracies with elements of authoritarian rule. This element of governance will 
need to be observed as it will most likely affect how the policy is presented to the 
constituents of the state which will in turn impact of how the constituents relate to the 
policy. Authoritarian rule in Sub-Saharan Africa has been prevalent in since the 
colonial times. Subsequent indigenous governments have practiced one form of 
authoritarian rule or another. The civil society in Sub-Saharan African countries is 
also relatively weak and a financial dependence on the government limits the amount 
of influence they are able to exert on the government on behalf of the people.
2) Both schools of thought have are made for westernized countries. Authoritarian rule 
has had a significant impact, whether post or current, on governments in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The issue of transparency which is an underlying element of both schools of 
thought in Implementation studies is not apparent western governments. The
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incidence of corruption and lack of adequate man power and resources is also reduced 
or minimal within western governments.
The type of governance that can be found in most developing countries is still in its 
transitional stage. While some developing countries which have formerly practised 
authoritarian rule have changed to democracies, they are still transitional in nature. The 
concept of governance is still growing and the former dictatorships are continuously 
changing. Civil societies are integral to this change because they make governments 
accountable. Civil societies in some Sub-Saharan African states have been weakened over 
time by authoritarian rulers. It will be necessary to rebuild and restructure civil societies from 
them to achieve function within governance. The reconstruction of the civil societies will 
include a financial autonomy in order for them to continue to be independent of the 
governments they were created to make accountable.
Governance is essentially the manner in which the governments and decision makers 
behave or create and implement policy. If the type of governance found within a city can be 
understood, it goes further in explaining the end result of implementation within the city 
whether from the top-down or the bottom-up. Both schools of implementation require the 
input of the Policy Makers and understanding how they behave is pertinent to proving or 
disproving the applicability of western style implementation debates in cities which have 
different characteristics from the countries the debates were developed in.
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6. Private-Public Partnership: Mixed benefits in 
urban services provision
Public private partnerships (PPP) are the new ‘buzz words’ for public service 
delivery. Private Public Partnerships (PPP) or Private Finance Investment (PFI) as they are 
sometimes known is becoming an increasingly common method of providing public sector 
services. The term is used to define the relationship between the public and private sector 
when resources such as capital, man-power, and knowledge are combined for the provision of 
public services (Gerrard, 2001).
It is widely believed in many contexts, that service delivery can be improved with the 
introduction of the private sector funds, business management skills and technical expertise, 
to public service delivery because of perceived efficiencies that could be gained from the 
private sector. The partnerships are usually divided, with the private sector as the principal 
partner and the public sector as the regulator/silent partner (Andersen, 2004)
The services provided through PPPs cover a wide range of areas which include 
airports, waste collection management and defence. This Chapter will look at different 
models of partnerships, their advantages and disadvantages, focussing on waste collection 
management services.
This Chapter will evaluate public private sector partnerships, how they are formed
and its general application in the provision of waste collection management services in a
developing country city like Lagos. PPPs have been selected by the Lagos state as its method
of policy implementation. It is therefore crucial to understand how PPPs work or are
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supposed to work. This will aid in assessing policy instruments, how they are applied and the 
best group to apply them.
6.1. Methods of Private Sector Inclusion
This Section is going to take a brief look at some PPPs types, their advantages and 
disadvantages. The PPPs selected have been chosen because of their relevance and popularity 
in PPPs. Four types of partnerships have been briefly considered for this paper and they are:
1) Service contracts
2) Joint ventrues
3) Concession
4) Privatization
1) Service contract
Service contract is regarded as the simplest form of partnership. (Batley, 1996). There 
are three main methods of delivery for this form of partnership which may be between a 
private company or a joint venture between several companies, and between a single 
government agency or consortia, often with one agency playing the lead role on behalf of the 
public.
a) The private sector leases facilities already owned/provided by the public
sector and pays a rental lease fee and provides the required service. The
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company is responsible for maintaining the facilities or equipment being 
leased and is not required to make any new capital investments it may 
however include the risk of cost recovery from the public.
b) A government agency commissions new facilities from a private enterprise, 
which, when completed, may either be operated by the company or another 
provider or returned to the state agency. In both cases the private enterprise 
is reimbursed over an agreed period of time. An example of this kind of 
agreement is school premises, which are built by the private sector which 
can either be operated by the public body when completed or the private 
sector operates it on the government’s behalf. In both cases the private 
sector is reimbursed over an agreed period of time. These kinds of contracts 
commonly last between eight and fifteen years. (Fiscal Affairs Department, 
2004, Li and Akintoye, 2003).
c) The service is contracted by the public sector from a private enterprise. The 
private sector is expected to own its own its own facilities and equipment 
and has the option of buying government equipment if available. (Li, 
Akintoye, Edwards, Hardcastle, 2003). This is form of contract is possibly 
the most cost effective for the government because the government does 
not have to make capital investments in infrastructure.
The advantage of using the service contracts for the provision of services and
facilities is that government expenditure on infrastructure and service costs is spread over
time, while still allowing for the flexibility of goods and service delivery. This method of
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service delivery and infrastructure provision is also used as a method to reduce a 
government’s debt portfolio (Li and Akintoye, 2003).
The service contract model enables the government agency responsible for service 
provision to include new actors in service delivery, and to harness local or external business 
capacity to support government capacity. An advantage of the service contract model is that it 
is flexible and avoids a monopoly, allowing different parts of the service to be contracted to 
different operators so that if one contractor is unable to fulfil its contractual obligations other 
actors have the capacity to take over the contract. The disadvantage of these forms of service 
contract is that it is not necessarily always the cheapest option (Bennett, Grohmann and 
Gentry, 2000).
2) Joint ventures
A joint venture is a company in which two or more parties have shares in a proposed 
or ongoing project. In this type of partnership, the parties in this joint venture are the public 
and private sectors. In the case of PPPs the parties in the joint venture are a public agency and 
private enterprise which co-own facilities or equipment used to provide services. This kind of 
partnership brings together capital resources and human resources from both the public and 
private sectors.
In a joint venture, the government agency often acts as a regulator and shareholder 
(Li, Akintoye, Edwards, Hardcastle, 2003). The private enterprise is primarily charged with 
the daily operations and management of the venture while the government agency’s
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responsibility within the partnership could be the provision of equity, concession loans, asset 
transfer and insurance (Owen and Mema, 1997). The partnership is established when both 
sectors begin to work together on pre-investment (Fiscal Affairs Department, 2004). Some 
joint ventures end after the completion of capital projects e.g. the construction of an airport, 
while others continue into service delivery. This method is usually used when both private 
and public organization others combined manpower and capital resources for efficient service 
delivery (Li, and Akintoye, 2003).
The advantage of a joint venture is that the private enterprise tries to ensure the 
profitability of the venture, while the government protects the public interest. It partners may 
contribute to capital costs which can then be recovered through user charges either paid for 
directly by the public, or indirectly through taxation. Both sectors have a substantial stake in 
the partnership which helps to promote efficiency. The main disadvantage of this model is 
that the decision-making process may be cumbersome because of conflicting interests’ 
between the two parties; one which is profit-motivated and the other of which focuses on 
public welfare (Li, and Akintoye, 2003, 2003).
3) Concession
Concessions are considered by some authors as both the most beneficial form of PPP 
for the private sector and as providing the best value for public services (Finnerty, 1996). 
Concessions essentially allow the private sector to buy the sole rights to the provision of a 
service over a period of time (Yarrow, 1986). In this model a private enterprise either 
provides a new service facility or develops an existing service facility. The private enterprise
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owns the facility or equipment maintains and operates it over time, (20 to 30 years would be a 
typical period) and at the end of which the facility then reverts back to the responsible 
government agency. There is usually a form of cost recovery through tariffs and levies 
(Tiong, 1992, Tillman, 1997, Bennett, 1998, Fiscal Affairs Department, 2004). This method 
is usually used to contract services on behalf of the final user (Yarrow, 1986).
The greatest advantage of this model of PPP is the operation and running of the 
facility and equipment by the private sector. Even though the facility will revert back to state 
ownership at the end of a specified period, the private sector is given opportunities make the 
service profitable. Again, the End User may be charged for the service directly or indirectly. 
The disadvantages of this model of PPP are that, as in all businesses, there is still the risk of 
failure and it encourages monopolies in service delivery.
4) Privatization
Privatization involves the complete sale or transfer to a private enterprise of a state 
owned asset e.g. a state owned utility company. This can be done either through sale directly 
to a private investor, through a public stock offering or as a grant to a private company that 
will assume full responsibility for the company. Privatization is usually used when a 
government agency no longer wishes to be directly involved in service delivery (Li, 
Akintoye, 2003).
Privatization is not a true partnership because the service is provided solely by the 
private sector, has been included because the legal responsibility for public service delivery 
usual remains with the relevant state agency (Slyke, 2003). For example, if waste collection
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is considered to be an essential urban service, if privatized provision fails, a government 
agency would normally be legally required to provide the service, and thus remains 
ultimately responsible for the service provision.
Privatization is an effective form of service delivery because market forces are used to 
determine supply and demand, and is most cost effective when there is competition for 
delivery of the service e.g. utility companies in the United Kingdom which were formally 
supplied by the government as a monopoly but are now supplied by competing companies. 
Privatization also allows scarce government resources to be channelled to the provision of 
others urban services.
The greatest advantage of privatization is that service delivery becomes market led: 
competition and innovation is introduced, most of the risk is borne by the private sector, and 
the drive to stay in business promotes versatility and efficiency in service delivery. The 
disadvantage of this method is that it could result in higher charges that may disadvantage 
lower income Users, and still creates the potential for monopoly.
From these models, it becomes clear that a key issue for any government intent on 
including the private sector in service delivery is how it can provide adequate services with 
scarce resources. Government can also go into partnership with the private sector to reduce 
the inefficiencies in their own provision of services (Bel, and Miralles, 2003).
The main disadvantage of these partnership models is that of cost, government 
services can be at a lower cost to itself because they are not profit led. The advantages of
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PPPs generally outweigh the disadvantages however, and governments are usually looking to 
make PPPs attractive to the private sector.
In examining the literature, PPPs have been growing in popularity over decades. In 
the 1980s, privatization was the favoured form of PPPs and the ‘80s was marked by 
governments trying to privatize national companies. The reason for this was to cut back on 
government spending and gain the advantages of market forces to increase the quality of 
service delivery. While privatization was great in theory, it could also be highly unpopular if 
for example, it led to higher tariffs.
6.2. PPPs, asset or public vice
Each form of PPP has been briefly illustrated above, the question that then needs to be 
asked is, and ‘Are PPPs the way forward for public service delivery or are they simply a 
method of stretching the government budget or shelving government responsibility?’ Strong 
arguments have been put forward for and against the use of PPPs in the delivery of public 
services.
In the provision of services, certain infrastructure and manpower must be available. 
One of the greatest attractions for PPPs to the public sector is that it can transition itself from 
an asset and services provider to just a services specifier (Owen and Mema, 1997). The issue 
for the public sector is not owning facilities but making its resources go further (Kaseva and 
Mbuligwe, 2005). In some developing countries, there is no maintenance culture and the
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implementing agencies sometimes find themselves without adequate man power. The need to 
transfer responsibility of infrastructure and its maintenance is an advantage in some 
developing country cities and it represents for some cities a more effective method of service 
provision as the burden for infrastructure provision and maintenance can be shifted to the 
private sector (Olowomeye, 1991).
The requirement of service provision without the necessity of predetermined assets 
allows the private sector to be innovative in the infrastructure it provides for service delivery 
which could lead to lower service costs (Ball, Heafey and King, 2000). The private sector 
needs to stay competitive in a changing market and it is able to bring its continuous 
innovation to public service delivery which could lead to future savings on other projects 
(Cointreau-Levine and Coad, 2000).
The introduction of the private sector in public service provision is intended to make 
service delivery more efficient. While the intention of PPPs as a method of public service 
delivery is intended to make use of market forces, the structuring of some partnerships like 
the concessions which allows the private sector to buy the sole right to service provision can 
limit the advantages that can be gained from market forces for example competition through 
bidding. The nature of some services, even without the benefit of concessionary contracts, 
means competition is at a minimum or does not exist because of the nature of the service and 
the cost (Yarrow, 1989; Cointreau-Levine and Coad, 2000).
Proponents of PPPs such as Attahi (1996), Onibokun and Adepoju (1996) argue that
the reduction of cost and the improvement of service efficiency arise from the involvement of
the private sector. Governments’ inefficiency in some developing country cities in the
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provision of public services forces it to look for alternative forms of delivery. This argument 
is particularly strong in the delivery of public services like waste collection (Attahi, 1996, 
Onibokun and Adepoju, 1996). Advocates of PPPs claim that cost efficiency, technological 
improvement and higher levels of service can be achieved through the private sector 
(Glaister, 1999; Bel, and Miralles, 2003).
In more developed countries like the United Kingdom, PPPs more commonly known 
as Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) are being used increasingly as means of service provision 
and infrastructure (Weaver and Manning, 1990). The Labour government elected in 1997 
continued with its conservative predecessor’s use of PFIs as a method of freeing up 
government finances and reducing government borrowing (Hall, 1998, Owen and Mema,
1997). Szymanski in 1996 was able to demonstrate that local governments that bid against the 
private sector for the provision of waste collection services were unable to achieve the same 
cost reduction in service delivery achieved by the private sector (Szymanski, 1996).
There are many risks involved in service provision. These include financial as the 
capital cost exceeds expectations due to outside influences, there could decline in demand for 
a particular service or even the complete failure of the venture (Batley, 1996). These risks of 
service provision are proposed to be shared by the partnering of the public sector with the 
private sector. The risk can either be completely transferred, as observed as is the case with 
the privatization of services or just the contracting of services, or shared which can be done 
with some service contracts and joint partnerships PPPs (Hall, 2003).
Risk and what constitute risk and who decides what risk is determine whose
responsibility the risk. While the argument for the involvement of the private sector is the
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sharing or complete transfer of risk, the private sector is very limited in its ability of the type 
of risk it can acquire (Owen and Mema 2003). Mainly as 1) it is in the partnership to make a 
profit and 2) the funding of the private sector to take on the initiative can determine what it 
can and cannot accept as risk e.g. in projects that the success depends on factors that cannot 
be controlled by the private sector like attendance in a public school or projects that nature 
can affect (Ball, Heafey and King, 2000).
The emphasis in service provision being highlighted with the use of PPP is customer 
satisfaction. The actual cost saving is no longer how much resources can be saved but the 
efficiency and adequacy of the service for the consumer. In this manner, it is hoped that the 
currency of service provision changes from monetary measurements to measurements that are 
customer focused (National Audit Office, 1997).
The main advantages of PPPs as have been argued above are the saving of 
government resources and making it available for other uses (Batley, 1996). The opponents 
of PPPs on the other hand argue that while PPPs could be more effective than the public 
sector in service delivery, they do not necessarily represent a cost advantage. The budgetary 
argument especially with projects which cover long periods of time with corresponding 
repayment periods does not necessarily reduce the cost of service provision but simply moves 
the cost as a future problem to another budget as a future revenue commitment (Cointreu- 
Levine and Coad, 2000).
It could also be argued that the government could generate a return on investment in
the same way as a private contractor could and reinvest the income generated from the
service provided (Hall, 1998). While Hall (1996) notes here arguments are valid, it must be
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remembered that one of the main reasons that PPPs became popular as mentioned above is 
because of shortfalls in public services provided by government (Aworti, 2004). The 
inefficiencies of the public sector created a gap which the private sector is able to fill. If local 
services could be as efficient as Hall (1998) proposes, then PPPs would not have the 
popularity they currently enjoy in public service delivery.
The public sector is anxious to get the best value for its investment and the private 
sector is also eager to negotiate contracts which specify the project parameters at the same 
time allowing it the flexibility not to get tied down with a higher percentage of the possible 
risks that could be involved in the venture or inflexible service provision terms (Owen and 
Mema, 2003). These two factors can cause the bidding and contract negotiations costs to run 
very high and decrease the savings that could be realized from the PPP (Owen and Mema 
2003).The value of private funds versus public funds, if the cost of borrowing is considered, 
makes private money more expensive than public money as governments are not only seen as 
less of a credit risk but have access to far more credit facilities (private, public and 
international sources) than the private sector. In terms of this higher cost of borrowing, it is 
more cost effective for the government to provide the service than the private sector (Ball, 
Heafey and King, 2000).
The role of the government usually changes within PPPs from the role of service
provider to the role of regulator. In its role as regulator or guarantor of service, the
government has to be able to create adequate policies to protect the public by ensuring that
the level of service received is value for money and openly transparent (Cointreau-Levine,
2000). The cost of regulation could make the savings of private sector provision insignificant
if not properly managed. The argument, especially for a lot of developing countries with poor
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service delivery and monitoring history, then becomes one of if the governments are unable 
to monitor themselves, how they will achieve the skills and scope necessary to monitor the 
private sector service providers (Attahi, 1999)
The partnering of the public sector and the private sector has had a history of creating 
disadvantages in external areas related but not part of the partnership service provision. The 
potential for conflicts of interest arise in PPPs and the phrase ‘who watches the watchmen’ 
(Prachet, 2005) becomes the question that will be asked. For example, the British 
government in its support of UN sanctions against Rhodesia was able to use its share of the 
joint partnership with BP to prevent entry to Eastern African states which serviced Rhodesia 
with oil (Bailey, 1979). Turning the partnership into a political tool for the governments own 
objectives. The potential conflict of interest represents a huge disadvantage for the use of 
PPPs.
Working conditions in sectors like waste management to a certain extent could be 
better in the public sector than in the private sector. In the privatization of services like waste 
management in some developing country cities, the working conditions and earnings of waste 
workers deteriorated as opposed to improved (Cointreau, 1994). The reason for the decline is 
seen as one of the private sector methods of cost reduction. While governments are usually 
able to set a minimum bar for the public sector staff, they are unable to set the bar effectively 
for the private sector as it could be seen to be prejudicial or hostile especially to small 
companies (Cointreau, 1994).
In weighing the advantages against the disadvantages of PPPs, they still weigh more
favourably for the delivery of public goods and services mainly because they are seen as
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more efficient and versatile than public delivery. PPPs do not always work out cheaper than 
public service delivery however; a majority of PPPs are not created for their profitability but 
for their efficiency which is the most important aspect of public services (Domberger and 
Fernandez, 1999). The benefit obtained is usually used to access if the cost was worth the 
investment as opposed to monetary profit e.g. consumer satisfaction (Ball, Heafey and King, 
2000).
6.3. SMEs, Informal Waste Sector, PPPs and the Lagos 
state Policy
SMEs are regarded as a highly useful tool in the reduction of unemployment in some 
economies. SME uses are acknowledged and usually encouraged with the introduction of 
support organizations locally (Bateman, 2000) and the allocations of funds from international 
finance agencies like the World Bank for the development of SMEs (Ayyagari, Demirguc- 
Kunt and Beck, 2003).
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) cover a wide range of businesses and 
enterprises. SMEs are defined by their size as opposed to their roles even though the 
maximum size of SMEs vary depending on the country for example, in European Union 
states, the maximum number of employees for small businesses are 50 and 250 for medium 
sized enterprises. The United States however sees companies of 100 employees as small and 
less than 500 as medium scale enterprises (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2004). In most 
developed countries, the informal sector is not included as SMEs as they are regarded as 
illegal enterprises and subsequently not included in most SME studies undertaken.
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SMEs and informal enterprises account for approximately 60% of the GDPs and 70% 
of employment in low income countries (Ayyagari, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, 2003) and 95% of 
all employment outside agriculture (OCED, 2004). These figures are important to show from 
the onset the importance of SMEs and the informal sector in developing country economies. 
They indicate that a large portion of goods and services are not carried out by large 
corporations or government but by small and medium sized companies.
The contribution of SMEs and the informal sector to some societies is potentially 
diverse. They contribute to income generation, employment and the empowerment of women 
(OCED, 2004). SMEs are argued by Heeks (2006), Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2004) to be 
the most effective poverty reduction instruments as their scopes usually range from the 
provision of unskilled goods and services which require low amounts of investment to start 
up e.g. woman selling food by the road side, to the provision of skilled services and goods 
which need a larger capital to run e.g. some manufacturing like medium scale shoe makers. 
SMEs are theorized to be able to boost employment rates more than large firms possibly 
because of their size and scale and ease of setting up (Beck, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Levine, 2003, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2004, Heeks, 2006).
There are two arguments which this thesis shall consider surrounding SMEs,
especially in developing countries and their role in the alleviation of poverty. First, there is
the argument by the World Bank which believes it can be used to reduce poverty, (Hallberg,
2000). It is argued that the provision of the ‘right’ circumstances for the development of
SMEs can aid poverty reduction in some developing country cities (Narayan, 2002). The
second argument states that not only do SMEs do nothing for developing country economies;
they might also be the cause of stunted economy growth in developing geographies like sub-
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Saharan Africa (Naude and Krugell, 2002). The reasons put forward is because small and 
medium sized enterprises within the sub-Saharan African region are still at the micro level 
with some business being one man businesses or family orientated businesses (Naude and 
Krugell, 2002).
This Section however, now focuses on the issues of SMEs in PPPs in developing 
country cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is a field in which little or no literature has been 
found. What this Section attempts to demonstrate is the value of SMEs to PPPs for the 
provision of waste collection services. Most PPPs are conducted in partnership with large 
companies (at least the ones documented) and even though there are vague references to PPPs 
with small scale partners, there was no actual detailed case studies carried out. The types of 
partnerships that have been observed within the PPP literature require large scale companies 
with large capital bases.
As has been mentioned earlier, one of the reasons for the creation of PPPs is to free up 
government resources. It is inferred from this that a majority of PPPs are created for capital 
intensive projects. The projects which are carried out in partnership usually include, waste 
delivery, provision of roads, schools, airport e.t.c. While some of the projects are very 
specialist orientated and their nature might require partnerships with one or a very limited 
number of firms for example, airport partnerships or defence partnerships, some other 
services might not necessarily require the use of a limited number of firms. For example, 
waste collection services for a municipality. The municipality can be divided into smaller 
areas so that multiple firms may be used for service delivery.
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In the supply of waste collection services in some developing countries, it has been 
observed that the informal sector is a significant contributor to the supply of waste services. 
For example, in Cairo Egypt, the informal sector accounts for approximately 50% of waste 
collected (Fahmi, 2005) and 25% Jakarta in Indonesia, (Klundert and Lardinios, 1995). The 
informal sector while not considered as SMEs in most developed countries because they are 
seen as illegal, are in developing ones in contrast perceived more favourably . This is because 
in countries like Egypt or Indonesia, they are viewed as a part of a growing informal 
economy that are often able to provide services when formal channels of service delivery are 
not available or extended to all who require the services. It must first be recognized that the 
size of the informal sector could make it hard to regulate e.g. Manila has approximately 
17,000 individuals working within this sector of waste delivery (Medina, 1997).
Note that the word individual was used and not just workers. This is because most of 
the literature on the informal waste workers depicts them as operating individually or in small 
family groups in which most workers in the informal waste sector operate and to give an idea 
of the possible amount of workers that the government would need to regulate if it were to 
decide to go into partnership with the informal sector.
In Abidjan in a study carried out by Attahi (1996), found that formal sector service
provision was boosted by the inclusion of smaller companies in waste collection services.
The inclusion of SMEs would have the three way effect of ensuring the provision of services
to the most vulnerable areas in society at the same time guaranteeing the incomes of some of
the most disadvantaged groups within society and ensuring a minimum level of service by the
introduction of regulatory measures to the informal sector (Attahi, 1996). The participation of
SMEs in PPPs would be a positive step forward for the SMEs and the public sector of
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developing country cities as mentioned earlier. For the public sector, it would be an increase 
in capacity and access in service delivery at the same time increasing the social security of a 
part of the population and for the SMEs the government contract signifies a stability of its 
income.
The advantages of the inclusion of SMEs in waste collections seems very appealing 
when considering logistics and social effects of the inclusion of the informal sector within 
formal service delivery and the partnering of SMEs however, the biggest problem to be faced 
would be the regulation of so many small service providers who are providing a government 
service. The regulation of a large number of service providers could be difficult and costly 
(Batley, 1996). Governments who find it difficult to regulate themselves and/or a single 
partner might find it even more difficult to regulate a multitude of partners. This could be a 
problem but not necessarily a disadvantage as the ease or not could depend on the structuring 
of the partnership and the inclusion of other Sections institutions that have a stake in the 
adequate provision of the service (Rosenau, 1999). The structuring of the partnership would 
also play an important role in achieving policy goals.
Implementation arguments are usually developed for large well funded government
bodies who might implement policy through state agencies or in partnership with a private
organization. The private organizations featured in implementation debates are usually large
well funded organizations. The SMEs which are also featured are organizations which have
an average of 300-600 employees with financial resources and access to credit facilities. In
developing country cities however, an average SME is 1-50 people have limited resources
and limited access to credit facilities. Some of these SMEs’ fall within the informal sector but
provides valid public services. The governments in these countries have to sometimes partner
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with firms of this size for example, the Lagos state PSP program. These are characteristics 
which are dominant in developing countries and make it more difficult to apply 
implementation debates.
6.4. Literature Gap
There is a knowledge gap that exists in this subject area and there should be studies 
carried out on SME and the informal sector involvement in PPPs because of the high level of 
informal sector involvement in the delivery of some services within some developing country 
cities.
6.5. Conclusion
PPPs are an increasing choice for governments to deliver essential public services. 
PPPs are not necessarily the cheaper public service delivery option, but it is argued that they 
are usually the more efficient option.
PPPs have been chosen by the Lagos state government as their implementation tool.
This decision had a huge impact both negatively and positively in the formal delivery of
waste collection services within the state. The chosen implementation method also had an
impact on the informal waste sector. It was therefore important to understand PPPs and the
potential relationship it would have with the informal sector service providers. The type of
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relationship developed between these two groups will impact the delivery of waste collection 
services within Lagos state and is therefore important to how implementation debates are 
applied in a developing country city like Lagos.
In some developing country cities, governments have been unable to provide a quality 
level of service in sufficient quantities to meet municipal needs. This has prompted within 
these countries the trend of privatization and public-private partnerships.
The private sector in some of these countries has had varying results in the provision 
of public services. The involvement of this sector has significantly changed the role of 
government to one of regulator and monitor. This changed role has meant that the 
government in charge has had to develop new skills in order to regulate a new service sector.
Very little research has been carried out on PPP and micro enterprises. In view of the 
Lagos state PSP program which is a partnership with private micro enterprises, it will be very 
interesting in Chapters eight and nine to find out how this affects the policy and if anything 
new can be learnt about PPPs.
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7. The informal sector: the underdogs of waste 
collection management
Inadequate waste collection, recycling and treatment is a critical problem in many low 
income cities where the capacity of municipal government to manage urban services is 
limited. In such contexts a wide variety of informal sector operators fill the gap particularly 
in waste collection and recycling. This Chapter looks at the role of the informal sector in 
waste management in developing country cities.
Chapter seven examines the role of the informal waste sector in developing country 
economies. It views the response to informal sector activities by Policy Makers in these cities 
and how their response affects informal sector activities. The informal sector has been a 
major service provider in some developing country cities. This makes them to extent street- 
level bureaucrats in the delivery of public services. Government responses to this sector, 
affect how the sector operates. This Chapter has both a governance context and a service 
delivery context and aims to inform us on how both affect implementation directly or 
indirectly. Implementation debates do not include this group within their debates. However, 
as they have been a core part of service delivery in Lagos, it is essential to understand how 
this group affects public policy implementation in developing country cities. This will further 
inform the hypothesis put forward by this thesis.
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7.1. Overview of informal sector involvement in waste 
management
This paper uses the term “informal waste sector” to include all waste management 
activities which operate a domestic service outside formal provision of waste services. The 
term “informal waste operator” is used to describe people working in the informal waste 
sector. The term “formal waste services” is used to describe those services operating with the 
formal regulatory system, usually provided directly by municipal governments or contracted 
out to private sector companies.
High population growth rates in some developing country cities have left municipal 
governments unable to provide adequate waste management within the urban areas (ASAAP, 
2003). Failures of formal response by national and sub-national governments have led to the 
development of informal responses to the problem of waste management (Klundert and 
Lardinois, 1995). Informal sector activities are complex and extremely varied. Services range 
from door to door collection of waste to diverse disposal options - such as waste picking and 
recycling; for example, in Jakarta, waste paper collected by waste pickers accounts for 90% 
of total secondary materials used in the paper industry. (Furedy, 1990)
In the composting sector, waste pickers account for a large portion of the organic 
waste used in the compost process. For example, in Cairo, waste collectors sell compost used 
as fertilizer to nearby farms within the urban environment (Klundert and Lardinios 1995, 
Medina, 1997, ASAAP, 2003, Taylor D. C, 1999).
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In some cities, informal waste operators either account for a significant portion of 
door to door collection, serving neighborhoods partially or not covered by formal sector 
provision e.g. Cairo 50%, Jakarta 25%, (Klundert and Lardinios, 1995). The informal sector 
may also fill gaps in the formal waste collection services, for example collecting waste from 
slum areas with poor road access (Fahmi, 2005).
The distinction between formal and informal provision of waste services is often not 
clearly distinguished within the literature. Nevertheless, the impact of the informal sector in 
waste management in developing country is often significant as it is a major source of waste 
services and valuable source of employment for unskilled workers (Charmes, 1990) e.g. in 
the early 1990s it was estimated that 17,000 people made a living working as waste pickers in 
the Manila dump (CAPS, 1992).
The diversification of waste disposal options in low income cities can be attributed 
more to the activities of the informal sector than the formal avenues of service provision 
(Fahmi, 2005). Informal waste operators can be found within the municipalities and at legal 
and illegal dump sites (Nas and Jaffe, 2004). The recyclates materials are removed from the 
bulk of the waste collected and sold to businesses which require them as raw materials 
(Fahmi, 2005).
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7.2. Activities and stages in the waste management 
process
The informal waste sector provides a range of services in the management of 
municipal solid waste, and is particularly active in the door-to-door collection of waste, 
materials recovery, and composting.
The services provided by the informal sector vary, but can be grouped into four main 
categories discussed below:
1) Door to door waste collection services:
Informal waste collectors often use low-cost equipment like push carts, 
donkey carts and small pick up vehicles or adapted bicycles, to go to areas 
which have little or no formal service collection and collect the waste 
generated by households. For example, in Santa Cruz Bolivia, the informal 
waste collectors serve approximately 37% of the population. (Medina, a; 
Klundert and Lardinios, 1995)
2) Materials recovery:
This activity is performed by the group often known as “scavengers” 
or “waste pickers”. A very large number of people can be found within this 
sector. For example it is estimated by Oepen (1993) that 37,000 people in 
Jakarta Indonesia work as waste pickers. They retrieve recyclable materials
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from legal and illegal dumps. In some instances, they perform both 
collection services and materials recovery e.g. the Zableen who are the 
informal waste managers of Cairo (Klundert and Lardinios, 1995, Fahmi, 
2005).
3) Composting:
This service is often not provided on the same scale as the other two 
services, but it is usually carried by those who undertake door to door
collection of waste. E.g. the Zableen in Cairo compost some of the organic
materials collected and sell them to farmer and landscapers. (Fahmi, 2005).
4) Middle men:
This is a poorly defined group which has not been well-studied, but 
they are sometimes involved in the brokering of services or products, 
and/or in revenue collection for informal waste services. For example the 
Wahiya of Cairo who acct as waste services brokers between the Zableen 
and the municipality (Fahmi, 2005; Fahmi and Sutton, 2006)
The informal waste sector operators frequently work in small groups, often consisting 
of members of the same family (Klundert and Lardinios, 1995). Access to End Users is not 
difficult for informal waste practitioners as those who provide a door to door collection 
service usually need only go to areas where service is poor. They are usually paid upfront as
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their costs are low and this makes it more attractive for the informal waste sector practitioners 
to want to participate. There is often a ready market within local industry for the materials 
recovered from waste (Furedy, 1993).
Responsibility for the delivery of waste services in developing country cities usually 
rests with municipal governments. They are mandated by law to provide waste collection and 
sanitation facilities for their municipalities’ population (Schubeler, 1996; Attahi, 1999).
The informal waste sector exists because of poverty and a need for survival (Furedy, 
1990; 1993). The informal waste sector also flourishes because of a lack of capacity from 
municipal governments of some developing country cities to provide urban services 
(Kironde, 1999). The resource requirement for entry into the informal waste sector compared 
to the resource requirement for formal waste service provision can be affordable (Onibukun, 
1999). The shortage of supply of municipal public or private solid waste services in 
developing country cities means there is a market for private informal waste services 
(Klundert and Lardinios, 1995; Furedy, 1990; Fahmi, 2005; Medina a; b).
7.3. Responses of government to informal sector waste 
operations
The responses of municipal authorities to informal waste operators vary from
tolerance to outright harassment with the intention of abolishing the sector, but can generally
be classified as one of three main responses (Fahmi, 2005). The first response is to ignore the
existence of informal waste operators; it is not politically practical to discourage the waste
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operators because of the services they provide and the inadequacy of municipal services, but 
neither is it politically practical to encourage them.
A second response includes an outright ban or efforts to restrict informal sector 
activities. Municipal governments often view informal waste operators as part of the waste 
problem in their municipalities, and the thought is that their methods of service delivery adds 
to as opposed to reduce the problem of the management of municipal waste. Municipal policy 
is used to try and stop the activities of the informal sector, either with an indirect ban or 
hostile policy for example, the privatization of waste services in Cairo (Fahmi, 2005, Medina, 
2000).
A third response from the municipal governments is the formal acknowledgement of 
the services provided by the informal waste sector and their accommodation within the policy 
created for the management of municipal waste services (Furedy 1997, Medina, 2005).
Few municipal governments acknowledge the informal waste sector as valid service 
providers. A common thread that can be found in these instances is that the process of 
recognition by the Policy Makers, of the informal waste sector as service providers began 
once informal sector groups had organized themselves into a lobbying or advocacy group. 
This was either an initiative of informal sector operators themselves, as in the case study 
discussed below of the Coopamare (Rolnik and Cymbalista, 2004), where the waste pickers 
formed their own co-operative and were then given official recognition by the municipal 
government, it could also be the result of external impetus, as in the case of the Zableen in 
Cairo, where World Bank funds supported an organization before it was given recognition by 
the governments (Fahmi, 2005).
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The recurring theme for those governments which do integrate the informal sector 
into formal service provision is that the informal sector must organize itself one way or 
another to be integrated within formal services. In general municipal bureaucracies lack the 
capacity to manager, oversee or regulate large numbers of small-scale transactions, and a 
common response is to transfer the responsibility of streamlining the management process to 
the sector themselves. While the organization of the informal sector into groups allows for 
the regulation of the informal sector by Policy Makers, it fails to recognise the heterogeneity 
of social structure in many low income occupations, or the sometimes narrow base of 
representation that groups may have (Rolnik and Cymbalista, 2004). The inclusion of the 
informal sector into formal waste services that is regulated may give them some degree of 
security although this is often fragile and subject to reversal due to a change of political 
power or policy reversal.
7.4. Relationships between informal and formal waste 
operators
In reviewing the literature, there are very few references to a relationship between the 
formal and informal waste operators. When it is mentioned, the inference is that the 
relationship is unpleasant with the informal sector persecuted by formal providers (Attahi,
1999). In a study in Abidjan, Cote D’Ivoire, Attahi (1999) reported finding the formal 
provider had used the informal waste sector as a scapegoat to blame for its inefficiencies in 
service provision, even though collection capacity was seen to drop considerably with the 
consequent exclusion of the informal sector (Attahi, 1999).
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While this may not be representative of the general relationships that can be found 
between the formal and informal providers within developing country cities, it is indicative of 
the kind of problems that informal sector operators do face in the process of trying to survive 
in providing its waste services. The problems which they face daily will be further illustrated 
in later Sections within the Chapter.
The two schools of thought on implementation studies were developed in countries 
where the informal sector is illegal and therefore recognise only formal avenues of service 
provision whether public, private or partnerships. The informal sector waste providers 
however in some Sub-Saharan cities are the main waste services providers even though most 
are unregulated. This limits the application of the implementation debates on waste services 
within these cities. The informal sector within these cities requires debates which recognise 
them as providers of urban services.
The informal service providers within Sub-Saharan African states usually represent 
the most disadvantaged groups within urban centres and require their elected officials to 
speak on their behalf. A transparent inclusive government should attempt to meet the needs 
of all members of the society especially the disadvantaged.
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7.5. Informal waste collection providers, their place in 
society
There are relatively few examples in the literature of municipal governments that have 
acknowledged the contribution of informal waste operators to urban waste management. A 
particular problem is to find longitudinal studies, where the impact of the informal sector on 
waste management practices has been studied over time. Three case studies were identified 
and are discussed below. Ideally the case studies would have illustrated the three different 
government responses covered but due to the limitation of the literature available, the three 
are all examples of informal waste managers. The three case studies are as follows:
• Jakarta, Indonesia, the case study looks at waste pickers who collect recyclate 
material and their contribution to the Jakarta economy.
• Paolo, Brazil, the Coopamare waste pickers who were able to organize 
themselves and gain government and community support
• Cairo, Egypt, the Zableen waste management community who are gradually 
being forced out from their livelihood by the government
The Jakarta case was selected because it demonstrated an economic value to the 
services provided by the informal waste sector. The Coopamare case illustrated the ability of 
the government to regulate the informal sector activities, and the strength of the informal 
sector organization. The Zableen case was selected because of the change in status it has 
undergone in municipal government opinion. They went from being recognized within the 
provision of waste services to being indirectly excluded with the creation of hostile waste 
policy. A description of each case study is given below;
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7.5.1. Jakarta, Indonesia
A collaborative effort from the German Society for Technical Cooperation and the 
Indonesian Home Affairs Department with the aid of an NGO and two planning institutes 
used the media to successfully lobby the rights of scavengers in Jakarta (Medina, 2007). They 
were able to increase the public image of the scavengers to make them more acceptable to the 
general public (Oepen, 1992).
Referral to the scavengers as the ‘self reliant brigade’ in 1989 by president Suharto 
(Furedy, 1993; Klundert and Lardinios, 1995) helped to increase their acceptance locally and 
encouraged institutions to develop programs for them. This institution like the institute for 
development studies encouraged the development of cooperatives, to further increase their 
bargaining power and access to processing technology (Furedy, 1993, Oepen, 1993; 1992).
In 1993 in Jakarta approximately 21,000 tonnes of waste a day was produced in the 
urban area. Approximately 25% of the waste was recovered by waste pickers. The activity 
was estimated to be saving the city approximately $270,000-$300,000 a month, and 78 
factories used paper glass, plastic and metals recovered by the informal waste sectors within 
their production processes. The recycling rates for glass and paper were reported to be as high 
as 60-80% (Oepen, 1993; Klundert and Lardinios 1995; Medina, 2000).
The waste paper collected by the scavengers accounted for almost 90% of the 
secondary paper sources in Jakarta and was estimated to save approximately 6 million trees. 
Approximately $48.5million was generated through solid waste recycling with collection fees 
totalling up to $0.5million. (Oepen, 1993, Furedy, 1993).
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The provision of an enabling environment for the waste scavengers allowed for the 
development of the group. Their rights were protected and their acceptance in society 
increased. The incomes realized within the sector also generally increased.
7.5.2. Case 2: Coopamare, Sao Paolo
Extreme poverty within some Brazilian cities encouraged the growth of the informal 
material recovery waste management sector. Despite the volume of waste traded, however, 
income levels still remained low. The predominance of middlemen within the informal 
material recovery sector in Brazil had encouraged the dominance of poverty within the 
informal material recovery sector (Medina, 2007; Klundert and Lardinois 1995).
The dynamics of scavenging changed in 1982 in Sao Paulo Brazil when eight paper 
pickers, working together, bought one cart. The formation of an association of waste pickers 
was able to generate support from a religious welfare organization called CEMPRE (Wells,
2000). These religious welfare organizations gave them some financial support and the new 
cooperative was able to construct more carts. In 1985 they founded an association called 
Coopamare to have a body to fight for the rights of waste scavengers (Medina, 1995). The 
activities of the Coopamare gained support from the political elite through the allocation a 
piece of land under a viaduct (in a middle-income area) from the then Mayor Luiza Erundina 
(1989-1993) under two conditions: 1), the cooperative would have to return the land as soon 
as it stopped its activities; and 2), the place should be kept clean (Medina, 2007; Klundert and 
Lardinios 1995; Rolnik and Cymbalista, 2004).
177
By the mid 1990s, Coopamare had approximately 100 members mainly working in 
two neighbourhoods of Sao Paulo. The Coopamare is run by the waste pickers with a former 
waste picker as the leader of the cooperative in the 1990s’ and various responsibilities shared 
amongst the cooperative members (Medina, 2007).
By acting in a cooperative, the waste pickers were able to collect larger volumes of 
waste. This allowed them to deal with businesses directly bypassing middle men and 
negotiating fair prices for their materials. Establishing good contacts with purchasing 
industries was seen as being of the utmost importance (Medina, 2000; Klundert and Lardinois 
1995).
Similar cooperatives have now been set up in other cities in Brazil, including Santos, 
Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre and Santa Catharina. Based on the experience of Coopamare, a 
training kit has been designed to help waste collectors in other cities to form cooperatives and 
to integrate these coops into officially run waste programmes. (Klundert and Lardinios 1995). 
One of the problems faced in some cities is the waste pickers and recyclers have become so 
successful that larger private sector companies have started to move into the same sector, 
undercutting the cooperatives as on Isla de Marhinieros, Porto Alegre.
A unique selling point of the Coopamare is that it was started by the waste pickers and
it was also run by the waste pickers. They were able to generate as much interest in their
activities because they worked together. They knew what they needed as a group and were
able to generate the type of help that could help their industry grow. The Coopamare was not
another poverty alleviation project put together by an NGO or faceless government body who
guessed or assumed what the waste collectors needed. The Coopamare working on behalf of
178
the Coopamare were able to identify the obstacles they met along the way in delivering their 
service and what could improve the quality of life that they had.
The Coopamare were able to identify that trading through middlemen kept them 
below the poverty line and came together to form a cooperative that could boost their 
negotiating power (Rolnik and Cymbalista, 2004). The Coopamare required public 
acceptance and were able to find an NGO to help them improve their public image. Their 
efforts to make themselves more acceptable to the people got the attention of their 
government who gave them a place to work. The continued efforts of the Coopamare to boost 
themselves out of poverty and generate public acceptance for their activities is the main 
reason for the success of the Coopamare.
7.5.3. Case 3: Zabaleen Cairo, Egypt
The Wahiya migrated to Cairo from Dakhla Oasis in Western Egypt. The Wahiya 
collected waste from door to door and were paid by the End Users for the service. The
tViZabaleen originally moved to Cairo in the early 20 century as migrants from El Badary 
district in Assiut (a rural region in southern Egypt). In the 1930s and 1940s, the Zabaleen 
bought waste from the Wahiya to feed pigs. The Wahiya then introduced the Zabaleen to 
informal waste collection and entered into a kind of partnership with the Zableen (Fahmi,
2005). The Wahiya collected the user charges and the Zableen collected the waste and 
separated it. A large proportion of the Zableen live in Muqattam one of the seven settlements 
allocated to them by the municipal government. It is the largest Zableen settlement; the other 
six have been continually moved due to the expansion of Cairo (Fahmi, 2005; Fahmi and 
Sutton, 2006).
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The Muqattam Zabaleen settlement was established in 1970 by the municipal 
government. It is part of a squatter settlement called Manshiet Nasser (Fahmi, 2005). This 
settlement was formed for the Zabaleen and squatters following a series of evictions of 
Zabaleens from other Zabaleen settlements. There is ongoing land diversification in the 
Muqattam as the city has continued to expand and the value of the land has continued to rise 
(Fahmi, 2005).
A pair of Zabaleen working together with a donkey cart can collect the waste from 
350 homes in a day (Fahmi, 2005). A study in 1996 showed that the Zableen collected 
approximately 3,000 tonnes (a third of Cairo’s waste) of waste daily approximately 85% of 
which was recycled and a majority of the organic content was composted or fed to pigs 
(which were sold to tourist houses) with a minimal amount being unusable (Fahmi, 2005; 
Fahmi and Sutton, 2006).
In 1981, the Zableen received a World Bank grant which was used in collaboration 
with the Environmental Quality International (EQI) an NGO to create the Zableen 
Environmental Development Programme (ZEDP). This was used to improve their living 
conditions which included upgrading their housing stock, water supply, sewage disposal, 
electricity and road infrastructure (Fahmi, 2005; Fahmi and Sutton, 2006).
In 1982, the government proposed to relocate the waste separation activities of the
Zableen to a desert settlement called Qattamiya. This settlement was 25km away from their
current location. This move would greatly have increased the transport cost of the Zableen for
their activities making their occupations unviable. The Zabaleen are attempting to resist this
move by campaigning and enlisting the help of local NGOs’ (Fahmi, 2005; Fahmi and
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Sutton, 2006; Saber, 2000). In 1989, the Wahiya and the Zabaleen formed the Environmental 
Protection Company (EPC). This gave the Zabaleen recognition as key participants within the 
local governments waste management programme (Fahmi, 2005).
With foreign assistance and the formation of co-operatives, the Zableen were able to 
establish micro enterprises which converted the recyclable materials collected e.g. conversion 
of collected plastic to pellets which were then sold to industry. The Zabaleen have been able 
to move from the lowest paid within the economy earning LE70- ($11.50) in 1983 to between 
LE360-LE450 ($60-75) per month by 2005. By 1995, 700 families owned collection 
enterprises, 200 owned and operated small to medium scale recycling enterprises and 120 
owned enterprises trading in waste-related products (Fahmi and Sutton, 2006). It is estimated 
that these enterprises together invested an estimated LE2.1 million ($350,000) in waste 
management equipment such as trucks, plastic granulators, paper compactors, cloth grinders, 
aluminium smelters and tin processors (Fahmi, 2005). It is also estimated by Fahmi (2005) 
that the activities of the Zableen have greatly reduced the cost of waste management for the 
municipal government of Cairo.
The Cairo Cleaning and Beautification Authority argue that the Zabaleen methods
were unhygienic and unsafe. The government policy became indirectly hostile to the Zableen
for these reasons. In 2004 the decision was taken to privatise the waste collection within the
municipality, opening up tendering to foreign companies to the supply of waste services
within the municipality of Cairo (Fahmi, 2005). The argument was that foreign companies
could afford more equipment and capital, which effectively undermined the business
operations of the Zableen, who have been unable to compete effectively with these
companies in the tendering process and face being relegated (Fahmi, 2005). While the
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companies have offered to employ the Zableen and give them access to the collected waste, 
this represents not only a loss of income for the Zableen (e.g. they got LE 3.00 ($.50) from 
the Wahiya for each house they collected waste from but the foreign companies pay LE 0.85 
($0.14)) but considering that most of the Zableen are self employed, it represents a loss of 
their independence (Fahmi, 2005).
The effects of the inclusion of foreign contractors on municipal solid waste 
management on the municipality of Cairo is an annual bill of approximately $50million a 
significant increase in cost and a decrease of the recycling and composting activities and a 
subsequent increase in land filling (Fahmi, 2005; Fahmi and Sutton, 2006).
As of 2004, the Zableen were faced with forced evictions from their homes and places 
of work by the government and low compensation as a majority live on housing plots without 
titles. A move far from the city making their livelihoods unsustainable and they now have to 
work twice as hard to be able to gain a niche in the market. (Source: Klundert and Lardinios, 
1995; Medina, 1997; Fahmi, 2005; Fahmi and Sutton, 2006).
7.6. Comparison of case studies
The three case studies were selected because this thesis needed to understand the role 
of the informal waste sector in developing country economies and the effect government 
response has on the sector.
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I) Operational activities
As demonstrated by the cases reviewed, operational activities of the informal waste
sector are extremely diverse. In some developing country cities, the informal sector are the
main providers of extensive urban waste services (Fahmi, 2005), which include door to door
waste collection and disposal; their activities also provide valuable sources of secondary 
v
materials and direct and indirect revenues for industry, farms and the municipalities 
(Klundert and Lardinios, 1995).
In 1995 the informal private waste sector of the city of Jakarta was estimated to 
provide $48.5million worth of recycling trading within the municipality. The volume of 
recycling trading in Cairo can be approximated to $30million. The figures show that the 
municipalities are able to reduce the cost of service provision by using informal private waste 
sector resources (Fahmi and Sutton, 2006). The composting content of the activities is usually 
a cheap source of fertilizers for nearby farms and private gardens (Fahmi, 2005).
The informal sector is also quite effective in the provision of jobs for unskilled 
migrant workers who would otherwise find it very difficult to survive as was illustrated with 
the Zableen in Cairo (Fahmi, 2005). The Zabaleen in Cairo have a communal system which 
helps new migrants into the city to live and learn and earn with an established family till the 
individual or family can afford their own housing and business. This communal system helps 
to give poor migrants a sense of stability and a steady income which grows over time (Fahmi, 
2005; Fahmi and Sutton, 2006). A critical factor, however, seems to be that informal waste
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operators find it difficult to cross over from providing small-scale services paid by individual 
End Users (for example in door-to-door collection householders usually make direct 
payments to the collector) to providing services on a larger scale funded by the municipality. 
It was clear in the case of Cairo, that even though they are well-established, the Zableen 
operators have been unable to migrate from informal providers to formal providers, and 
successfully compete in the contracting process once formal privatisation was introduced into 
the waste management system (Fahmi and Sutton, 2006).
II) Problems and issues
One of the critical problems to scaling up and establishing informal waste services on 
a more secure footing appears to be the complexity of managing a large group of people 
working individually or in very small scale operations. In the above cases, the 
accommodation of the informal waste operators with government policy and implementation 
was only possible by bringing them together in cooperatives and letting them collaborate in 
order to achieve common objectives (Klundert and Lardinios, 1995; Medina, 1997).
The common objectives which were as demonstrated in the case studies above include 
the increase of income generated, better working conditions, access to financial institutions, 
fairer prices for their recyclates and improved working conditions. This required some 
degree of both self-management and internal control as demonstrated by the case in Sao 
Paolo, Brazil (Klundert and Lardinios, 1995).
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In the case of Coopamare, the government was able to set a standard of a clean 
environment at which against which the informal sector were required to perform. This made 
the informal sector accountable to the government for its actions as they would lose the land 
allocated to them for their activities (Medina, 2000). While, as was demonstrated with the 
case of Jakarta in Indonesia, the financial gains for the municipality from working with the 
informal waste sector made a significant difference in reducing the city budget waste 
management (Klundert and Lardinios, 1995; Fahmi, 2005). The Zableen case meanwhile 
demonstrates how this sector can be used to reduce poverty (Fahmi, 2005).
Several other issues of management were not fully explored in the case studies for 
instance, the quality of the urban environment with informal sector provision as opposed to 
formal sector provision. Public perception of informal waste activities is often very hostile 
towards the service providers even while patronizing their services another aspect which was 
not discussed in the literature.
Informal waste operators are also at high risk of diseases and infection as a result of 
poor working conditions and lack of protection and they also face exploitation from 
middlemen as they usually have no direct access to the industries that use the recovered 
materials (Fahmi and Sutton, 2006). Only recognition of the contribution of informal waste 
operators, and the importance of the services they render, will protect their rights as 
individuals and also give them other avenues to secure and increase their income (Klundert 
and Lardinios, 1995; Fahmi, 2005).
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Ill) Prejudice and hazards
Informal private waste services providers endure considerable prejudice due to 
the nature of the service they provide. The very fact that they survive on what society has 
deemed “waste” ensures that they are often treated as outcasts (Perera and Amin, 1996). As 
stated earlier, the participants within this sector are often the poorest in society and enter the 
private informal waste sector as a way of surviving (Schubeler, 1996). Those working 
informally in waste management are often minority and excluded populations for example, 
recent rural-urban migrants, ethnic or religious minorities, low castes, women and children 
(Klundert, Lardinios 1995). While their services maybe used, they remain one of the most 
vulnerable sectors of society, especially waste pickers (scavengers).
The middlemen in between the scavengers and the industries that use the materials 
that they collect usually take full advantage of the waste pickers (Medina, 2000). These 
middle men tend to create monopolistic markets where the sellers have no choice but to go 
through them and the middle men buy from the waste pickers at a fraction of the actual 
market value of materials recovered (Medina b, Taylor 1999).
Private Informal waste sector practitioners may also be the targets of violence: for 
example in 1992 paramilitary groups in Colombia carried out a ‘social cleansing’ operation 
and killed 40 waste pickers and gave them to the local university as cadavers (Medina, b).
Due to the nature of the sector, private informal waste practitioners face health and 
accidents hazards on a daily basis. In cities where waste management is poor, landfill sites
186
and informal dump sites are often used for both hazardous and non-hazardous waste. 
Accidents occur at the dumps e.g. waste slides. The informal waste pickers are thus prone to 
disease like typhoid, diarrhoea, parasitic diseases, and malaria (Klundert and Lardinios, 
1995). Due to the presence of pregnant women within this profession, there are reported cases 
of birth defects and high infant mortality rates. Health problems and accidents affect the 
income of this sector as their income stops when they are not working (Cointreau, 1994).
IV) Policy implications
The policy implications of the discussion above are that, when there is political 
acceptance of a potential role for informal sector waste providers, inclusion of the informal 
sector as actors in waste management services can be mutually beneficial for both the 
informal sector and municipal government. As the case study of Coopamare in Brazil 
illustrated, the municipal government is able to regulate the informal sector to an extent and 
in return, its waste bill could be fractionally or significantly reduced (Klundert and Lardinios, 
1995). In Sao Paolo the municipal government were able to set conditions such as keeping 
the urban environment clean at all times, which was adhered to by the sector, which also 
increased the informal workers acceptability within the community. For example, the 
community in Sao Palo had originally not accepted the government plan to give the informal 
sector land within municipality for fear of decreased land values but the informal sector had 
been able to prove itself not to be a societal menace (Klundert and Lardinios, 1995) and 
generated acceptability within the society.
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The government of Sao Paulo were able to demonstrate that they considered the needs 
of all citizens with thin the urban environment by creating policy which was inclusive of one 
of the most socially disadvantaged groups in their urban area. This allowed the informal 
waste picker sector to develop eventually becoming the bench mark group for assisting 
disadvantaged groups in developing urban cities. The government of Sao Paulo with the 
cooperation sector was able to monitor the informal sector activities, improve informal 
working conditions and public acceptability. Monitoring of formal service delivery could be 
challenging in some developing country cities could be challenging due to scarce resources. 
The ability of the Coopamare to monitor themselves effectively (reporting any problems to 
the officials) made it easier for the Policy Makers to be able to include their services with 
formal providers.
The informal waste collection in Lagos as of 1996, was the main waste collection 
service providers in Lagos state. The methodology to be used with the sector will be the semi 
structured interview method. This will allow this thesis to explore the problems faced by the 
sector and how they feel their services and circumstances could be improved.
7.7 Gaps in literature
The study from Coopamare in brazil while indicative of what could be done, it 
is by no means a yardstick as the number of waste workers involved are very low (100) and it 
covers mainly materials’ recycling and not door-to-door collections or composting.
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From the point of view of governments, a critical problem in managing the informal 
sector is the number of operators and difficulty of establishing representative organisations of 
informal sector operators. The question of how can they be regulated, and how can this 
regulation be enforced to reduce any negative impact the sector could have on themselves, 
the community and the environment is significant.
During the secondary research carried out for this paper, it appears that there are 
several gaps in the literature. The first gap is the lack of recent case studies of the informal 
sector. The case studies found during the literature review were not only old (usually more 
than 10 years); they lacked depth (data from the informal service providers, data from the 
End Users and effects of informal sector activities on the urban environment were missing) 
and were not longitudinal, with the exception of the Cairo case study which was carried out 
recently by Fahmi, (2005). The reviews of the case studies also left a lot of questions 
unanswered, in particular the relationship between the informal sector and the formal waste 
service providers and the extent to which the informal sector was included in public policy on 
service provision.
While the case studies implied the kind of problems that the informal waste sector 
faced, none of those reviewed were in-depth. The same could be said for the benefits that the 
informal waste sector gained when they were included within public policy. While it is 
implied that informal workers earned more than some public sector workers, did the higher 
income actually make a difference in their income, quality of life and overall health? The 
arguments though passionate were not enough to convince sceptical Policy Makers that they 
would do more than gloss over the informal waste management sector.
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The focus of this thesis however is can governments in developing country cities 
successfully create effective policy and implement it to provide basic waste management 
services within developing country urban areas. The question this thesis would seek to ask is 
how the informal private sector can be added to waste policy in order to provide effective 
waste management within the municipal urban area. A majority of the literature has focused 
on the strengths of the informal sector without really dwelling on their weaknesses. Being 
able to view both strengthens and the weaknesses of the informal private sector objectively 
can aid their successful integration into formal waste services provision.
7.8. Conclusion
The informal sector in developing country cities like Lagos form an integral part of 
service delivery. They can either contribute positively or negatively to the urban environment 
and urban economy in which they operate. It is important for this thesis to understand how 
this sector operates as discussed earlier because they form a large part of the street-level 
bureaucrats in some developing country cities. The govemment/Policy Makers’ response to 
the activities of this sector has an impact on service delivery and the lives of the practitioners 
who operate within this sector. This further contributes to proving or disproving the 
hypothesis developed at the beginning of this thesis.
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8. Lagos State waste collection management: 
Introducing the Lagos PSP Programme
8.1 Phase 1:1996-2004
Chapter 8 is the first half of the empirical work of this thesis. Its aim is to test the 
hypothesis which was put forward in Section 2.11. As discussed in the conceptual Chapters 
of this thesis, certain charateristics are found to be present in developing country cities which 
are absent in developed country cities. These characteristics have an impact on the 
applicability of western models of implementation. This Chapter aims to apply those western 
models to Phase I of the Lagos state waste collection PSP Programme and evaluate the 
results. This Section shall look at the role of governance, the informal sector and End Users 
as they affect implementation in developing country cities. This Chapter begins by first 
examing the waste management problems in Lagos State. The information in the Chapter is 
drawn mainly from relevant reports and documents and from key informant interviews. For 
the purposes of anonymity, key informants are referred to as PI, P2, P3 and P4.
8.2 Lagos PSP Programme
Privatization of Lagos State solid waste management has occured twice since 
Nigeria’s independence in 1960. Waste privatization in Lagos first occured from 1980-1985 
(Section 3.9). The second and the current form of waste collection services privatization 
created by the Ministry of the Environment (MoE) Lagos State is the Lagos State Private
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Sector Participation (PSP) Programme for solid waste collection created in 1996. Its aim was 
to re-introduce formal private sector waste collection managment a service which until 1996 
had been provided free to End Users by the State.
The Lagos State PSP Programme invited the private sector to deliver solid waste 
collection and transfer services. A bidding process is not used within the PSP Programme. 
Contractors who met the minimum criteria of owning ten 10-tonne trucks were invited to 
apply to deliver the service. The qualifying Contractors payed the MoE a fixed sum of 
N 100,000 (£400) per annum and were expected to market their services to the End Users 
directly and recover their cost and earn a profit from waste levies. The levies were preset by 
the MoE and an official price list was given to the PSP Contractors to charge End Users . The 
PSP were mandated to collect the waste and transfer them to the MoE designated disposal 
sites (MoE, 1995).
The PSP Programme started with 1,500 participating Contractors in 1996-7. This 
turned out to be a misleading figure because the MoE found that the companies who claimed 
to meet their criteria did not actually meet them. Some Contractors could barely cope with 
waste collection on a street. (The orginal contracting process proved to be inadquate as the 
Contractors were taken on on the basis of what they claimed they could cope with without 
any physical verification). By 2000 this number had dimished to 645, the remaining 855 
companies had folded up (MoE, 2007). By the end of Phase I, there were approximately 200 
PSP Contractors participating within the PSP waste collection policy. The cause of the 
decrease in the number of PSP Contractors was their inability to make a profit. It is unknown 
at what rate the Contractors left the programme as no accurate records from this period were 
available during the data gathering process.
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In this thesis, the Lagos State PSP Programme is divided into two phases. Phase I 
covers the period from 1996-2004 when the PSP Contractors were expected to collect 
payment for their services directly from the clients. Phase II covers the period from 2004 to 
2007 (2007 was the emipirical data gathering phase of this thesis) when the government paid 
the PSP Contractors directly and recovered the cost of the service by laying a PSP waste tax 
on the End Users (MoE, 2004). Phase I is disccussed in Chapter 8 while Phase II is discussed 
in Chapter 9.
8. 3 Lagos State waste problem
Although waste is usually a municipal function, a weak local government system as 
discussed in Section 3.8 has meant that the State has retained responsibility for waste 
collection (PI, 2007; MoE, 2006). Waste problems in Lagos State include disposal of 
industrial and medical waste, collection and transfer of domestic waste, illegal waste dumps, 
and incidental environmental problems due to the poor management of waste within the State 
(PI, 2007; P4, 2008; MoE, 2007; LAWMA, 2005).
One of the most acute problems in the State has remained the collection and transfer 
of waste from domestic and commercial premises in the municipal areas (usually classified as 
municipal solid waste), the focus of this research. This problem has been given high priority 
by the MoE (Ministry of Environment) and LAWMA (Lagos State Waste Management 
Authority) because of the illegal dumping of waste in the municipal environment, its direct 
health and visual impacts, and the indirect or transferred impacts on the Lagos urban
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environement such as traffic and flooding, which affected the socio-economic fabric of the 
State (Civil Liberties Organization, 2004).
The waste problem was defined by the Ministry of Environment (MoE) on behalf of 
the State (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P3, 2007; P4, 2008; MoE, 1995). According to key informants 
in the reserarch, by the mid-1990s, the problem, as defined by the MoE during a series of 
Ministry and agency meetings, was twofold. The first issue was the inadequate collection and 
transfer of municipal solid waste from its point of generation to its point of disposal (PI 
2007; P3, 2005) which resulted in extensive uncontrolled dumping of waste and the 
associated aesthetic, health and environemtal hazards (Onwumere, 2002). In 2006, it was 
estimated that of the 6,000 tonnes of municipal solid waste generated in the State daily, an 
estimated 4,000 tonnes was dumped illegally within the urban enviroment (Lagos State,
2006). The second problem was the inability of formal provision to meet demand for waste 
collection and transfer, and the difficulty of collecting solid waste in low-income informal 
areas where the network of access roads was limited (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P3, 2007; P4, 2008; 
PSP Focus group, 2007). Previous policies had relied on organized collection from LAWMA. 
This was supplemented by emergency clean-ups (The policy was to let the waste pile on the 
roads and then clear the waste when the nusiance factor was very high) when waste 
accumulated as LAWMA had lacked sufficent waste collection capacity to meet demand. The 
cost of emergency clean-ups and the failure to acquire equipment to increase and maintain 
waste collection capacity had been a major concern to the MoE Policy Makers (PI, 2007; P2, 
2007; P4, 2008, Technical Committee, 2004). By the beginning 1996 the cost of waste 
collection, transfer and disposal and the emergency clean-ups were approximately a quarter 
of the total State budget, so the issue had reached crisis proportions for the Policy Makers in
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terms of cost and effect on the urban enviroment and population (PI, 2007; Onwumere, 2005; 
Momodu, Suleiman and Isiguzo, 2006; Achankeng, 2003; P4, 2008)
The MoE and LAWMA predict the amount of waste generated will rise in line with 
population growth. LAWMA predicts the amount of waste generated could rise by 
approximately 10-15% (P3, 2005; PI, 2007; P4, 2008, MoE, 2007; LAWMA, 2004). 
Population growth was predicted to rise at a rate of approximately 8% per annum (Lagos 
state, 2006).
Between the years of 1981-1991, LAWMA was responsible for municipal solid waste 
collection and transfer, but large propotions of the urban settlements were either unserviced 
or relied on informal waste collectors known as ‘cart-pushers’. During this period, LSWDB 
(Lagos State Waste Development Board) (which then became LAWMA) was supported by a 
$54m grant from the World Bank in 1988 (World Bank, 1991) to purchase 375 trucks 141 
compactors, 23 bulldozers, 4 maintenance workshops and 84 tippers.
As discussed in Section 3.9, there are two problems with imported equipment - it is 
often poorly designed to cope with the high organic content of waste found in developing 
countries, and the maintenance is difficult due to a lack of experienced technicians and 
available spare parts, which results in a constant breakdown of the equipment and the service 
(PI, 2007; Technical committee, 2004). By 1991, only 42 compactor trucks remained with 
the other trucks having been cannibalized for their maintainance (PI, 2007; Technical 
committee, 2004; Nkwoh, 2006; LAWMA, 2007).
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8.4 Solution
The Policy Makers wanted to avoid the inefficiencies of previous waste policies, both 
the regular service provided through LAWMA, and the emergency clean-ups (PI, P2, 2007). 
The emergency action was particularly unsatisfactory due to its high cost, irregularity, and 
the environmental nusiance and hazards caused between interventions (PI, 2007).
The first stage was to develop a Private Sector Partnership (PSP) Programme to tackle 
the inefficiencies of waste collection and transfer services that had been provided by 
LAWMA. A policy was required that recognised past inefficiencies in formal government 
provision and the decision was made by the Policy Makers of the MoE to introduce private 
sector service provision as a more efficient mechanism for service delivery (PI, P2, P3, 2007; 
MoE, 1995).
It is evident from this example that implementation of waste services in Lagos State is 
primarily driven from the top. As in the discussion of top-down literature, Policy Makers 
instigate change (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1983, Sabatier, 1984, 1993) and are able to an 
extent direct the allocation of resources for a service (Sabatier, 1986). It is notable however, 
that in the case of the PSP Programme in Lagos, while a Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
Programme was initiated to deliver the service, full privatisation is not possible because 
ultimately the role of service delivery still rests with the government (Li and Akintoye, 2003).
The model of PPP that has been employed in the delivery of the Lagos PSP
Programme is Service Contract C (see Section 6.1:l.c). In Service Cotnract C, the private
sector owns its own equipment and has the option of acquiring government equipment in the
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provision of the contracted service (Li and Akintoye, 2003). Service Contract C ensures that 
the PSP Contractors have the necessary equipment to deliver waste collection and transfer 
services. This method of service contract allows the government to go from a service supplier 
to a service regulator (Li and Akintoye, Edwards, Hardcastle, 2003).
The disadvantage of the Phase I PSP Programme is that it did not take full advantage 
of the Service Contract C model, as it did not use a bidding system to determine the cost of 
the service as the cost of the service was predetermined by the MoE (PSP focus group, 2007). 
This was possibly because private waste collection using Nigerian Contractors was new in 
Lagos State. The informal sector waste collection service providers have mainly represented 
private waste collection till this period in Lagos state. The Policy Makers wanted to make 
waste collection attractive to private investors who had no history of deliverying the service 
and this precluded them from bidding to provide the service.
The main advantage to the client organisation of Service Contract C is that all 
equipment is acquired maintained and owned by the private sector Contractors (Fiscal Affairs 
Department, 2004) (Section 6.1.l.c). The aim was to overcome the problems that LAWMA 
had expreienced, when equipment mostly through grants and loans from the World Bank, 
was not maintained resulting in constant breakdown of the service (PI, 2007, Technical 
Committee, 2004).
A second advantage of Service Contract C in the Lagos context is that it allows a wide
range of private firms including small, medium and large sized firms to participate in the
project. Firms which do not already have equipment can acquire what is needed at subsidized
prices, provided that they already met the minimum requirement of owning ten 10-tonne
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trucks (Bennett, Grohmann and Gentry, 2000). This also gave the implementing agency the 
option of selling off its equipment in a ready market.
An interesting feature of the PSP Programme is that it was inspired by the informal 
waste sector that filled the gap left by the inadequacy of formal waste collection (PI, 2007). 
The MoE, in searching for an answer to the problem observed the informal sector practices 
and learnt an important lesson from their activities which was 4 if the service provided was of 
a good standard, the citizens of the State were willing to pay for the service’ (PI, 2007; P2, 
2007; P3, 2007; P4 2008). There was, however, no understanding of the complimentary role 
provided by cart-pushers, or consideration of an integrated solution which would involve 
them working in parallel with larger private sector waste collection firms.
8.5 Phase I Lagos State PSP Programme: 1996-2004
By 1995, in the face of increasing international pressure and internal civil unrest, the 
then ruling head of State, General Sani Abacha, announced a timetable for a 3-year transition 
to civlian rule. Abacha died under mysterious circumstances in 1998, and his successor 
General Abdulsalami Abubakar reformed the civil service and set up a national electoral 
commission to supervise elections for the presidency, national assembly, State legislature and 
governors, and local governments, which were held in 1999 (BBC 2009).
By 1996, formal provision of waste services was virtually non-existent within the 
State. The first phase of the PSP Programme began in 1996 under Military rule (PI, 2007;
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P2, 2007; P4, 2008). The Lagos State Military Governor at the time, General Marwa, was a 
close ally of General Abacha, and would probably have been aware of General Abacha’s 
plans to succeed as a civilian president; General Marwa may well have intended to follow 
suit and was not willing to risk any policy that could be prejudicial to his political future (See 
Table 3.1 for complete list of Lagos State governors).
Although, the MoE had observed that the general public seemed to willing to pay cart- 
pushers for waste collection services, there were many problems with the informal sector 
operations. Although the cart-pushers were highly efficient in collecting the waste generated, 
waste collected was often dumped by the roadside as designated formal disposal points were 
too far for the cart-pushers to transfer the waste (Cart pusher interviews (CaPI) 1, 2007; CaPI 
2, 2007; 3, CaPI 4, 2007, cart-pushers group interview 1, 2008). The waste collected by the 
informal private sector frequently ended up in illegal waste disposal sites adding to the waste 
problem of the State (Olori, 2005). There are currently very few waste transfer centres within 
the municipal areas of the State and LAWMA during Phase I of the PSP Programme did not 
have adequate capacity to collect waste from these approved centres (MoE, 2004).
The Military governor at the time, General Marwa, was unconvinced that households 
would pay for waste collection as many saw formal waste collection as a government service, 
and he required the service to be implemented as a pilot study before it was implemented 
across the State for this reason (PI, 2007). Formal collection had a history of being paid for 
by the government (LAWMA, 2005), and over 53% of respondents to the structured 
interview conducted for this research in 2007 saw formal waste collection as a government 
service which had always been paid for by the government as shown in Table 8.1 below.
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Table 8.1 Response to question, Who pays for waste? 
Source: Structured interview survey
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum ulative Percent
Valid 7 4.4 4.4 4.4
Government 86 53.8 53.8 58.1
You 61 38.1 38.1 96.2
Not Applicable 2 1.2 1.2 97.5
4 4 2.5 2.5 100.0
Total 160 100.0 100.0 .0
The pilot scheme for the PSP Programme, which started in 1996, was tested on Kosofe 
Local Government area (which was later divided into two local government areas Kosofe and 
Somolu Local Governments). These areas were probably selected as they are predominantly 
high-income areas that would be more receptive to paying for waste collection than residents 
of lower income areas.
The pilot scheme was designed as a self-financing project. The collection and transfer of 
waste was to be collected by the private sector and paid for by the End Users (Li and 
Akintoye, 2005). The government advertised in the local press for private waste collectors 
that fit the eligibility criteria (PI, P3, 2007, PSP group interview, 2007). Contractors were 
required to own 10 ten tonne trucks, create route maps and generate statistical data for 
instance, number of residents, and income levels of their allocated areas and market their 
services to the End Users (PI, P2, 2007; P4, 2008; MoE, 1995).
The characteristics of the pilot scheme were;
1) In 1996 the MoE did not have firm political support from the government of the day 
for the policy (PI, 2007)
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2) The MoE on behalf of the State created the policy in 1996. However, legislative 
backing did not start until 2001 after the civilian-led (led by Mr Tinubu) government 
took power in 1999 (PI,2007; P2, 2007; P3, 2007; Gazzet, 2001).
3) The private sector for the second time was formally invited to participate in the waste 
collection process, alhtough this was the first time in the country that local companies 
had been involved in solid waste collection services, as the first privatisation 
programme which ran from 1980-1985 was contracted to a foreign company (PI, 
2007; LAWMA, 2005 and 2006).
4) This policy was unprecedented within the State as it was the first time the citizens 
were being charged directly for the collection and transfer of domestic waste (PI, 
2007; P2, 2007; P4, 2008). Other services such as water, run by the water 
corporation, had been subject to a fee for some time (the corporation was Federally- 
run but now privatized) but waste has traditionally free.
5) The PSP Programme was designed to reduce the State’s role in the provision of waste 
collection and transfer services. The privatization changed the MoEs’ and LAWMAs 
role from service provider to service regulator (PI, 2007). The public sector became 
service regulators when private provision is introduced into public services (Owen 
and Mema, 1997).
The policy had been created, and its implementation through the PSP Programme is 
discussed below.
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18.6 Implementation schools of thought
8.6.1 Objectives, and resources
The MoE wanted the waste collected and transferred from the municipal areas of 
generation to the designated areas of disposal. The State budget for waste collection and 
transfer at the time of the policy creation was around a quarter of the total State budget (PI, 
2007; Onwumere, 2005; Momodu, Suleiman and Isiguzo, 2006; Achankeng, 2003; P4, 2008) 
and the Policy Makers were keen to reduce State expenditure on waste collection and transfer 
costs to the general public.
The MoE at the start of the policy had limited political and legislative backing, 
described as important in the literature (Van Horn 1975; Sabatier 1993; and Hood 1976). The 
policy set out to try and use market efficiencies (Jensen, 1978) to achieve its objective to 
improve its short fall in service delivery (PI, 2007). If the test was successful within the test 
area, then the following benefits were expected by the Policy Makers;
a) Less government revenue would be expended in the collection and transfer of 
municipal waste as it would be paid for by the End Users (P 1, 2007; MoE, 1995).
b) A sector of the economy would open up and more jobs and skill opportunities would 
be created through the PSP Programme (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P3, 2007).
c) Efficiency would be introduced within the collection and transfer of waste from the 
municipal areas (as recommended by Sabatier, 1983)
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d) The MoE could improve its services as regulators of the service (Ahmed, 1996; PI, 
2007; P3, 2007).
e) Waste collection resources could be diverted for other environmental services
f) The government monopoly on waste services would be curtailed (Li and Akintoye, 
2005)
g) Provision and maintainance of infrastructure would mainly be the responsibility of the 
private sector (Ball, Heafey and King, 2000).
The companies participating in the PSP Programme were expected, like the informal 
sector, to market their services to the consumers directly. This was expected to ensure that the 
service provider conducted their services efficiently. The test pilot was supposed to achieve 
two main objectives:
i) It was supposed to prove that the private sector was capable of delivering an 
efficient service, and
ii) Prove that if the targeted End Users (households) were provided with an efficient 
service, they would be willing to pay for the service contrary to the expectations 
of the Military State government in 1996 (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P3, 2007).
The outcome of the pilot test set the precedent on what the MoE/LAWMA needed to
achieve and the potentials of the PSP Programme. The shortcomings of the programme
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were used as a learning curve within the MoE/LAWMA to improve the service. The PSP 
service developed a number of unanticipated problems that are listed below;
i) The End Users were often late in payment or completely defaulted in 
paying the PSPs (PSP focus group, 2007; PI, 2007), partly because they 
saw the formal provision of waste collection and transfer services as a 
service which had always been paid for by government. There was 
possibly the sense of mistrust from the End Users who thought the PSP 
Contractors were being dishonest and trying to get paid twice from the 
government and from them (Structured interview, 2007). More than 67% 
of the respondents interviewed in the structured interview undertaken for 
this research were not aware of the PSP Programme during this phase of 
the PSP Programme (Structured interview, 2007).
ii) The PSP Contractors found it difficult to canvass for new customers, and 
some found it difficult to make some households relinquish their waste as 
these residents used the waste they generated to landfill their land (PSP 
focus group, 2007).
iii) The private sector had little or no experience in the large scale collection 
and transfer of waste prior to 1996. The PSP Contractors who signed up at 
the beginning of the policy were the first set of local companies to engage 
in formal private collection and transfer of solid waste in the country (PSP 
focus group, 2007; PI, 2007; P3, 2007). The inexperience of the collectors
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possibly led them to underestimate the true requirements of waste 
collection and transfer (Attahi, 1996).
iv) The PSP Contractors, in a bid to cut costs, also engaged in fly tipping at 
illegal dumpsites exacerbating the problem they were brought in to solve. 
This is because the PSP Contractors had larger collection vehicles than the 
informal sector and thus tipped larger amounts of waste due to their larger 
capacity at illegal dumpsites. This led the MoE to create a monitoring 
department in 2003 (LAWMA, 2003; PI, 2007; P2 2007; monitoring 
official, 2007; MoE, 2007). The formal private sector activities were 
difficult to monitor due to the inexperience of the monitoring department 
and the ratio of the monitoring teams to the PSP Contractors which was 
1:350 (PI, P2, 2007, monitoring official, 2007).
The result of the initial test was disappointing and well below what was expected by the 
MoE officials. The test could have developed the problems it did for a number of reasons. 
Hogwood and Gunn (1993) describe this form of policy implementation as managerial. The 
creation and the implementation of the policy was very much top-down in nature and the PSP 
Contractors had no input in the creation of the policy (Sabatier 1986, 1993; Hjem, Porter, 
Hanf and Hull, 1978). The policy was created first and then the PSP Contractors were sought, 
effectively dividing the policy and implementation process (Barret and Fudge, 1981). This 
could mean that the PSP Contractors were unable to identify with the policy they were 
recruited to implement and what the policy was designed to achieve, which could account for 
the predominance of flying tipping amongst the new PSP Contractors.
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The consultation for the policy, if any had been carried out, could have included the 
clients, possible PSP candidates and waste consultants. The Policy Makers based the creation 
of the policy on which institution or sector can provide the most efficient waste collection 
service and where to acquire the resources to implement the policy and keep the service 
running continuously (MoE, 2007).
Barret and Fudge (1981) suggest that policy implentation should begin from the target 
group expected to deal with the End Users on a one-to-one basis (Meyers, Glaser and 
Donald, 1998). In the case of the Lagos waste collection PSP Contractors, the PSP 
Contractors could not be involved in the policy planning stage as before the policy was set up 
they had no experience in the sector (PSP focus group interview, 2007).
The informal private sector could have been consultants in the policy process (Fahmi, 
2005) because they had the experience of providing the service as private service providers. 
Consultation with the cart-pushers could have resulted in two conflicting outcomes. First, the 
sector would prove to be very unhelpful as the policy would essentially threaten the 
livelihoods of cart-pushers (Fahmi, 2005). Alternatively, a suitable agreement could have 
been reached between the Policy Makers and the informal private sector for the regulation of 
their activities, as described in Section 6.6. with the Coopamare and the Mexican government 
(Furedy 1997).
A problem of the PSP Programme can be traced back to simple lack of resources.
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984), Hogwood and Gunn (1993), Hjem and Porter (1993) argue
that adequate resources must be provided in terms of financial resources and manpower from
the Policy Makers for policy implementation to be successful. The Policy Makers went from
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a position of spending approximately 25% of State budget on waste collection management 
(Onwumere, 2005, Momodu, Suleiman and Isiguzo, 2006, Achankeng, 2003), to wanting to 
minimize cost and to for the service to become completely private sector led over night 
(Attahi, 1996).
From the fieldwork, no detailed estimates of the cost of the programme were made by 
the MoE, nor did the PSP Contractors have an idea of the requirements needed to run a waste 
collection service. For example, basic costs of advertising were shifted to the PSP 
Contractors who had limited resources for advertising and had to market their services from 
house to house, and only limited advertising was carried out by the MoE (PI, 2007; PSP 
group interview, 2007). This had the impact on the programme of severely limiting the public 
awareness of the Programme, and as mentioned earlier, more than 67% of the respondents of 
the household interviews were unaware of the PSP until Phase II was introduced in 2004 (see 
Chapter 9) (Structured interview survey, 2007).
Very few resources were spent on training the PSP Contractors for their new role. The
training given to the PSP Contractors was insufflcent to prepare them for reality of service
delivery (PSP Focus Group, 2007). The training did not include vital facts for instance on
how waste collected can affect the life span of the vehicles used. Capable manpower with the
right qualifications and experience is essential for the successful implementation of policy
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984, Sabatier, 1993, Weissert, 1994). The PSP Contractors still
in business at the end of Phase I have now acquired the skills that are required to fulfil their
contracts in the process of providing the service. Training is essential as the PSP Focus Group
(2007) readily admitted that they had no prior experience in delivering the service prior to
joining the PSP Programme. The lack of information from LAWMA with regard to the
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service also hindered the progress that the PSPs made as the residents could view them as 
fraudsters and feel the service was not mandatory by law (Sabatier, 1986, Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1983).
8.6.2. Conditions for policy implementation
‘If an efficient waste collection service is provided, then the public would be willing to 
pay for formal waste collection managment services’ (PI, 2007; P2, 2007). As it was, a 
market for the service already existed with strong supply and demand which was 
demonstrated by a thriving informal sector. The MoE’s aim was to create a more efficient 
service than that provided by the private informal sector to meet the demand for waste 
collecting and importantly which also did not culminate with the waste collected remaining 
within the municipal areas in illegal dumps. Hjem and Porter (1993), Bish (1974), Ostrom 
(1973) an effective service is expected to engender support from the targeted End Users .
The increase in the number of private firms participating within government services 
in a society would also affect the efficiency of public services in administrations that contract 
out public services (Hjem and Porter, 1993, Hogwood and Gunn, 1993, Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1983).
It is notable that even when the fieldwork was carried out in Lagos in 2007, in structured
interviews over 53% of those interviewed believed that the government should pay for waste
collection as it was a government responsibility, compared to just over 40% who felt it was
their responsibility as they generate municipal waste (End User survey, 2007). Respondents
from different income backgrounds especially those from the high income bracket (over
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50%) felt that waste collection was a government responsibility and should be paid for by the 
government using the tax that the government already collected as seen in Table 8.2 below 
(Structured interview Contractors, 2007).
Table 8.2 Waste responsibility 
(Source: End User survey, 2007)
Income Government You Not Applicable 4 Total
5,000,001 -  
Above
0 17 16 0 33
1,000,001 - 
5,000,000
0 9 10 0 19
500,001 - 
1,000,000
0 7 8 1 16
100,001 - 
1,000,000
0 9 7 0 16
Below - 100,000 0 21 8 0 29
Optional 4 20 11 1 36
Total 4 83 60 2 149
There was no research before the pilot project started on how the policy would be 
received by the End Users (PI, 2007). Although demand had been established through the 
activities of the informal sector, why then did the policy implementation give such poor 
results during its trial phase?
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Part of the problem was a lack of public consultation prior to the launch of the policy, 
especially with the informal sector upon whom the policy was modelled. 55% of respondents 
surveyed said they would have attened a public consultation on the collection of their waste. 
In the fieldwork the informal sector service providers provided informatin that showed that 
the customers are not always prompt with their payments (Informal Sector Contractors (CaPI 
1, 2007; CaPI 2, 2007; CaPI 3, 2007, CaPGI 2, 2008, PSP group interview, 2007, household 
interviews, 2007).
Consultation would also have demonstrated that a majority of the householders were 
unwilling to pay the government in particular to have their waste collected (Structured 
interview, 2007). Waste is often not the most important item on the End Users agenda and 
that the informal sector often has to be very flexible when it comes to being paid by their End 
Users and still deliver an efficient service (CaPI 1, 2007; CaPI 3, 2007). This understanding 
between service provider and client works well with the informal sector as many are owner- 
workers, their overheads are low and they do not hire workers that need to be paid or 
equipment to be maintiained (Fahmi, 2005). Their equipment requires relatively small 
investment to acquire and maintain, and in some cases the carts utilized in the provision of 
the informal waste collection services are leased and the cart owners only maintain these carts 
(Fahmi, 2005, CaPGI 2, 2008).
In contrast, the formal PSP Contractors require prompt payment for services due to their
large overheads. A large percentage of End Users were usually late with their payments or
completely defaulted on their payments (PSP focus group interview, 2007; Madu, 2004;
Ehigihator; 2001). This led to a number of initial PSP Contractors going bankrupt; (PSP
Focus group interview, 2007; Ehigiator, 2001). The most important lesson of Phase I for the
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Policy Makers of the MoE was the End Users are not always willing or able to pay for 
services, and the PSP Contractors needed to be paid on time to maintain their businesses and 
levels of service (P 1, 2007; LAWMA, 2007; PSP focus group, 2007). The Policy Makers 
had to reconsider the policy as a public good and an essential service and find a meeans of 
changing public perceptions and make people to take personal responsibility for their waste 
(PI, 2007). The implication of this for the bottom-up school of thought is while the street- 
level bureaucrats might develop coping mechanisms in the delivery of their services to the 
End Users (Winter, 2002), the ultimate decision for implementation within the Lagos context 
lies with who has the resources for implementation. Phase I saw the Policy Makers attempt to 
shift resource input from themselves to the End Users . The street-level bureaucrats had no 
input within the policy process. The End Users were able to excercise their rights as 
consumers not to pay for the service and the Policy Makers were able to go with the contract 
agreed between them and the PSP Contractors.
The MoE rationalized that if they were to create the enabling environment for the 
private sector to participate within the sector of waste collection and transfer, then PSP 
Contractors would adhere to the terms of the contract agreed with the MoE. The MoE would 
then be able to acquire the level of service required as the PSP Contractors are agents of the 
government (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; MoE; 1995). This was initially the case when the PSP 
Contractors started their role as private sector service providers in 1996 (PSP group 
interview, 2007).
The assumption that an enabling environment could be created wihout adequate
safeguards seems highly flawed. In Nigeria, past governments military governments have
tolerated corruption (BBC News, 1999) and the new civilian governments which came into
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power in 1999 had to launch an anti-corruption agenda which is still being carried out 
(Njoku, 2007). For this reason, it was naive of the State government to start a policy without 
an adequate fraud assessment (Nijhof, Cludtf, Fisscher and Laan, 2003). In order for the PSP 
to make up for the fall in estimated revenue, they had to essentially cut operational costs in 
terms of how much they paid for transporting waste and started to dump the waste in illegal 
dump sites adding to the existing problem (PSP group interview, 2007; PI, 2007; MoE; 
2005).
The literature indicates that Policy Makers assume in some circumstances that 
because a policy covers an essential service, core actors will automatically follow their lead 
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). In Lagos, the premise was the End Users would demand a 
level of service that the PSPs would be forced to supply (P4, 2004). The PSPs were in 
competition with informal service providers who were able to collect household waste on a 
daily basis and are quite flexible about when they received their remuneration as has been 
mentioned earlier. The PSP Contractors found it very difficult to modify the thinking of the 
End Users to collect their waste on a weekly or bi-weekly basis and therefore found it even 
harder to compete against the informal waste collectors (PSP focus group interview, 2007).
It would have been more pertinent for the Policy Makers to try and change this cultural 
mind set before embarking on the Programme as opposed to assumming that because End 
Users already pay the informal sector for waste services, they would automatically pay the 
formal sector for the same service even though carried out at a higher standard.
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8.6.3. Enabling legislation
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989) state that the legislation which backs policy must be 
clear and unambigious in what is required of the policy. It should state the policy goals and 
objectives and how they are expected to be achieved. The policy should also state the 
implementing agency wihtin it. The legislation which backs the domestic PSP waste 
collection Programme is the Lagos State Environemental Sanitation Law (2001) (Annex C). 
This Legislation, states that the End Users are expected to patronize the PSP Contractors for 
their domestic waste collection services. It includes penealties for the non-performance of the 
PSP Contractors, penalties for the non-compliance of the End Users and penalties for cart- 
pushers. This legislation also introduces the KAI Brigade and States its functions and powers 
(Lagos, 2001). Below is an analysis of the effect the Lagos State Environemtal Sanitation 
Law has had on the PSP Programme.
The Military heads as it was mentioned earlier did not believe that the End Users would 
be willing to pay for a service that has always been provided by the government for free (PI, 
2007). For this reason, there was no enabling legislature that originally supported the PSP 
Programme itself when it started in 1996.
The Environmental Sanitation Law for Lagos State was published in 1998 two years after 
the pilot scheme started and repealed in 2001 (Lagos State, 2001) to be replaced with new 
legislation the Environmental Sanitation Law, 2001, which includes the PSP vaguely by 
saying who they are and what they do but gives it very little other legislative backing. Within 
the top-down literature, it is recommened that there should be strong legislative backing for a
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new waste collection management service as prescribed by Sabatier (1993) and Pressman and 
Wildavsky, (1983).
The legislation is written in a manner that could be construed as giving the Policy Makers 
a get-out clause from the policy. To begin with, it does not introduce the PSP Programme, the 
actors or their roles, as it did in the same document for the Corps (also known as KAI) which 
detailed the K.I.A, the actors, their role within the MoE and the local government councils 
and the penalties for non-compliance with the Corps (Gazette, 2001; P2, 2007; PSP Group 
interview, 2007).
There is nothing within the Environmental Sanitation Law to say who these registered 
private people are and how they can be identified as government service providers. The 2001 
Environmental Sanitation Law lists some fines for the patronage of the informal sector 
service providers and for the formal and informal service providers themselves which are not 
high enough to be deterrents against breaking the law (See table 8.3 below) (LG 2 interview, 
2007). The PSP pratitioners did not have the authority to make the End Users give up their 
waste or make them pay for the service recieved. The bottom-up school of thought believe 
that the street-level bureaucrats (in this case the PSP practitioners) because of the relationship 
the have with End Users, have a better ability to implement policy (Lipsky, 1980; Matland, 
1995). In the case of the PSP practitioners, this was not the case, they had difficulties in 
establishing the sort of relationship (they deliver the service and the End Users pay for the 
service), which their contracts required.
The Policy Makers shifiting the public enlightenment aspect of the policy also
contributed to the lack of coperation the PSP practitioners recieved from the End Users . The
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End Users needed the Policy Makers to certify the PSP practitioners, which they did not do. 
Bardach (1977), proposes that the Policy Makers need to be mangerial in their appraoch to 
policies created and be ready to micro manage their porjects. The Policy Makers were quite 
lackadasical about their role within the implementation process during this phase. The lack of 
input from the Policy Makers and the use of private firms gave the End Users liberty for 
license not to comply with the policy.
Table 8.3: Fines
(Source: Lagos State Environmental Sanitation Law, 2001)
Offence Minimum fine Maximum fine
N £ N £
Failure o f PSP Contractors to 
service End Users 5000 20 10000 40
Direct dealings of End Users 
with unregistered operators 5000 20 10000 40
Failure to pay for services 
rendered by the PSP 
Contractors
500 2 1000 4
Cart-pushers 5000 20 10000 40
The fine of N500 (£2) for the End Users is not sufficent to patronize the PSP 
Contractors as most End Users can afford to pay this amount. In some instances, it was 
cheaper to pay the £2 fine than patronize the service. For instance, a Duplex (detached house) 
had a bill ofN5000 (£20).
Furthermore, the residents of an area were able to opt out of the service in two ways.
First, they could choose not to participate in the service was being marketed to them, so they
could choose not to participate, and second, the fine imposed for non-compliance or non-co-
operation with the PSP Contractors was nominal and in some case less than the service
charge i.e. the fine was between N5000-N10000 (£20-£40) and the charges depending on the
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type of accommodation being fined were as much as N4000 in 2001 (MoE, 2004; Gazette, 
2001).
The Environmental Sanitation Law 2001 does not mention the implementation or 
regulatory responsibilities. It is not clear whether the responsibility for regulation falls to 
MoE or LAWMA or to the clients. Baradach (1977) argues that the legislation which backs 
policy can be used to map out its implementation making it legally binding. This is important, 
because during Phase I, the implementation of the PSP Programme resided with the MoE and 
not LAWMA. That meant if the End Users had any problems or issues arising from the 
implementation of the policy, they would not be so easy to resolve, it especially as the MoE 
and LAWMA are on opposite sides of the city. The importance of legislation as Pressman 
and Wildavsky (1983) and Hogwood and Gunn (1993) found within implementation would 
apply here, as strong legislation is required to a new policy that requires large-scale 
compliance.
The literature aruges the need for adequate legislation to govern the implementation 
of policy. It defines all the actors that are affected directly or indirectly by the policy. It 
designates the implementing agencies and the powers associated with them in carrying out 
their alloted tasks (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Hood, 1976 and Sabatier, 1993). It stops 
encroachment from other agencies especially those agencies whose objectives are contrary to 
the successful implementation of the policy while giving ample power or opportunity for 
agencies that have similar or symbiotic goals to work together (Pressman and Wildavsky, 
1983; Hjem and Porter, 1993).
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The incidence of corruption as discussed in Chapter 6 and that will be discussed in 
Section 8.7.2 later in this Chapter often clouds the legislative process in developing country 
cities like Lagos. In Nigeria, the time taken for a bill to be sent to the executive from the 
legislature is approximately 1-3 months from first reading (Nigerian Senate, 2006). The 
legislative process can be held up indefinately in some instances because bribes have not 
been given (Affe, 2009). While legislative backing is important in the implementation of 
policy as discussed above, for it to be enforceable it is importat that other powers be confered 
to the Policy Makers to allow vital services be delivered to End Users. The issue of 
corruption at any point in the implementation process does not arise in either school of 
thought on implementation.
The policy while making the activities of the cart-pushers illegal and placing a fine on 
their activity, was an insufficient deterrent to the Informal Sector Participants. Firstly they 
were very difficult to police due to their eratic schedules and sheer numbers , and secondly, 
they did not lose their as equipment as it was returned to them upon the payment of the fine, 
enabling them to continue operation (LGA 1, 2007). This meant they could continue to 
compete with the PSP for customers after their fines were paid.
8.6.4. Committed and Skilful Implementing Officers
Skill availability and commitment to the PSP Programme can be considered in two 
parts. The first stage is assigned to the MoE who are effectively both the Policy Makers and 
the implementing agency. A point of interest that must be put forward here is that LAWMA 
was the waste management implementing agency for the MoE. The MoE choose to 
implement the PSP waste policy directly because:
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1) LAWMA was still designated as the formal waste collector for the rest of the 
State. LAWMAs role at the time had been redefined for emergency evacuation 
in areas which had not be assigned to PSP Contractors.
2) The MoE Policy Makers preferred the hands-on approach for domestic waste 
and delegated industrial waste collection to the implementing agency 
LAWMA. The PSP Programme was designed for domestic waste collection 
and was in its infancy stages. MoE The amount of industry available in Lagos 
at the time was low due to inadequate electrical supply and a heavy reliance on 
generators which increased production costs. The level of industrial waste was 
more manageable for LAWMA than domestic waste.
3) Methods of implmentation differed for the two agencies. The MoE prefers the 
door to door method of waste collection while LAWMA prefers the use of 
communal bins - a major disagreement point between both agencies (PI, 2007; 
P3, 2007; MoE, 1995; LAWMA, 2006). In 1996, domestic waste was the 
highest source of waste in the urban environement in Lagos state. As will be 
discussed later, a contributing factor to the waste visible within the urban 
enviroment were the central pick up points supplied by LAWMA. This was 
because LAWMA had insufficient equipment capacity to collect the waste as 
it was generated.
4) A last possible reason could also be that LAWMA’s ineffectiveness in the past 
to deliver on waste services to municipal areas made it unacceptable to the 
MoE to delegate implementation of the PSP Programme to LAWMA.
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As Matland, (1995) stated, the service which policy is proposing needs to be delivered 
with adequate manpower with skills (and preferably) experience in the delivery of the 
service. In addition, there has to be a high level of commitment from the Policy Makers and 
the street-level bureaucrats (Sabtier, 1986). These two factors will increase the ability of 
implementation to meet policy goals. The commitment of the MoE to the PSP Programme is 
not in doubt nor can it be questioned. What can be questioned however is their method of 
implementing the PSP waste collection policy. From the interviews conducted at the MoE in 
2007, it would seem that the PSP Programme model for this phase was based on a pattern that 
was not particularly understood by the MoE (MoE, 2007). Two assumptions were made by 
the MoE which hindered the implementation of the PSP Programme. First was a lack of a 
true understanding of how the informal sector actually worked and how it was being 
sustained. Second was the fact that the MoE believed that the private sector would naturally 
be able to provide an adequate waste collection service that the Policy Makers at 
MoE/LAWMA have found difficult with skilled man power to provide in the past.
The skill of the MoE in implementing a project like the PSP is also called into
question. Prior to the implementation of the PSP project, the MoE had little experience in
supervising the private sector or in handling a project of this nature and size (MoE, 2007;
LAWMA, 2005). It must be understood that prior to the PSP Programme, the MoE only had
experience supervising LAWMA and for the most part according to Olowomeye (1991) and
interview with the MoE Policy Makers in 2007, the MoE had been unsuccessful in
supervising LAWMA effectively because of the inefficiencies in LAWMA i.e. the LAWMA
equipment was often in a state of disrepair (Olowu, 1991; PI, 2007; P4, 2008). Sabatier
(1986) advocates that there should be adequate skill and dedication in the implementation of
policy. While the Policy Makers were dedicated to the policy, they did not have the required
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skill to imolement the policy. The lack of skill within the PSP Waste Collection Policy was 
not limited to the Policy Makers, the implementing agency LAWMA and the PSP contractors 
did not have the required skill to implement the PSP Programme.
It might suffice to say that the Policy Makers were not really aware of the scale that 
the PSP Programme would be, and so were unable to make adequate provisions to ensure a 
successful test of the policy (PI, 2007; P4, 2008). It can also be said that they placed a lot of 
emphasis on trust and obedience. Trust in the PSP Contractors and obedience from the 
general public. The MoE soon found that they were poorly equipped to monitor the PSP 
Contractors (PI, 2007).
The almost non-existent relationship that the MoE had with the public did not give them 
the added resource that the public could give in the view of them reporting poorly performing 
PSP Contractors or PSP Contractors who engaged in fly tipping. The respondents in an 
interview, who were asked if they would or were even able to contact the MoE or LAWMA 
to report a problem, all responded either negatively or were under the impression that nothing 
would be done about their complaints (respondents structred interview, 2007). In an interview 
with the MoE Policy Makers in 2007, they reported that the biggest problem that they faced 
was fly tipping by the PSP Contractors and they had very little control over the actions of the 
PSP Contractors (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P4, 2008).
The MoE possibly did not consider the reception that the PSP Contractors would receive 
from the general public. In a focus group interview in 2007, the CEOs of the PSP companies, 
indicated that they were very poorly treated by the clients, and they could only imagine how 
poorly treated their workers were (PSP focus group, 2007).
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8.6.5. Support of stakeholder groups and sovereigns
Sabatier (1993) divides sovereigns into legislative and executive sovereigns. The 
importance of sovereigns and interest groups is built on the premise that without their 
positive input, implementation can not be successful even if all four elements listed in 
Section 8.5.1-8.5.4 above are in place (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier, 1993).
In order to understand the implementation of the first phase of the PSP Programme, it is 
pertinent to explain to those readers who are not proficient with Nigerian law that the Policy 
Makers and the law makers are two different entities (Dibie, 1999, 2003). As disccused in 
Section 3.8 the MoE can make policies that they would like to become law, but it is the 
executive arm of the government (i.e. the office of the governor) and the House of Assembly 
that transforms policy into State laws (Dibie, 1999, 2003). Sovereigns can how ever direct 
Policy Makers to create policies to meet political agendas or precieved social needs. During 
the military era, there was no House of Assembly, and laws were created by the office of the 
State adminsitrator/military governor.
During the implementation of the first phase of the PSP Programme, support for the 
policy from the both the sovereigns and the interest groups was minimal (PI, 2007). On the 
part of the law makers, they need to be divided into two groups. The first group consists of 
the sovreigns from 1996-1999 who were military (and were both the executive and legislative 
arms of government), and has been explaied earlier in Section 8.5.3, there were serious 
doubts about the success rate of a policy which expected the municipality to pay for services 
traditionally paid for by the government (PI, 2007). There is also a need to shed some light 
about possible political processes during this era. This period in the country’s history was
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fraught with political tension with calls both domestically and internationally for the military 
government to hand over power to a democratically elected civilian government (Anderson, 
1997).
By 1996, the military government was advocating switching to civilian rule while at the 
same time frustrating and banning public meetings (Soliman, 1998). The government did not 
want to be seen to add to the tension and mistrust that was already rife at the time and the 
then governors’ possible political ambitions. For these reasons, the government did not want 
to be seen as directly backing the PSP Programme even though it gave the MoE the 
permission to test the policy (PI, 2007). Mazmanian and Sabatier, (1989) stress the 
importance of sovereign support for a policy, sovereigns can use the powers of their office to 
promote or end a policy. They can do this in two ways, the use of veto powers or the denial of 
resources to the implementing body for implementation (Caimey, 2009). As will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 9, sovereign support is invaluable to the implementation of a policy. 
The lack of political support for the policy could also be the reason for the limited resources 
available for the PSP Programme in Phase I.
In 1999, after the hand over to civilian rule (from the military governor to the civilian
governor), the civilian sovereigns inherited massive waste collection and transfer problems,
State debt and other problems (PI, 2007; P4, 2008; MoE, 2007). The PSP waste collection
policy was tested by the MoE and its implementation gradually grew but it was not until 2001
that it was formally incorporated into the Lagos State Sanitation Law (P4, 2008). The new
civilian government showed more of an interest in the PSP Programme than the former
military government. The new civilian government had the environment as one of its key
political mandates (Fashola, 2006). The PSP Programme regardless still remained unchanged
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until the next phase which began in 2004, and waste management had gone higher up the 
political agenda. The stakeholder groups involved in the implementation of the PSP 
Programme can be grouped as the MoE (Policy Makers, law makers and monitoring dept), 
LAWMA, the PSP Contractors and the End Users (PI, 2007; P2, 2007). The stake holder 
groups according to Sabatier (1986), can influence policy through lobbying sovereigns 
directly or indirectly through the media. This is key as their participation within the policy 
implementation process is essential to its success. The stake holder groups especially the End 
Users who are used to gauge policy outcome are required to participate positively within 
policy implementation. If Policy Makers are unable to gain stakeholder support for their 
policy, there is the possibility that the implementation of the policy will fail and the policy 
will most likely be cancelled or substitued for another policy (Matland, 1995).
a) PSP Contractors:
An important point that must be noted about this group during this phase is 
that they are the first group of indegenious business women and men to provide 
formal waste collection and transfer services privately (PSP Focus Group, 2007; PI, 
2007; P3, 2007). Prior to the inception of the PSP Programme, private sector waste 
collection and transfer of waste was performed by the informal sector (MoE, 2007, 
Informal Sector Participant Interview, 2007). The private sector had no prior 
experience in waste services delivery except for the training provided for them by 
LAWMA (PSP focus group interview, 2007). All the facilities used by this group to 
provide the service they were contracted to provide were procured by the PSP
223
Contractors especially for the implementation of the PSP Programme (Focus group 
PSPs, 2007).
The criteria to participate within the PSP Programme were stipulated by the 
MoE without any input from the PSPs. The PSPs were expected to own a minimum of 
ten 10-tonne trucks and make their own routing plans which they were to bring to the 
MoE for approval (MoE, 1995; 2007). The start of the project met with some 
companies registering that they had vehicles that did not belong to them and that they 
could not make use off (PI, 2007). The focus group interview (2007) revealed that the 
Contractors were not fully prepared for the task to which they had been contracted for 
and had to learn how to provide the service on the job.
Attahi (1999) explains that some indegenous waste service Contractors in 
some developing country cities usually underestimate the demands to deliver an 
efficient service in developing country cities. The equipment required, manpower and 
technical expertise, are often miscalculated or not involved in the calculations for the 
delivery of waste services and find they are unable to provide adeqaute supply to meet 
demand for efficient waste service (Attahi, 1996). It would appear in Lagos that the 
requirements for providing a waste collection service were grossly underestimated by 
the service providers and their LAWMA trainers, who should have prepared them 
much better.
There was a distinction between what they were told to expect and what they 
actually experienced in providing the waste collection service. What the Contractors
expected was a service that was in high demand and took very little effort to provide.
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What they found was that service was in high demand, but, directing the demand 
towards a government approved supply was difficult and generating supply to meet 
the demand for waste services was more difficult than anticipated. This made the 
business less profitable than anticipated.
Policy Makers were able to gain the participation of this group as prescribed 
by Mazmananian and Sabatier (1989). However, the groups lack of expereince in 
delivering this service meant that the service which they delivered was not of a 
standard acceptable to the End Users . Their support of the policy did not enhance or 
add to the PSP waste collection policy.
b) End U sers:
The End Users are the most important actors within this policy 
implementation. As mentioned earlier, it is their co-operation with service providers 
that will determine how successful or unsuccessful the policy will be (Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1984). The End Users or their representatives in this case, were not 
represented during the policy making process. This, coupled with the lack of direct 
information from the Policy Makers contributed to the low participation rates from the 
clients. A majority of the End Users refused outright to pay for the service on the 
basis that the charges were too high (PSP focus group, 2007).
The added complication of the service provided by the PSP Contractors being 
compared to the informal sector especially in terms of frequency and cost of the
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service also contributed problems to the PSP waste collection service (Household 
survey, 2007, PI, 2007; P4, 2008; PSP focus group interview, 2007). Involving the 
End Users directly or indirectly within the policy and receiving input from them could 
have improved the way in which the service was received and perceived by them and 
boosted the PSP Programmes chances of success. This would to an extent have 
allowed them to understand the policy, what to expect from it (Hjem and Porter, 
1993). The inclusion of the End Users in the implementation process would also have 
gone to an extent of begin to change the attitude of the End Users in their attitude 
towards the waste they generate.
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984), argue that the impact of policy 
implementation can be measured on its impact of the targeted End Users. If 
implementation has a positive impact on them, then implementation will be seen as 
meeting policy goals and objectives. If it has a negative impact, then there is a need to 
reaccess and revise the policy. Caimey (2009) suggests that, policy implementation 
can not simply impact on a small percentage of the End Users positively and the 
others negatively, because then implementation will still not have met its policy 
objectives. Implementation therefore must impact the End Users fairly evenly across 
the board and the impact should be positive. The impact of the PSP waste collection 
policy in Phase I of the PSP Programme was mainly negative across the board for the 
End Users and this led for calls for the informal sector to be aidded in the delivery of 
their service by the End Users (Ndiribe, 2000).
226
c) Informal private sector:
The informal sector while an interest group within waste policy were 
considered by the Policy Makers during this phase as a nuisance and part of the 
problem (MoE, 2004). Unable to find a workable solution to allowing the informal 
private sector to continue to operate, it was decided that the sector be forced out of 
waste collection and transfer services and their activities were made illegal (PI, 2007; 
P2, 2007; P4, 2008; MoE, 2004).
The inclusion of all the interest groups, directly or indirectly in the policy 
process helps to increase the probability of it succeeding and increases the sense of 
personal ownership of the policy (Sabatier, 1993; Hogwood and Gunn, 1993).
8.6.6. Socioeconomic changes:
Sabatier, 1993; Hofferbert, (1974) and Aaron, (1978), Hogwood and Gunn (1993) 
Darling and Hammond (1990) argue that for implementation of policy to be effective, there 
needs to be a stable economy. This directly affects the cost of delivering the service and how 
much End Users are willing to pay for the service. For instance, the cost of running the 
collection vehicles increased significantly with the increase in the cost of diesel in Nigeria 
which was N30 in 2004 and is now N100 (PSP focus group, 2007). The constant increase in 
fuel costs (BBC News, 2000), which is an important element to the operation of the PSP 
Contractors hinders the level of service that they can provide to the client as the increase in
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the cost of fuel has made the cost of delivering of the service of some Contractors exceed the 
income made revenue collected (PSP focus group, 2007).
The remuneration received by the PSP Contractors for the services was not increased 
according to the rate of inflation (PSP meeting, 2007). The effect of inflation will not solely 
concern the service providers alone. The End Users will also be affected especially as the 
income system in Nigeria is not designed to cope with increases in inflation (Odusola and 
Akinlo, 2001; Akinbobola and Saibu, 2004). This means that for a proportion of the 
population, their living costs will not be in line with income. Thereby leading to a 
prioritization of what End Users are willing to use their scarce resources to meet (PSP focus 
group, 2007; informal participants 3, 2007, structured interview, 2007).
As the socio-economic conditions change within a city, this can have an impact on 
policy (Bardach, 1977). When the economy is bouyant, resources are available for the 
implementation of policy, but when the economy is stagnat or declining, policies will have to 
compete for resources and either face being cancelled or being replaced by another policy 
(Sabatier, 1986). In some developing country cities, the economic impact felt by some 
policies is political made, for instance, funds being diverted from implementation to fund 
political campaigns (Njoku, 2007). For a policy to survive turbulent economic climates, it 
must prove itself relvant and necessary to the End Users .
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8.7 Problems faced by the PSP Contractors
Some of the problems faced by the PSP Contractors have been discussed briefly in 
Section 8.5.5 above. Those however, were not the only problems faced by the PSP 
Contractors in the carrying out their contracts. Some of the problems faced were unique to 
some PSP Contractors operating in specific areas. It must be noted, that the MoE did not 
allocate the area to be serviced to service providers, the areas to be serviced are chosen by the 
service providers themselves (PSP group interview, 2007; PI, 2007; P3, 2007).
The service providers usually choose areas which are very well known to them, and 
close to their vehicle depot, to reduce the cost of running the vehicles to the collection area 
and on to the landfill site.
The problems mentioned earlier in this Section are varied for different service 
providers. This Section will analyse the problems as a basis for discussion of the 
effectiveness of Phase II of the PSP Programme in Chapter 9. The problems are discussed 
below;
1) Peoples attitudes to waste and waste service providers:
The attitudes of the End Users to waste collection managment services 
vary from place to place in Lagos State. However, one constant attitude was 
expericenced by most of the PSP Contractors: The PSP Contractors and their 
staff are at the bottom of the social ladder and are treated like leppers of
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society because they were handling waste (PSP group interview, 2007), this is 
an attitude also found in other places as discussed in Section 7.6.iii; (Klundert 
and Lardinios, 1995). There is often no disticntion made between the company 
owners, their staff and occupation (PSP group interview, 2007), a problem 
also highlighted in the literature (Klundert and Lardinios, 1995). This attitude 
affects the types of waste that the PSP Contractors were expected to collect, 
which on for some had even included corpses (PSP group interview, 2007).
The second attitude is specific to some neighbourhoods. The waste 
generated in these areas is used to reclaim water-logged land and some people 
are reluctant to part with their waste (PSP group interview, 2007; PI, 2007). 
Although reclamation is a secondary use for the waste generated, the use of 
untreated waste as casual landfill causes all sorts of environmental problems, 
including pollution of the waterways, health hazards, and exacerbating 
flooding. (PI, 2007; P4, 2008, PSP group interview, 2007; MoE, 2005).
2) Equipment:
The equipment used in the collection of waste in Lagos State has been 
found by PSP Contractors to have a general life span of eight months 
(PSP/LAWMA meeting, 2007). The waste collected in Lagos State as was 
mentioned earlier is very corrosive and most of the PSP Contractors are not 
able to afford new equipment (PSP group interview, 2007; PI, 2007). 
Equipment procurement can be a benefit in the quality of service which formal
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providers can provide (Cointreau- Levine, 1983), but in Lagos, the high cost 
of the equipment and maintenance of the equipment is a considerable factor 
for the PSP Contractors which depresses profits (PSP group interview, 2007).
3) Service cost:
The cost of the service has increased at a steady rate in some cases, 
especially because of increases in the cost of fuel, but the renumeration 
received by the PSP remained constant (PSP group interview, 2007). The PSP 
Contractors also found that a significant proportion of the client households 
were either late with their payment or defaulted on paying completely for 
services rendered. The late payment of user chargers from the End Users 
meant that the service was run at a loss by some of the PSP Contractors and 
the service often broke down due to a lack of funds (PSP group interview,
2007).
8.8 Problems in Phase I
Several critical problems emerge from the implementation of Phase I of the PSP 
waste policy, identified partly by Policy Makers (1-3 below) while the other lessons have 
been identified by the researcher. These topics will inform the evaluation of Phase II of the 
PSP Programme, and can be summarised as:
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1) Politics
2) Corruption
3) Infrastructure
4) Economics
5) Consultation
6) Legislation
7) The actual ability/capacity of the private sector to provide a viable public sector 
service
8) The attitude of the End Users to the PSP Contractors
8.8.1. Politics
Political backing is seen as an essential factor in the implementation of policy
(Sabatier, 1994; Jordan, 1999). The PSP Programme was hindered by a lack of political
support especially during the period of the Military era 1996-1999, when Lagos State was
under an appointed Governor and the State Executive was the legislative body (Mbaku,
1996). State legislatures must not pass legislation which contravenes central government
policy, especially in a dictatorship (Kimenyi, 1987). The 1996 PSP Programme does not
contravene the Federal Decree 58 (1988) which mandates the efficient collection and disposal
of municipal solid waste (Agunwamba, 1998). Matland (1995), stresses that accountability is
lost within the policy implementation process at the bottom because the street-level
bureaucrats are appointed and not elected officials and are therefore not accountable to the
End Users. At the beginning of the PSP Programme from 1996-1999, the sovereigns who
should have been accountable to the End Users were themselves appointed and not elected
officials. This meant that while waste was a big issue within the urban populace of Lagos
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state, the sovereigns could choose whether or not an effective waste collection policy was 
important to them (the sovereigns).
The unwillingness of the political leadership to commit to Phase I (see Section 8.5.5) 
shaped the method which was employed in its implementation. The political support was 
sufficient to start the pilot scheme but not enough to launch the policy State-wide (PI, 2007; 
P4, 2008).The lack of political support limited the resources for implementing the policy, 
reinforced the need to shift all the cost of service delivery to the private sector (PI, 2007; P4, 
2008).
8.8.2 Corruption:
Corruption within the provision of public services usually has three negative outcomes 
attached to it (Gupta, Davoodi, Tiongson, 2001). They are:
1) The artificial increase in the cost of service provided and a reduction in the supply 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).
2) Reduction of investment in manpower (Ehrlich and Lui, 1999).
3) Reduction of the revenue generated which in turn reduces the quality of the service 
provided further discouraging its use (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Hindriks, Keen and 
Muthoo, 1999).
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Although the intention of the PSP Programme was to create an enabling environment 
for the private sector delivery of waste services (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P4, 2008), during one of 
the interviews the phrase which kept coming up was; “You know how our people behave” 
(PI, 2007; PSP group interview, 2007). The interviewee was referring to corruption in the 
provision of some services (PI, 2007; Bardhan, 1997) and the mentality of some of the 
shadier businessmen who liked to cut comers in either their service delivery or remuneration 
gains (P2, 2007; PSP focus group interview, 2007; Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Corruption during 
the implementation of Phase I of the PSP waste collection policy had two impacts on the 
newly privatised service:
1) Fly tipping and
2) Untrue declarations of actual number of trucks owned.
Fly tipping in illegal rubbish dumps was a major problem, as the PSP Contractors 
were not providing the service contracted, but were exacerbating the problem they were 
brought in to solve (PI, 2007; P4, 2008; LGA I, 2007).
Untrue declarations of number of trucks owned also set back the Programme (Ehrlich 
and Lui, 1999). Some of the first companies which signed up to deliver private waste 
collection services had declared they owned a minimum of ten 10-tonne trucks thereby 
claiming a minimum capacity of one hundred tonnes. In reality several of the companies 
(which cannot be named for privacy purposes) owned only two 5-tonne trucks (PI, 2007; P2, 
2007; PSP focus group interview, 2007; MoE, 2005) thereby reducing the daily collection 
rates from those estimated (PI, 2007; P2, 2007).
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The researcher was not able to discover if any other sorts of corrupt practices took 
place, for example in letting contracts. In a bid to reduce corruption, the MoE mandated the 
inspection of the trucks declared by the PSP Contractors to confirm if the companies had the 
capacity Stated in their agreed contracts to collect the waste from their allocated wards 
(Mbaku, 1996; MoE, 2005). The stipulation of ten 10-tonne trucks severely reduced the 
potential pool of Contractors and encouraged the false declaration of equipment (PI, 2007; 
P2, 2007; P4, 2008; PSP group interview, 2007). The false declaration of equipment did not 
improve the delivery capacity. The need for accurate data from the PSP Contractors 
influenced the redesign of the PSP Programme in Phase II (MoE, 2005).
Corruption is not featured as a specific problem in either the top-down or the bottom- 
up implementation school of thought. Provision is made in both schools of thoughts for the 
monitoring of implementation. This is mainly to ensure that implementation is meeting policy 
targets as opposed to limiting or eradicating corrupt practices at any point within the 
implementation process. Corruption is however a serious problem for some developing 
country cities (Njoku, 2007) and any implementation school of though which will be 
applicable to them will need to incorporate measures which guard against or at least mitigate 
the probability of corrupt practices.
8.8.3 Infrastructure
The inability of the PSP Contractors to meet waste collection demand in the two pilot
areas, allowed the gap in service provision to continue. This strengthened the position of the
cart-pushers as the main waste collection providers in the State (Structured interview, 2007;
PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P3, 2007). Most implementation literature assumes that the infrastructure
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required for the implementation of policy is either already provided, or the provision of 
adequate infrastructure will be provided at some point during the implementation process.
8.8.4 Economics
Sharp increases in the cost of fuel, and shortages of supply also limited the service 
(PSP focus group interview, 2007; Adenikinju, 2008). Shortages of diesel and petrol in 
Nigeria are exacerbated due to erratic electricity supply and the dependence of households 
and businesses on electricity generators. Fuel dependent businesses have to compete with 
households and businesses for fuel (Igbikiowubo, 2008). Although Nigeria exports crude oil, 
it has no working operational refinery at present (Okwuonu, 2008).
As increasing fuel costs depressed profits for the PSP Contractors (PSP focus group 
interviews, 2007) the cost of foreign exchange increased, and so made buying new vehicles, 
equipment and spare parts more expensive (Leigh, 2008). Reducing the profits which private 
Contractors could make in turn reduced the payments the State received from the Contractors 
(PSP focus group, 2007).
As was discussed in 8.5.6 above, stable economic conditions are essential for the 
implementation of public policy. It should be argued however, that while the economy of 
Nigeria is fairly stable, its fuel supply which is needed to run the country however is not. Fuel 
is required for the implementation the PSP waste collection policy. The cities where the two 
schools of thought were developed rarely get this problem, which therefore was not 
significant enough to be included within the implementation theories developed. The PSP
236
Programme will not be shelved or discontinued because of a lack of fuel, but the services will 
not be delivered therefore impacting implementation directly.
8.8.5 Consultation
The main aim of consultation is to reconcile End User needs to policy objectives and 
means of service delivery (Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin, 1994). In Lagos, there was a 
high demand for an improved waste collection service and the policy was implemented based 
on this perceived demand rather than a wider evaluation normal in policy change (Crosby, 
1996; Sabatier, 1996). During the Military dictatorship, consultation was an exception rather 
than the rule (Osoba, 1996). In addition, the economy was uncertain because of international 
sanctions imposed during the last years of military rule (Elliot and Hufbauer, 1999; Nossal, 
1999). This included Nigeria’s suspension from the Commonwealth in 1995, which limited 
its interaction with Commonwealth countries and completion of on-going projects and 
humanitarian aid. Economic interaction with Nigeria and the Commonwealth States was also 
limited (Baird, 2008; Ohazuruike, 1997). The effect the suspension had was the restriction of 
hard currency supply, creating inflation as demand for currency remained high while supply 
was limited. Furthermore, movement restrictions between countries affected the cost of 
importing machinery into the country (Hoffman, 1995).
To make the sector financially viable, the government had set user charges that were 
relatively high (MoE, 1996), limiting the number of End Users who would be willing to pay 
(PSP group interview, 2007). The lack of affordability and the unreliability of the service 
possibly more than any other reason played a role in the lack of success of the 
implementation of Phase I (structured interview, 2007).
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The top-down school of thought advocates for the inclusion of the sovereigns and 
stake holders with the implementation process (Sabatier, 1994). Consultation however, is an 
exception rather than the norm in some developing country cities in the creation of policy and 
its implementation.
8.8.7. Legislation
The absence of formal regulation and weak controls created an awareness of the need 
to strengthen the legislative basis for implementing (Sabatier, 1993) the PSP Programme and 
awareness of its intentions and operation (PI, 2007, Lagos State, 1999). In Lagos, advertising 
and enforcement are the main instruments used to create awareness of government policies, 
both of which were nonexistent in phase I (P2, 2007; PSP focus group, 2007). The 
importance of legislation is to make citizens or End Users know what their obligations are. 
The absence of legislation or poorly constructed legislation hinders implementation (Sabatier, 
1996; Lipsky, 1970).
Effective legislation is an essential to underpin policy implementation (Sabatier, 
1996; Lipsky, 1993). A crucial problem in the Lagos PSP Programme was the lack of 
effective sanction against the PSP Contractors. There were low penalties for failure to deliver 
services in the 2001 legislation outlined in the Official Gazette (Lagos State, 2001). At the 
initial stage of the implementation of the PSP Programme, it became quickly apparent that 
the PSP Contractors were having the same problems LAWMA had with their equipment in 
1994 (PI, 2001). The difficulty in acquiring and maintaining the equipment meant that MoE 
staff had to be very lenient to non-performing PSP Contractors (PI, 2007; P2, 2007). For this
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reason, during Phase I the PSP Contractors were not obliged to provide an efficient service 
while still seeking full payment from End Users (structured interview, 2007).
The bottom-up school of thought suggests that legislation is not important in the 
implementation of policy, as most End Users do not actually read legislative documents and 
what they learn of the policy and its legislation is through the street-level bureaucrats 
(Winter, 2002). However, neither the proponents for a strong legislature from the policy 
makers to guide implementation (Gunn and Hogwood, 1994; Sabatier, 1994) nor the 
proponents of more powers to the street-level bureaucrats (Matland, 1995) account for the 
situation where End Users use their numbers to boycott a policy and its implementation other 
than to go back to the drawing board. End Users in some developing country cities when 
faced with policies which are not advantageous to them, simply do not comply with the 
policy without necessarily voicing their displeasure.
8.8.8 Private Sector ability to provide a viable public service in Lagos
The PSP Contractors were ill-prepared for delivery of this new service. They knew 
little of the requirements of waste collection and transfer services and even less about the 
types of waste they would be collecting and how this should be handled (PSP group 
interview, 2007). The private formal sector can sometimes underestimate the requirements of 
providing an effective waste collection and transfer service (Attahi, 1999). Some Contractors 
remarked that the training and the reality of delivering the service did not match up (PSP, 
group interview, 2007). This naivete it would seem was a further hindrance to service 
provision from the formal private sector (Attahi, 1996).
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Some PSPs Contractors were able to stay in business throughout the implementation 
of Phase I and were able to adapt (although some of their methods did not meet the targets of 
the PSP Programme) and stay within the field of private waste collection (PSP, focus group 
interview, 2008). These PSPs brought two advantages to the table;
1) They were in a better position to train new entrants within the field than LAWMA 
which is a publicly owned organization;
2) These sets of PSP Contractors were able to contribute positively to consultation on 
waste collection management policy being created or modified within the State.
The PSP Contractors, while the service delivered by them in Phase I was erratic at 
best, still showed a potential to be able to deliver the service. The main observation from the 
MoE was the inability of the PSP Contractors to generate enough profit to stay in business. It 
was reasoned that if financial security was provided for the PSP Contractors, the sector would 
deliver a higher level of service than the public sector. This was one of the factors which 
informed the revision of Phase II of the PSP Programme.
8.9 Conclusion
The conclusion of Phase I of the Lagos State PSP waste collection policy yielded a 
number of lessons. The fact that the policy did not produce the anticipated results in Phase I 
does not necessarily mean that it has failed as a viable method of providing waste collection
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services to the State. Valuable lessons were learnt from the policy as it stood at the end of 
Phase I, briefly listed below;
1) The private sector with the adversities that it faced which include poor preparation, 
limited advice from LAWMA, and hostlie attitudes and non-payment from the public, 
have nevertheless proved that under the right circumstances, the private sector is able 
to contribute to formal waste collection managment services and adapt itself to the 
local condtions prevalant within Lagos State.
2) There is a need for the State government to re-evaluate its role as the service regulator 
to facilitate the smooth running of the the PSP waste collection managment 
Programme, for example through providing better assessment and monitoring.
3) There is a need for firm political commitment from the ruling elite that transcends the 
mere introduction of the service to the State.
Phase I of the PSP Programme ended in 2004. The programme was a new experience 
within the State for the Policy Makers, policy implementers and the End Users ., with 
different outcomes for different actors:
1) Policy Makers:
The Policy Makers learnt that while their role within waste collection 
manamgent service had changed, it was by no means to a diminished capacity that 
the Policy Makers had originally hoped. Their new role as service regulators and
241
service enabalers demands more from the Policy Makers in terms of 
administration and contract management than when the MoE and LAWMA 
provided the service directly.
2) PSP Contractors:
The PSP Contractors learnt that they needed to be able to adapt to the new role 
of public service providers and deliver an adequate level of service for them to be 
able to get the cooperation End Users .
3) End U sers:
The End Users are coming gradually to the realization that they are to be 
responsible for the domestic waste that they generate.
From Phase I of the case study of Lagos State, it is evident that the major policy shifts 
often found in administrative environments often found in developing country cities, requires 
a strong facilitator to lead the processes. This is because while the MoE Policy Makers were 
not alone in observing the activities of the informal sector, it took the MoE a significant 
amount of time to introduce formal private collection within the State and create an enabling 
envoronment for the formal private sector to develop. What must be noted in Phase I is the 
Policy Makers’ inability to make the PSP Programme work as a viable self sustaining 
programme. In Phase II, the Policy Makers assess the PSP Programme and attempt to
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redesign the Programme to meet public service needs. Chapter 9 will analyze whether these 
changes have an effect.
The implication of the findings of Phase I for implementation debates is that End 
Users have a significant role to play in policy implementation. The type of governance found 
within urban environments also affects how the End Users relate to policy implementation. 
The top-down and bottom-up schools of thought usually view the End Users as a measure of 
implementation as opposed to an actual part of implementation. These issues are further 
discussed in Chapter 9.
The implementation debates are formed within countries that have established 
democracies and practise good governance. These characteristics give the implementation 
process have characteristics that will not necessarily be found within developing country 
cities like Lagos. Accountability within the implementation process is taken for granted with 
public access to Policy Makers and implementers and the presence of watch dogs and over 
sight committees for implemented policy.
In developing country cities like Lagos, where the implementation of the policy 
under discussion started with a sovereign appointed by a dictator and who was then replaced 
by an elected official. This newly elected official came in as a transitional ruler, 
democratically elected but with dictatorship characteristics. This means that while the 
government was supposed to have changed in dimensions, it still retained some of its 
predecessor’s characters. Implementation debates were not created for dictatorship rule. Top- 
down implementation debates were also not created for none participating governments.
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The next problem faced by cities like Lagos, as discussed earlier and witnessed in the 
implementation of Phase I of the implementation process was a lack of skilled man power. 
The top-down and bottom-up school of thought view adequate skill to implement a policy as 
core to implementation being able to meet policy objectives. However, as observed in Phase 
I, there was a fundamental lack of skill for the implementation of the policy starting from the 
Policy Makers who created the policy to their designated implementers. The two schools of 
thought do not make provision for this large skills deficit. Both schools of thought assume 
that because policy has been created, the skills for the implementation of the policy must be 
available for its implementation.
While it is acknowledged that the End Users are the recipients of policy and are 
accorded limited veto powers by the top-down and bottom-up schools of thought, they are 
rarely featured in implementation studies except as a measure of implementation success. Or 
as a tool with which to argue influence. Phase I of the PSP Programme has shown that this 
group in some developing country cities is more than an instrument of measurement and 
influence. This group will readily use its veto power and that power can affect policy 
outcomes especially in cases where the veto is by a significant proportion of the End Users. 
The most significant aspect/ characteristic of this group’s use of its veto power is the lack of 
demonstration (rally, marches) which can be found in developed country cities. The group is 
most likely to show its displeasure by simply refusing to participate in implementation, a 
factor not included within implementation studies.
Finally, the top-down and bottom-up schools of thought have not been applied to
situations where policy is created to replace the public services being provided by a large
informal sector. The informal waste collection sector in Lagos was able to provide an
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efficient service compared to the service or lack of service being provided by formal 
channels. This aspect of urban services delivery while not unique to Lagos, as it is observed 
in Sao Paolo, Jakarta, Abidjan, and Cairo and would need to be added to any implementation 
theory for it to be applicable to developing country cities with strong and established informal 
sector services.
245
9. Phase II: 2004- 2007
Phase II of the implementation of the PSP Waste Programme, which is analysed in 
this Chapter, covers the period from 2004-2007 when the data was gathered, Phase II is still 
on-going. Several lessons were learnt from Phase I which influenced the reforms in Phase II 
of the PSP waste collection policy. Chapter 9 reviews the changes that were made to the PSP 
Waste Collection Programme, the new actors that have been included within the waste 
collection PSP Waste Collection Programme and the effects of these changes. This Chapter 
also looks at the value of implementation debates in Phase II of the Lagos state PSP waste 
collection programme.
9.1 Phase II (2004 and on-going)
By 2003, Lagos State as reported by the media was overrun with ‘growing heaps’ of
refuse (News Agency of Nigeria, 2004; NTA News, 2003). In 2003, every aspiring governor
and the incumbent governor used ‘waste’ under the umbrella of the environment as a political
battle cry (Epia, 2003; Fashanu, 2003). This political attention was very encouraging for the
MoE/LAWMA Policy Makers in regards to the waste problem within Lagos State. An
evaluation of the PSP Programme was conducted by the MoEs’ Department of Sanitation at
the request of the MoE Policy Makers (Dept of Sanitation, 2007). Sabatier (1993) states that a
policy revaluation is essential in order to determine if policy implementation is meeting
policy objectives. During the revaluation of the policy, the policy could be modified to make
it more efficient in meeting policy objectives or it could be changed completely if it is
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determined that objectives cannot be met or the policy is no longer relevant (Sabatier, 1996; 
Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989).
An in-house unpublished evaluation of the PSP waste collection programme was 
undertaken in 2004. The aim of the evaluation was to ascertain whether or not the PSP Waste 
Collection Programme was meeting its objectives and whether it remained a viable 
alternative to public provision of waste collection and transfer services (PI, 2007; Dept of 
Sanitation, 2007). If the domestic waste collection and transfer PSP Waste Collection 
Programme was determined to be the most efficient option in delivering waste collection and 
transfer services, then how could the service be improved to become more efficient?
The decision by the Policy Makers at the MoE to evaluate the programme was
informed by the State agency’s poor record in delivering waste collection and transfer
services in the State and the progress made by the PSP Waste Collection Programme in
delivering the service from 1996 to 2004 (P4, 2008). The monetary cost of the government
providing an efficient waste collection service was weighed against the efficiency of private
sector service delivery (Dept of Sanitation, 2007). As discussed in Section 6.1.1 .c, Service
Contract C had been adopted in Phase I which allows for the service to be provided by the
private sector and funded by the End User (Li and Akintoye, 2004). This PPP partnership
allows for the provision of the infrastructure to be provided by the private sector.
Infrastructure maintenance as discussed throughout this thesis has been the major problem
contributing to the poor service delivery by the public sector in some developing country
cities including Lagos (Attahi, 1999). A key decision was made by the Policy Makers at the
MoE that the Service Contract C remained a viable resource in the provision of formal
collection and transfer of municipal waste (Dept of Sanitation; 2007). The Policy Makers as
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recommended by Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989) suggest that a constant review of the policy 
was necessary for implementation to meet its objectives. This review should remove the parts 
of the policy which were redundant while leaving or enhancing the parts of the policy which 
were efficient (Bardach, 1977).
At the start of the PSP Waste Collection Programme in 1996, 1500 companies signed 
up to provide the service to two local government areas. This number had dwindled to 624 by 
1997 (Ehigihator, 2001) and 57 Contractors by 2004 in the two local government areas 
(NAN, 2004). The sharp drop in number of PSP waste collection participants was due to non­
profitability of the formal private waste collection sector in Lagos State and the lack of 
experience of the private sector leading to the closure of these companies (Ehigihator, 2001; 
PSP group interview, 2007). The MoE needed to restructure the Programme to make it meet 
implementation objectives (provide an efficient waste collection and transfer service, 
maintain a clean urban environment and transfer the cost of the service to the End Users ) and 
make the private waste sector profitable to attract new PSP Participants into the formal waste 
services sector. To achieve these objectives, the MoE made several changes to Phase II of the 
PSP Programme which is discussed in the Section 9.2 below. The street level bureaucrats 
(PSP Contractors) as prescribed by Matland,(1995) had sufficient discretion in the provision 
of their contracted services but were still unable to provide an effective service. This gives 
credence to Sabatier (1986) who mandates that the amount of discretion street level 
bureaucrats have should be mitigated through the policy.
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9.2 Phase II
Phase 2 of the PSP Waste Collection Programme began in the last quarter of 2004. 
The second phase of the PSP Waste Collection Programme was to be expanded from the two 
pilot local government areas to include 22 more local government areas to cover most of the 
urbanised parts of Lagos State. The areas covered were selected by the MoE Policy Makers 
and adverts were put up for PSP Contractors who were interested in covering those areas (PI, 
2007; P4, 2008; Dept of Sanitation, 2004; LAWMA, 2007). The areas not included for 
coverage Phase II of the PSP Waste Collection Programme were mainly outlying rural areas 
which were thought not to have as pressing a need for waste collection management services 
as the urban areas (PI, 2007; P3, 2007; Department of Sanitation, 2007).
Phase II of the PSP Waste Collection Programme compared to Phase I of the PSP 
Waste Collection Programme had political support from the newly elected governor of the 
State, Governor Ahmed Tinubu and his cabinet (PI, 2007; Dept of Sanitation, 2004). During 
the governors’ re-election campaign, Governor Tinubu had adopted the environment as a 
political objective in the campaign manifesto and during election rallies, for example at the
t hfinal rally held on the 20 of March at the international trade fair complex in Lagos (Olaleye,
2003). Governor Tinubu, and Environment, Commissioner Tunji Bello stated their pledge to 
the environment and to eradicating the waste problem in the State (Olaleye, 2003; Alliance 
for Democracy, 2003; Lagos State, 2007). Both were returned to office.
Once elected, Governor Tinubu and Commissioner Tunji Bello actively promoted
Phase II of the PSP Programme, holding public meetings with community leaders and
religious leaders (Momodu, 2004). The Advertising Department of the MoE used
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newspapers, television and radio to promote Phase II of the PSP Waste Collection 
Programme. The aim was to raise public awareness of the policy, and the roles of the Policy 
Makers, PSP service providers and the End Users in implementing the PSP Waste Collection 
Programme. (Oduwole, 2005; Momodu, 2004, 2005; Ahiante, 2004; Ogbonnaya, Haruna and 
Oyekemi, 2004; Adegbiye, 2004). The support of sovereigns is a key aspect of the top-down 
argument for implementation (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989). Bardach (1977) goes further 
to argue that sovereigns can use their influence to ensure that blocks to implementation such 
as rival agencies and provision of resources are removed. The bottom-uppers admit that the 
support of sovereigns can have a positive or a negative impact on implementation depending 
on their view of the policy (Barrett and Fudge, 1980).
The MoE Policy Makers’ advertising campaign was also designed to change peoples’ 
attitudes towards waste. As discussed in Section 3.5, many people still considered waste 
management as the sole responsibility of the government. This attitude is still prevalent in 
some of population with over 53% of respondents to the survey undertaken for this thesis still 
viewing waste generated as the responsibility of the government (Structured interview 
survey, 2007; Dept of Sanitation, 2007). The change of attitude required from the campaign 
is having some effect as over 38% of people surveyed also said they took personal 
responsibility for waste generated (Structured interview survey, 2007).
This commitment to environmental problems, especially waste problems, from the
political elite not only ensured the continuity of the PSP Waste Collection Programme for
waste collection but also allowed the MoE/LAWMA Policy Makers to lobby for further
changes that were made to the PSP Waste Collection Programme in 2004 (PI, 2007; P2,
2007; P4, 2008). Commitment from the political elite for policies is identified as being
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important by both the top-down and the bottom-up school of thought, and seen as an essential 
factor in the successful implementation of policy (Sabatier, 1994; Gunn, 1994)
9.3 Expansion
Phase II of the PSP Waste Collection Programme needed to be expanded to support 
the major expansion proposed, to cover the 22 local government areas proposed (PI, 2007; 
P3, 2007; MoE, 2005; LAWMA, 2007). In order to achieve this, the Policy Makers needed to 
make some changes to the PSP Waste Collection Programme and incorporate some new 
mechanisms. The key changes are discussed below.
9.3.1. Contract:
The first change to the contract was to the entry requirements of PSP 
Contractors. The cost of the vehicles was a major consideration for the Policy Makers, 
as it had proved difficult for companies to maintain their vehicles and continue to 
meet the 10-truck minimum requirement (PI, 2007; P4, 2008). The new entry 
requirement did not specify the number of trucks, only routing schedules were 
demanded of the new Contractors (Dept of Sanitation, 2007). Contracts were still 
awarded on a non-tender basis with the Policy Makers dictating the cost of the service 
(Financing is discussed in Section 9.3.4 below). The Contractors were paid per tonne 
of the domestic waste they collected and took to the landfill sites. This change was 
designed to encourage any company which was interested in joining the waste service
delivery PSPs to sign up to deliver the service (Dept of sanitation, 2003; PI, 2007).
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The truck specification was later revised to permit only tipping trucks, as the 
non-tipping trucks were causing traffic at the landfill sites and reduce truck 
turnaround times (Dept of Sanitation, 2005). The companies were then expected to 
tell the MoE and LAWMA how many streets or wards or local government areas that 
the company considered it could cover with its collection capacity; and their capacity 
was also assessed by MoE (PI, 2007; P3, 2007). The PSP Waste Practitioners 
capacity was assessed by evaluating what type and total number of trucks the firm had 
and their total collection capacity and how much waste an area produced which was 
assessed based on the income level and predominant type of housing found in those 
areas (Dept of Sanitation, 2004). This second assessment by the MoE was done to 
ensure that the company did not over estimate its capacity to deliver the service, as 
some companies who submitted schedules for collecting waste for a ward could not 
cover more than one street efficiently (MoE, 2005). Assessment of company capacity 
was a lesson carried over from Phase I as discussed in Section 8.7.3, the PSP Waste 
Practitioners were not able to meet the capacity required to deliver an efficient 
service.
The PSP service provider then had to create a route plan for its designated
areas to show how an effective service could be delivered on a regular basis with a
minimum collection of once a week per household (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P3, 2007; P4
2008). This change in the vehicle criteria meant that different sized companies (Large
medium and small) could participate within the PSP waste collection and transfer
Programme. There are currently over 200 companies (large medium and small
enterprises) participating in the PSP domestic waste collection and transfer an
increase from 57 companies at the start of phase two in 2004 (LAWMA, 2007; NAN,
252
2004). The increase was achieved by the Policy Makers taking on the financial risk of 
recovering service cost from the End User. The policy maker theory that if an 
enabling environment was created, the private sector would participate within the 
waste collection and transfer programme.
9.3.2. Enlightenment Programme:
The Policy Makers of the MoE also took part in the State Governor’s initiative 
to start a State Enlightenment Programme to promote the PSP waste collection service 
with the End Users (Dept of Sanitation, 2007). The aim of the policy maker 
involvement in promoting the PSP Waste Collection Programme was to increase 
public awareness of the PSP waste collection policy. Some 69% of people surveyed 
were not aware of Phase I of the PSP waste collection policy (structured interview, 
2007).
The MoE and LAWMA also regularly have public enlightenment campaigns 
at markets and bus garages with staff from the MoE advertising department having 
talks with the market and bus garage communities. The MoE and LAWMA also 
reinstated monthly Environmental Sanitation Days, on the last Saturday of every 
month and on these days attempt to reach the public by going door to door to talk to 
people on a face to face basis (PI, 2007; P3, 2007).
It is unclear how effective these measures have been, as no attempt was made
by the MoE to follow up the community leaders and the residents on whether or not
the information was passed on. The level of public awareness of the Phase II of the
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Programme it must be said is significantly higher as approximately 99% of people 
surveyed are aware of the new policy and over 46% of respondents surveyed had the 
service in their area (Structured interview, 2007).
9.3.3. Local Government Inclusion:
For the first time, Local Government were included as part of the enforcing 
arm of the Policy Makers. Prior to Phase II of the PSP Programme, local governments 
were expected to take care of the waste generated within their municipality through 
the Lagos State Waste Disposal Board (Aboyode, 2004; LAWMA, 2007) as discussed 
in Section 3.8.2. Their inability to manage waste generated within the State saw the 
role of waste management revert back to the central State Government in the late 
1980s to the early 1990s (LAWMA, 2007). In the delivery of Phase I of the PSP 
Waste Collection Programme, the local governments were not given a significant role 
within the policy. The extent of their participation was to report non-performing PSPs 
(Victoria Island Local Government, 2007).
In Phase II however (with lobbying from some local governments, for
example Victoria Island Local Government, and Ikeja Local Government (Victoria
Island Local Government representative, 2007; Ikeja Local Government
representative, 2007), the role of the local governments significantly increased. PSP
Participants operating within the local government municipalities were now directly
answerable to the local governments and could be sanctioned by them. The
Department of the Environment in each local government office is now empowered to
investigate why a PSP participant was not delivering the contracted service. Their
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findings are then sent to LAWMA for further action (Victoria Island Local 
Government representative, 2007; Ikeja LG, 2007). The non-performing PSPs can 
have their contracts cancelled at the request of the Local Governments (Victoria 
Island LG, 2007; Ikeja LG, 2007). The Local Governments can also have 
representatives at the LAWMA/PSP meetings which they were not invited to 
participate in Phase I. The Local Governments took on a dual role as monitors and 
enforcers of the PSP Waste Collection Programme within their municipalities.
The inclusion of the local governments is of importance to the execution of the 
PSP Waste Collection Programme because they are the closest to service delivery and 
able to monitor what is happening on the ground; they are also the most accessible to 
the End Users and the first point for complaints. The MoE and LAWMA do not have 
local offices, the use of the Department of Environment in the local government 
offices made the service closer to End Users. The inclusion of the local governments 
within the implementation of the PSP Programme increased its accessibility of the 
Policy Makers to the End Users as well as increasing their monitoring capabilities. 
The bottom-up school of thought argues that street level bureaucrat proximity to the 
End Users makes implementation more effective. This is because they are able to 
relate information on policy directly to the End Users and deal with their complaints 
(Lipsky, 1980).
9.3.4 Financing:
One of the major problems identified during the policy review of Phase I of
PSP waste collection Programme was the allegiance of the PSP Contractors (PI,
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2007; P4, 2008). In Phase I, the relationship between the PSP Contractors and the End 
Users was linear shown in Figure 9.1 below. The highest level of interaction or 
relationship occurred between the PSP service providers and the End Users. This 
relationship is shown by a thick arrow in Figure 9.1, while the relationship between 
the Policy Makers and the PSP providers is shown by a thinner arrow. The Policy 
Makers at the time had little or no interaction with the End Users.
Figure 9.1: Phase I Relationships
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The bulk of the resources in the PSP Waste Collection Programme flowed between 
actors with the highest amount interaction during the implementation of the Programme, 
which was between the PSP Contractors and the End Users (PI, 2007; Dept of Sanitation,
2004). PSP Contractors invest in manpower and infrastructure and the End Users made
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payments directly to the PSP Participants for the services that they received, thereby funding 
the continuity of the service (PI, 2007; P3, 2007). This type of contract as discussed in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 8 is Service Contract C (Li and Akintoye, 2004). The effect this 
relationship had on the delivery of service in Phase I was the PSP Contractors honoured their 
service contract by collecting the waste from the households. The second half of the contract 
which was to dispose of the waste at the landfill site as agreed with the MoE was often not 
honoured as discussed in Chapter 8, so widespread illegal deposits were common (see 
Section 8.5.2).
The PSP paid a flat fee of N 100,000 (at the time worth £400) to the MoE to become 
service providers, and the payment was effectively the main relationship between the MoE as 
the service monitoring body and the PSP Participants in Phase I (Dept of Sanitation, 2004; 
LAWMA, 2007). The arrangement effectively created a pattern of obligation which excluded 
the MoE and making their new role (within their limited capacity) as service regulators more 
difficult (PI, 2007; P2, 2007). Monitoring of public services provided by public bodies or 
private corporations has a history of being challenging in some developing sub-Saharan 
African cities (Attahi, 1996).
With the expansion proposed in Phase II, it was necessary to change the relationship
between these three actors, as the evaluation of Phase I demonstrated that the financial
relationship of the three main actors (MoE/LAWMA, PSP Contractors and End Users ) was
contributing to the lack of achievement of PSP Waste Collection Programme objectives (P3,
2007; Dept of Sanitation, 2007). The MoE required a means of making the PSP service
providers comply with the terms of the signed agreements. The aim was to control the flow of
resources and change the pattern from linear resource flow to cyclical one as seen in
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Diagram 9.2 below (PI, 2007; P4, 2008). The solution that was adopted was to start paying 
the PSP service providers directly and recover the cost of the service from the End Users , a 
variant of Service Contract C (Oduwole, 2005; PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P3, 2007; P4, 2008). This 
would change the loyalties of the PSP service providers from the End Users to the Policy 
Makers. The change of paying the PSP directly was also intended to improve the level of 
service by attracting more investors to join the PSP Waste Collection Programme (PI, 2007; 
P3, 2007; PSP focus group, 2007). Sabatier (1993) argues that Policy Makers often control 
resources and are able to use these resources to influence implementation outcome (Sabatier, 
1993).
Diagram 9.2: Cyclical flow of resources
The PSP service 
providers  provide  t he  
capi tal  and  
in f r as t ruc ture  to  run 
t h e  service and  are  
r e imbu rs e d  monthly  
by t he  MoE
The MoE pay the  
PSPs di rect ly and  
r ecove r  t he  cos t  f rom 
t h e  cl ients.  The MoE 
r e g u l a t e  a nd  mon i t o r  
the  service.
The clients a r e  t axed  
for the  services  
received f rom the  
PSPs by t he  MoE
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The change in the financing of the PSP Waste Collection Programme heralded the 
inclusion of a new actor within the PSP Waste Collection Programme which will be 
discussed in more detail in Section 9.6.1 below. The change in the resource flow was also 
designed to increase the interaction between the Policy Makers and the End Users . This was 
aimed at potentially increasing the amount of monitoring that could carried out by the MoE 
which is integral to the implementation of government policy (PI, 2007).
Comment box 1
PI, Policy maker with the MoE for 15 years. PI has 
constantly evaluated the PSP Programme from its 
inception. P 1 in discussing the problems experienced in 
Phase I noted:
‘We needed to change the loyalties o f  the PSPs ’from their 
client to us in order to get better results with the 
Programme. ’ PI, 2007
Pongsiri, (2002) states that monitoring should be an integral part of policy 
implementation. Monitoring gives the Policy Makers an indication of how effectively 
policy implementation is being achieved (Pongsiri, 2002). The MoE developed a 
complaints’ procedure for the End Users if the PSP Contractors were not providing 
the contracted service as opposed to just withholding payment for services as in Phase 
I (PI, 2007).
9.3.5. Customer Complaints:
In 2004, a customer complaints procedure was introduced. This was advertised
to the End Users through letters sent out with PSP waste bills (MoE, 2004). The PSP
waste collection service received by the End Users had its own bill sent out every
month separate from the land tax paid by householders (MoE, 2007). The MoE
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introduced three methods for the public to make their complaints. These included a 
postal complaints service; a telephone service with numbers provided for End Users 
make complaints, and a complaints desk in the Department of Sanitation to receive 
complaints made in person at the MoE (MoE, 2004; Dept of Sanitation, 2007). The 
MoE received about of one hundred letters, three hundred calls and fifty verbal 
complaints at the start of Phase II of the PSP Waste Collection Programme (MoE, 
2004; Dept of Sanitation, 2007). The volume of complaints reduced by approximately 
40% by the end of 2006 as the service became more standardized (Dept of Sanitation, 
2007). Approximately 10,000 complaints had been resolved by 2007 (MoE, 2007).
The complaints procedure introduced into Phase II of the PSP Waste 
Collection Programme assisted the MoE in further monitoring the activities of the 
waste collection PSP Contractors (MoE, 2004). The complaints procedure made the 
Policy Makers more accessible to the End Users as complaints were sent directly to 
their office. The Policy Makers also encourage the End Users to give their advice on 
how the service could be better improved and these comments were consulted during 
the policy review (MoE, 2007).
9.4 New Actors
In order for these changes to be effective, it was necessary to include some new actors 
within the PSP Waste Collection Programme to improve monitoring and financing. As 
discussed in Section 9.2 above, Service Contract C was still being used by the Policy Makers 
and this meant that even though the PSP Participants were now paid directly by the
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governments, the cost was to be recovered from the End Users. A substantial increase in 
monitoring of the PSP Contractors was required by the MoE/LAWMA and an effective 
method of collecting revenue became integral to the Policy Makers. The following sub­
sections will look at the additional actors brought in to improve the PSP service.
The introduction of new actors within the policy implementation arena is a top-down 
function. It is difficult to introduce new actors into policy implementation without the 
approval of the Policy Makers in developing country cities. This is mainly because most 
government structures are central in construction in developing country cities (Attahi, 1999).
9.4.1 Banks:
The Policy Makers required an effective funding flow for the project. The
Policy Makers at the MoE considered the State’s poor track record delayed payments
and long-winded bureaucracy required for the approval of payments (P4, 2008) as a
hindrance to encouraging new PSP Participants to join the Programme. So the State
turned to the banks as an alternative funding mechanism. The banks would receive
payments for the PSP Participants from the government and payments for the PSP
service from the End Users. The banks were also included within the PSP Waste
Collection Programme in order for the PSP Participants to gain easier access to credit
facilities (Dept of Sanitation, 2005). The MoE/LAWMA guaranteed loan repayment
of the PSP Participants by either withholding their payments or confiscating
equipment from defaulting operators PSPs (Meeting LAWMA/PSP, 2007). The
collection of fees from the End Users also prompted the inclusion of the banks. For
End Users, it made paying the levies easier in terms of location and convenience (PI,
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2007). Twenty banks with State-wide branches were contracted by the MoE to 
maintain the PSP waste collection and transfer funds (Dept of Sanitation, 2007).
9.4.2 Billing PSP:
Payments were made by households, and the cost of the service was based on 
the type of accommodation occupied by each household. Prices for the service ranged 
from N50 for single rooms in tenement buildings to N5000 (£20) per month (MoE, 
2004). In order for each End User to know what was expected of them, bills were to 
be sent out to the End Users (MoE, 2004). The MoE and LAWMA had no prior 
experience in sending out bills, and it was decided that a private contractor should be 
included within the PSP Waste Collection Programme to perform this service (MoE,
2004). This new PSP was to liaise with the PSP waste collection practitioners to 
collate data on the areas being serviced and send out the bills to the recipients of the 
service accordingly (PSP group interview, 2007; PSP general meeting, 2007).
9.4.3 Landfill PSP:
The role of the landfill PSP was twofold. The first was to invest in equipment
and maintain the landfill. The second role that this PSP was to increase the monitoring
of the PSP waste collection participants (Dept of Sanitation, 2007). As discussed in
Chapter 8, during Phase I of the PSP Waste Collection Programme, the PSP
Participants were often not transferring the waste collected in the municipality to
disposal sites (PI, 2007; LAWMA, 2005). The introduction of this PSP ensured that
collected waste was brought to the landfill, as payment for the PSP waste collectors
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hinged on the landfill PSP giving the waste collection PSP Contractor a receipt for the 
waste a duplicate of which was given to the MoE. A weigh bridge was introduced at 
the landfill site to give more accurate data on the amount of waste brought to the 
landfill. Data is also collected on the types and origins of waste brought to the landfill 
(PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P4, 2008; MoE, 2004).
9.4.4 Monitoring/Enforcement PSP:
Monitoring is agreed by both the top-down and bottom-up schools of thought 
as an essential part of implementation (Hogwood and Gunn, 1994; Sabatier, 1994; 
Winter, 2002). Monitoring for Phase II of the PSP Waste Collection Programme, 
while still a duty of the monitoring department of the MoE, was also contracted to 
PSP monitors, another new area of privatisation within Lagos State (LAWMA, 2005; 
LAWMA, 2007). Monitoring companies were contracted to monitor the PSP waste 
Contractors and report back to the MoE/LAWMA. The PSP monitors also served as 
enforcers. They were charged with investigating why bills were not paid and tasked 
with either getting the End Users to pay their bills, or in the case of continuous 
defaulters, sealing up their compounds until the payment was made (LAWMA, 2007; 
Meeting PSP/LAWMA, 2007).
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9.5 Effects of the Restructuring on the PSP Waste 
Collection Programme
The effects these changes had on the PSP Waste Collection Programme at the start of 
the Programme were mixed. This Section will start with the positive outcomes before moving 
on to the negative.
9.5.1 Positive Outcomes of Phase II of the PSP Waste Collection Programme
A number of positive outcomes can be noted at the start of Phase II of the PSP
Waste Collection Programme. These outcomes include;
i) Increased participation of PSP waste collectors as new participants signed up
to provide waste collection and transfer services. The new participants 
increased the collection and transfer capacity in terms of resources, equipment 
and manpower within the State. The new waste collection PSP Participants 
within the State allowed the Policy Makers to be able to expand the PSP 
service to cover more areas within the State.
ii) The change in the PSP payment structure guaranteed for the first time that 
most of the waste would end up at the designated disposal site as proposed 
within the PSP Waste Collection Programme. As one policy maker remarked, 
in comment box 2 below.
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Comment box2
“The PSP Contractors could no longer dump their waste 
anywhere but the allocated sites. Even when their vehicles 
breakdown, they ensure it is fixed without dumping the waste 
and bring it to the dump if  not, it is a wasted effort for them 
( P I , 2007 )
The targeted End Users were more supportive of the new PSP Waste 
Collection Programme because the waste did not end up within their 
immediate environment as previously (Structured interview, 2007). Some 43% 
of the interview respondents preferred the PSP waste collection service for the 
above reason. Some respondents from areas not serviced when the survey was 
undertaken wanted their areas to be included because it was seen as a more 
efficient service than that provided from the informal waste collectors 
(Structured interview, 2007).
iii) The new PSP Waste Collection Programme diversified and opened new fields 
within the private sector. This created both skilled and non-skilled jobs within 
Lagos State (MoE, 2007).
9.5.2 Negative Outcomes
A. Banks:
The Policy Makers’ objective for the inclusion of banks within the PSP
Waste Collection Programme was to make it easier for the End Users to pay
the new domestic waste collection bills. It would also streamline PSP
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participant payments from the MoE/LAWMA (PI, 2007; P2, 2007). Two 
problems emerged from the banks.
i. The first problem was that allegedly some banks, on receiving waste 
collection payments, would put the money on temporary deposit in 
bank officials’ private high interest accounts for a period of 
approximately three months and not the MoE accounts as contracted 
(PI, 2007). This meant at that time there were not enough funds to pay 
the PSP Participants punctually. This was discovered by the MoE who 
would find their accounts empty or with low funds when it was time to 
pay the PSP Contractors. The amount recorded as being available from 
State government allocation and payment for services received, would 
not be present in their accounts. On investigating further, it was found 
that amounts that should have been in the account 3 months earlier 
were suddenly appearing (minus interest), whereas current payments 
were missing. Further investigation revealed some bank managers 
were redirecting the funds to their private high yield account for the 
time period the funds were missing. The threat of being reported to the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission eventually had the effect 
of discouraging this practice amongst bank officials (P2, 2007; P4,
2008).
ii. The second issue was that on receipt of clients’ payments, because of 
the temporary deposits mentioned above; banks were not informing the
billing company which End Users had paid their PSP bill (PI, 2007).
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This led to confusion, as the End Users who had paid complained to 
the MoE and LAWMA for being billed twice or having enforcement 
actions taken out against them (PI, 2007). The billing PSP was unable 
to correlate their data on paying and non-paying End Users for the 
waste collection service (P3, 2007). Only the threat of legal action by 
the MoE finally resolved the problems between the MoE and the banks 
(PI, 2007; P2, 2007).
B. PSP Participants:
At the start of the Programme, two things were absent (PI, 2007). The 
first was a weigh bridge at the landfill sites (which were later introduced, and 
the second was adequate monitoring of the waste taken to landfills (PI, 2007). 
The PSP Contractors were paid on the basis of how many trips they made to 
the landfill site to dump waste. Some of the PSP Contractors made fraudulent 
claims on the number of disposal trips their trucks actually made (PI, 2007; 
P2, 2007). This problem was further compounded as the MoE was in charge 
of the domestic PSPs waste collectors, while LAWMA was in charge of 
industrial PSPs waste collectors. LAWMA contracted companies that were 
also working for MoE, who were paid upfront for services for LAWMA, but 
would claim that some of waste collected from industrial sites was domestic 
waste, thereby double billing the government (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P4, 2007).
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To resolve these problems, a weighbridge was introduced at the 
landfill site and for every time waste trucks went to the landfill, they were 
weighed and received an electronic print out which was presented at the end of 
the month to the MoE for remuneration (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P4, 2008). The 
MoE banned LAWMA from using the domestic PSPs for industrial waste and 
all the LAWMA PSPs had to paint their trucks the LAWMA trademark orange 
to distinguish them from the domestic PSPs (PI, 2007; Dept of Sanitation, 
2007). Any domestic PSPs caught collecting industrial waste and trying to 
pass it off as domestic waste was banned from the Programme and fined (P2, 
2007; Dept of Sanitation, 2007).
The introduction of the weighbridge created a new problem as some of 
the PSP Contractors allegedly started to weigh down their trucks with rocks as 
they are paid per tonne of waste transported to the disposal site (PI, 2007; P2,
2007). The MoE put monitoring agents at the disposal sites to monitor the 
waste disposed of and some of the companies who did this were banned and 
black listed from the PSP Waste Collection Programme (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; 
P4, 2008; MoE, 2005; PSP/LAWMA meeting, 2007).
Billing Company:
The billing company created a unique problem, which while not 
outright fraud, was a cost the Programme in lost revenue (PI, 2007; P4, 2008). 
The billing company was charged with acquiring the information on the
properties i.e. type of accommodation and location, and sending out bills, and 
matching the information to the areas being served by the PSPs (PI, 2007; P2, 
2007; Dept of Sanitation, 2007). The company collected the required 
information and sent the bills to about a third of clients, but the remaining two 
thirds of the bills were being sent to areas not covered by the PSP Waste 
Collection Programme (PI, 2007; PSP/LAWMA meeting, 2007). This meant 
that households in some areas such as Surulere which received the service 
were not charged (Structured interview survey, 2007; PI, 2007) while others 
in areas such as Mafoluku who were not receiving the service were being 
billed (Structured interview survey, 2007; PI, 2007,).
Comment Box 3
Surulere is a 35 year old married professional resident. 
She has lived in Surulere for a few years with her husband 
and one child
“O f course I prefer the free PSP service, I just don’t like 
that they are not reliable. They can come today and you 
will not see them again for two weeks ”
Surulere resident (Structured interview, 2007)
The companies which dealt with enforcement were faced with trying to
enforce bills at properties which had not been serviced (PSP/LAWMA
meeting, 2007). The outcome was that between 2004 and 2006, the Policy
Makers were footing almost 99% of the bill for the PSP service although the
budgeted revenue from the End Users was approximately 20% (PI, 2007;
Dept of sanitation, 2007). This created bad publicity for the Programme, with
some targeted End Users looking at the Programme as fraudulent (Dept of
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Sanitation, 2007). Thus while waste collection services improved, it was at 
considerable cost to the government.
Equipment:
After the widening the Programme to the main urban areas of Lagos 
State in Phase II, a critical problem had been the long queues to unload trucks 
manually at the landfill site. This had discouraged some PSP Contractors 
during Phase I from using the disposal sites as it increased their turnaround 
time (PSP focus group, 2007).
The cost of acquiring standardized equipment was problematic for 
some PSP Contractors. The general cost of purchasing a second-hand 
collection truck ranged from N2-N4 million (£8,000-£ 16,000) which was 
unaffordable for many small companies (PSP focus group, 2007). The MoE 
intervened in the interest of standardizing collection equipment used in the 
State by negotiating with local banks for equipment loan facilities for the PSP 
Participants equipment (PI, 2007; P3, 2007; PSP/LA WMA, meeting, 2007; 
Dept of Sanitation, 2007).
The MoE also aimed to regulate the choice of equipment (PI, 2007; 
P3, 2007). However, while the Policy Makers were keen for the PSP 
Participants to obtain good quality equipment, and to make informed choices, 
so avoiding expensive equipment that could not be adequately maintained in
Nigeria (PI, 2007). The choice of equipment could make the difference 
between effective service and ineffective service (Onibokun and Kumuyi, 
1999). Picture 9.1 below is an example of trucks which are difficult to 
maintain in Lagos being used by some PSP practitioners.
The trucks in the Picture 9.1 have broken down along the Ikorodu 
expressway in Lagos and are awaiting repairs. Trucks such as compactor 
trucks which are expensive to obtain and difficult to maintain, and have very 
little impact on the waste collected as the waste is mainly organic and already 
very dense, are discouraged by the MoE (Dept of Sanitation, 2007). LA WMA 
continues to argue vehemently that it can maintain compactor trucks for the 
PSP Participants (P3, 2007) but its track record of maintaining its own 
equipment was dismal as discussed in 3.8.2 (PI, 2007; P4, 2008). Cointreau, 
(1994), argues against the use of over sophisticated equipment for some 
developing country cities in the collection of their waste, as the cost is often 
high, and maintenance is poor, limiting the benefit to a city (Cointreau, 1994).
Picture 9.1 Broken down PSP compactor
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An interesting feature in Phase II of the PSP waste collection programme is when 
problems have arisen during the course of implementation; the Policy Makers have been very 
quick to act to resolve the issue for the smooth flowing of the programme. This is interesting 
for two reasons; the Policy Makers and the End Users are much more informed on the 
progress of the PSP Contractors. The Policy Makers through increased monitoring through 
the monitoring department, local governments and End Users. The End Users through 
identification with the programme and paying for the service when they are satisfied with the 
service and making their complaints heard when it does not meet contracted standards. For 
example, if the PSP Contractor is to come once or twice weekly and he does not provide the 
service, using the complaints procedure to report the company. The second point of interest is 
the Policy Makers have shown willingness to act when problems arise during the 
implementation of the service.
Neither the top-down nor the bottom-up schools of thought have any provisions 
within them on how to deal with large scale incidences of corruption as could be witnessed at 
the beginning of Phase II of the PSP Programme. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984), draw 
attention to the possible problems of inter-agency clashes or the hi-jacking of implementation 
by competing agencies and how this can hinder implementation outcome. Monitoring is out 
forward by Hogwood and Gunn (1994) as an essential aspect of implementation to ensure 
implementation is hitting policy targets. And if implementation is not hitting policy targets to 
understand why this was. Bardach (1977), even advocates for a little strong arming by Policy 
Makers to create conditions which are conducive for street level bureaucrats to hot 
implementation objectives. However, wide spread corruption is not expected by either school 
of thought as a reason for poor implementation outcome. An implementation theory that is
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developed for a developing country city like Lagos would require a strong anti-corruption 
measure for it to be applicable.
However, the top-down school of thought would be the most applicable in this 
situation. This is mainly because as observed above, the Policy Makers are able to make the 
most impact in the implementation of the PSP waste collection programme in Lagos. Policy 
Makers argue Sabatier (1996) are able to exert the most influence in the implementation of 
policy because they control scarce resources. Pressman and Wildavsky (1983) argue that 
Policy Makers must also be willing to take decisive steps to meet policy objectives without 
weighing them down with bureaucracy. From the negatives of the policy observed above, the 
bottom-up school of thoughts is not equipped to deal with street level bureaucrats that hinder 
the successful implementation of policy as observed above. The bottom-up school of thought 
advocate for a high level of monitoring of policy implementation (Hill, 1996), to ensure 
implementation is meeting policy objectives but as observed from the above, the monitoring 
must come from the top for it to be effective.
9.6 Phase II implementation analyses
The implementation of Phase II of the PSP Waste Collection Programme was carried 
out in phases (PI, 2007). As discussed in Chapter 8, while private waste collection was not a 
new concept to in Lagos State, the PSP Waste Collection Programme introduced in 1996 was 
a new concept to the MoE and LAWMA Policy Makers. This Section examines whether 
Phase II of the PSP made improvements compared to Phase I of the Programme.
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9.6.1 Clear and consistent objectives and adequate resources:
The objectives of Phase II are almost identical to those of Phase I stated in Section 
8.5.1, as reported by key informants, although the Phase I objectives were never clearly 
documented. The MoE’s original objectives in Phase I of the PSP Waste Collection 
Programme, were for the collection and transfer of waste from the municipal areas within 
Lagos State to formal disposal sites, and the reduction of costs for the service (PI, 2007; P4,
2008) (see Section 8.3). This was expanded in Phase II to increase coverage of the PSP 
service, include a wider range of PSP actors with resultant job creation, and encouragement 
of direct payments for the service by the End Users (Dept of Sanitation, 2005). Owen and 
Mema (1997) state that the objectives of any policy must be clearly mapped out at the 
beginning of the policy (Owen and Mema, 1997).
While still using some market efficiencies (good service levels equals to increase in 
demand) to improve the level of formal services provided to the End Users (Jensen, 1978), 
the innovation in Phase II was the introduction of a resource loop enabling the MoE to act as 
financial co-ordinator (Section 9.3.4) changing the dynamic of the actors in the PSP to make 
the stake holders more accountable to the Policy Makers (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; Dept of 
Sanitation, 2007). This confirms Bardachs’ (1977) theory that policy can be used to structure 
the path in which implementation should follow. The structure of implementation in Phase I 
and II of the PSP Programme it can be observed has been structured by the policy makers to 
take the direction that they have chosen.
The policy objectives in Phase II of the PSP Waste Collection Programme were 
strengthened by continued political support and resources which continued during the writing
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of this thesis. Political support is seen as a critical factor in the success of PSP Waste 
Collection Programmes, as identified Van Horn, (1975); Sabatier,(1993); Hood,(1976). By 
paying the PSP Participants directly and helping this sector to access credit from the banks, 
the Policy Makers were able to create a more enabling environment for the PSP Participants 
(PI, 2007; PSP focus group interview, 2007).
The Programme was given legislation in the Lagos State Environmental sanitation 
law (2001) to back it up and make it legally binding on the residents where the service was 
provided. The Lagos State environmental Law is discussed further in Section 9.6.3 (Lagos 
State Gazette, 2001). The government took on the bulk of the Public Enlightenment 
Programme for the PSP Waste Collection Programme in 2004 to launch Phase II of the PSP 
Waste Collection Programme (PI, 2007). Media campaigns and public meetings were used to 
sensitize the End Users (Adepegba, 2004).
A difference between Phase I of the PSP waste policy and Phase II of the policy the
objectives of the policy are made known to the End Users and they are also invited to
participate within the policy process. The bottom-up and top-down schools of thought both
prescribe the identification of a need for policy and then its implementation by one group or
the other (Barrett and Fudge, 1980). In some western economies for example, the United
Kingdom, there is consultation with the main actors within the policy process however; it is
not a mandatory part of implementation. Phase II of the PSP Programme showed that it was
necessary to engage the End User in the policy implementation process as their co-operation
is required for the policy to be successful. The bottom-up school of thought argues that
because it is in direct contact with the End Users, it is better place to provide an efficient
service (Hill, 1991, Hill and Hupe, 1996). This might be true in situations where corruption is
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at a minimum or does not exist. It might it even hold to account in situations where the End 
Users co-operate with Policy Makers even if they are unhappy with policy. However in the 
Lagos context policy implementation was hindered by the very street level bureaucrats the 
bottom-up wants to be in charge of policy implementation. It is not to say that there was no 
corruption at the policy maker level of implementation, but it took the intervention of the 
Policy Makers for implementation to start meeting policy objectives.
9.6.2 Cause and Effect:
Sabatier (1993) advices Policy Makers to evaluate and revise the assumptions with 
which they make policy after it has been implemented for a period of time. The cause and 
effect theories which the policies makers apply to the creation of policy can positively or 
negatively impact the implementation of the policy (Van Horn, 1970). The top-down school 
of thought therefore puts forward that there is a need to evaluate the original cause and effect 
theory applied to the policy and its subsequent implementation (Van Horn and Van Meter, 
(1975). The revision of the PSP Programme was carried out by the MoE in Lagos (PI, 2007; 
Dept of Sanitation, 2005). It could no longer be taken for granted that if the formal private 
provision offered a better level of service, it would be used and paid for by the End Users 
(MoE, 2007).
Two things had to be done to make the service more viable. First the Policy Makers
had to earn the trust and patronage of the End Users. To achieve this, the Policy Makers
launched the Clean up Lagos campaign which began at the end of 2003 (Momudu, 2003).
This was done by holding a series of meetings (which are still held once a month) with the
PSP Contractors and training them on how to continuously improve their service. (PI, 2007;
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PSP focus group interview, 2007; PSP/LA WMA meeting, 2007). The MoE also reviewed the 
capacity of the PSP waste collection participants and used this to reassign streets in which 
they collect waste. Streets allocated maybe returned if the PSP participant is able to 
satisfactorily and legitimately increase its collection capacity (PI, 2007; Dept of Sanitation, 
2007).
The combination of the targeted campaign and the improvement in the service was 
expected to increase the patronage of the PSP Waste Collection Programme. This probably 
accounts for why before 2004, 67% of the surveyed population were unaware of the Phase I 
PSP Waste Collection Programme and why approximately 99% of the surveyed population 
was aware of the Phase II PSP Programme post-2004.
The Policy Makers from the implementation of Phase I of the PSP Waste Collection 
Programme understood the inappropriateness of comparing the services of the PSP 
Participants to the service provided by the informal private sector. This was due to;
1) The cost of service delivery between the two groups. The informal service 
providers’ overhead costs are low and usually comprised of obtaining and 
maintaining their waste carts (focus group interview cart-pushers, 2008) as 
opposed to the PSP service providers which have continual running costs 
which include staff cost, truck acquisition and maintenance, truck garaging 
(focus group interview, 2007; PI, 2007).
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2) The levels of service delivery between both groups were not directly 
comparable, mainly because much of the waste collected by cart-pushers 
was dumped and not transported to the landfill site, as the cart-pushers are 
unable to carry the waste over great distances while the mechanized service 
of the formal private service is able to carry waste to designated disposal 
sites.
One of the issues raised from the implementation of Phase I for the Policy Makers 
was not to assume the reaction to the policy of the End Users (PI, 2007; P2, 2007). The 
Policy Makers convinced the government that it was necessary for them to make initial 
resource allocations to the Programme and recoup the funding back from the End Users 
(P4, 2008; PI, 2007). It was therefore imperative that politicians (Governor, House of 
Representative and House of Assembly) should perceive Phase II as a viable service 
option.
Lagos State government is trying to practice an inclusive form of governance. In order to
understand why End Users had been mainly uncooperative with the PSP Contractors and the
service should be tailored to meet End Users needs, a series of meetings was held in 2004.
The State Governor, Deputy Governor and technical staff from MoE/LAWMA held the
meetings with the local leaders, including priests, pastors and imams, traditional leaders (a
number of the old traditions still hold strongly within the State) including Obas (kings) and
chiefs, (indigenous senate), grassroots politicians and ward and local government heads (PI,
2007; P2; 2007; P3, 2007; P4 2008; Ahiante, 2004). The involvement of high ranking
politicians in the meetings indicates the political weight given to the programme. It is not
known how many meetings were held, however, all the meetings had a common agenda at all
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the meetings was waste in Lagos state, how it affected the residents of the State and the roles 
of the different levels of stakeholders in making Lagos State a cleaner State.
The meetings served two purposes;
1) The local heads were given vital information about the PSP Waste Collection 
Programme which they were expected to pass on to their constituents, allowing the 
government to indirectly interact with the electorates through the grass root leaders 
(PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P4, 2008). Lipsky, (1993) suggests that that the information 
passed on to End Users from the group closest to them is the most important link for 
implementation success. Lipskys’ (1980) argument would be valid especially in 
countries that have strong sense of community. When policies are passed from Policy 
Makers to End Users, it can mainly be impersonal. When this same piece of 
information is given in a community forum, for example a church gathering, the 
people can identify more readily with it. Possibly because if the community leaders 
are able to relate the policy they are promoting on behalf of Policy Makers to 
problems within the community, it makes it easier for the End Users to identify with 
the policy. The policy from the Policy Makers would need to be related to a wide 
range of people most with nothing more in common than they live in the same city. In 
a nut shell, the local leaders can personalize the policy for the End Users in a manner 
that Policy Makers and street level bureaucrats cannot.
2) It gave the Policy Makers an opportunity to understand why the informal private 
sector was still the main supplier of waste collection services within the State by
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getting feedback from community leaders (PI, 2007; Dept of Sanitation, 2007;
Ahiante, 2004).
The result of the consultation indicated that Users were willing to pay for efficient 
waste collection services, but not premium prices for a government service (Balogun, 2008). 
The End Users that were targeted expected the service to either be free or the formal private 
service to be competitive with informal sector prices especially within low income areas 
(Structured interview, 2007). The structured interviews carried out for this thesis indicated 
that, where PSPs operated, approximately 43.1% of people interviewed would choose the 
services of the PSP Contractors compared to the 26.9% whom preferred the cart-pushers, 
(structured interview, 2007).
Over 43% of respondents who used PSPs preferred their services because waste was 
transferred to legal dumpsites. Even though only 35% felt the PSP waste collection service 
was a better value service to the informal sector (Structured interviews, 2007). Over 60% of 
the End Users surveyed were unhappy about the irregularity of the waste collection service 
provided PSP Contractors. Over 64% of the End Users surveyed were unaware of collection 
times (as observed by the researcher during the survey) saying the PSPs rang a bell for them 
to bring their waste to them as opposed to collecting the waste door to door as mandated by 
the policy (Structured Interviews , 2007).
During the consultation meetings, the participants complained that the prices set by the
MoE for the service were too high and needed to be revised (Oduwole, 2007). The
consultation justified a price review in 2004 and a subsequent review due to be published in
2007. The author of this thesis was able to obtain a domestic waste PSP bill and compare the
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price and found that the prices had already been reduced by approximately 20%. In 2004, 
houses in high income areas were to be billed N3,000 (£12) per month in the price list 
published by the MoE (Appendix A) at the beginning of 2004, but this was revised to N2,500 
per month according to a bill received at a private residence in 2009 (appendix A) (MoE, 
2007).
A second assumption in Phase I of ‘cause and effect’ which the Policy Makers had 
assumed that an environment which enabled the formal private sector to thrive would also 
support the objectives of Policy Makers. The assumption that people would pay for a good 
PSP service proved not to be the case, PSP Contractors who initially signed up found that 
their business was not viable (Focus group interview, 2007; NAN, 2004). The Policy Makers 
took the decision to intervene in 2004 by getting the State to pay the PSP waste collectors 
directly especially as it served the dual purpose of ensuring the waste reached the landfill and 
more PSP Participants are able to join and stay within the waste collection and transfer field 
(PSP focus group, 2007; PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P4, 2008; Technical committee, 2004). The 
restructuring of the resource flows not only gave the Policy Makers more control over the 
PSP service providers (as discussed in Section 9.3.4) but also helped the formal private 
service providers to stay within the field and to guarantee an income (PI, 2007; P4, 2008).
9.6.3 Enabling Legislation
The top-down school of thought argues that legislation is one of the most effective
tools within the Policy Makers’ arsenal for the implementation of policy (Hanf and Jansen,
1998). Legislation can be used to structure implementation and gives the policy the backing
of the law. Legislation can also be used to protect implementation and its agents from
281
encroachment by other agencies and policies (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). Strong 
legislation is therefore required to boost implementation success.
As discussed in Section 8.5.3, the Sanitation Law (2001) was not amended and no 
addenda or amendments were added to the law at the inception of Phase II. Sabatier (1993) 
prescribes for a legislative review by Policy Makers to reinforce laws. The PSP waste 
collection and transfer legislation is still as inadequate as it was in Phase I. The reason for not 
strengthening the legislation may have been that the legislation affects every household in the 
State, and the new civilian government did not want to alienate its new electorate (PI, 2007; 
P2, 2007). There was a change however to the enforcement which was minimal during Phase 
I; in contrast enforcement during Phase II took on four dimensions (PI, 2007; P3, 2007; P4, 
2008; MoE, 2005; Dept of Sanitation, 2007):
1. Monitoring:
The Monitoring Department in the MoE undertakes periodic inspections of 
different parts of the State and manages the complaints desk of the PSP Waste 
Collection Programme (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; MD head, 2007). The Department also 
investigates environmental offences, and reports back to the MoE, with the authority 
to carry out sanctions (for instance closing down businesses, sealing compounds and 
levying fines) against the PSP Participants and End User offenders (MoE, 2005).
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2. Kick Against Indiscipline Brigade (KAI)
The role of this group who are the environmental police in Lagos is to 
apprehend offenders as the crime is being committed (as it were). For example, they 
can apprehend citizens for littering or waste collectors for fly tipping as the event is 
occurring (MoE, 2005). The KAI brigade goes out on daily patrols and apprehends 
people in the process of faulting Lagos State sanitation laws (Lagos, 2001).
3. Local governments
The local governments are also monitored the PSPs and have the power to 
investigate End Users and PSP complaints (Section 9.3.3). They have no sanction 
powers on the PSP Contractors but can recommend to the MoE/LAWMA that non­
performing PSP should be struck off the register (LG1, 2007; LG2, 2007; MoE,
2005).
4. Private sector monitoring/enforcement companies
These companies were also contracted to monitor PSP participant activities, 
investigate disputes and administer sanctions on both the PSP practitioners and the 
End Users (see Section 9.4.4; PSP/LA WMA meeting, 2007).
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All the above groups had the power to seize cart-pusher’s carts. Cart-pushers had 
their carts seized in some areas on a fairly regular basis for instance in Victoria Island 
(Victoria Island Local Government representative, 2007). This restricted the areas in which 
they could operate but the measure has not been effective enough to stop informal waste 
collection completely.
The enabling legislation was strengthened by more effective enforcement from the 
MoE/LAWMA. To make a policy well know within the State, it must either get considerable 
press attention like the fraud policies or have significant enforcement presence and 
consequences (Onwudiwe, 2004). The way in which enforcement is carried out within the 
Lagos State urban area was changed in four main ways:
1) New contracts were set up with private monitoring companies to monitor the activities 
of the PSP practitioners and they report their observation back to the MoE, increasing 
the latter’s monitoring capacity significantly (PSP/LAWMA meeting, 2007; PI, 
2007).
2) The monitoring firms were used to collect unpaid bills for waste services. They also 
investigate why bills are not paid, and are empowered to impose standard sanctions 
depending on the situation (PSP/LAWMA meeting, 2007). For instance, if bills are 
not paid but the client has received no services, they investigate the problem. If the 
fault is with the PSP, they report back to the MoE, and if it is with the client, the 
client’s property may be sealed off until the bill is paid (PI, 2007; P2, 2007).
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3) An advertising campaign on behalf of the MoE included radio and television 
advertisements highlighting the personal and environmental benefits of the service. 
The campaign also included a public education Programme carried out by MoE staff 
on National Sanitation Days in well-frequented places such as markets and motor 
parks. The PSP practitioners are also supposed to continuously educate the End Users 
(PI, 2007; P2, 2007).
4) Sanctions against cart-pushers were imposed. Local governments and KAI (Kick 
Against Indiscipline Agency) have been mandated to fine the informal sector waste 
collectors (N5000-N 10,000 or £20-£40) and households who dispose of waste at 
illegal sites and in waterways (N5000-N10,000 or £20-£40) or 3 months in jail. They 
are also mandated to apprehend people who litter the streets and levy on the spot fine 
ofN1000-N2500 (£4-£10) (PI, 2007; Ikeja LG, 2007).
These initiatives have helped to ensure in Phase II that not only is the PSP Waste 
Collection Programme widely known but it is more widely accepted. At the start of Phase II 
in 2004, approximately 2% of households receiving the waste collection service were paying 
their bills (PI, 2007; Dept of sanitation, 2007) and by mid of 2007 about 40% of End Users 
receiving the service were paying their bills (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; Dept of Sanitation, 2007).
A fundamental flaw within the PSP Waste Collection Programme remained the lack 
of accountability of the PSPs practitioners for non-delivery of services. According to 37.3% 
of respondents from the structured interview survey, the main problem with the service was 
its infrequency, unreliability (Structured Interview, 2007; PI, 2007). The lack of experience
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of the PSP waste operators was also a problem also experienced in Phase I of the PSP Waste 
Collection Programme.
The challenge for the MoE and LA WMA was ensuring that enough operators 
remained in the field whilst maintaining service levels. The drawback of being too harsh on 
the practitioners could mean that some of the PSPs would leave the field. The leniency on 
practitioners reported during the survey period meant the government was still funding 
approximately two thirds of the PSP waste collection and transfer bill (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; 
P3, 2007, P4, 2008).
9.6.4 Committed and Skilful implementing officials
Winter (2002) considers that the street level bureaucrats’ commitment to the 
implementation of a policy increased the chances of implementation mirroring policy 
objectives. Sabatier (1996) argues that the street level bureaucrats chosen by Policy Makers 
need to fully understand the policy have the skills to implement it and are willing to commit 
to its implementation. Bardach (1977) proposes the agency chosen for implementation must 
have the skills to deliver or a specialist agency should be created for the purposes of 
implementation. This implementation pre-condition is very important in the implementation 
of policy as the incompetence perceived from the street level bureaucrats can stop End Users 
engaging with the policy (Hanf, 1982).
Phase II of the PSP Waste Collection Programme had an increased skill resource
compared to Phase I of the PSP Waste Collection Programme. Phase I of the PSP Waste
Collection Programme provided an invaluable learning curve for the Policy Makers and the
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PSP practitioners. The MoE/LAWMA gained experience as Policy Makers/guardians of the 
PSP Waste Collection Programme in how to deal with the different actors required for the 
implementation of the PSP Waste Collection Programme (MoE, 2007). The MoE has new 
skills which allow it not only to see the PSP Waste Collection Programme holistically, but 
also to improve upon Programme so that it delivers a measure of the PSP Waste Collection 
Programme objectives (P2, 2007; Dept of Sanitation, 2007). For example, the MoE/LAWMA 
had to develop expertise in contract preparation and management, enforcement.
The PSP practitioners are now developing a body of experience that enables them to 
improve service provision and client relationships (PSP group interview, 2007; LA WMA,
2005). New companies wanting to join the PSP Waste Collection Programme can acquire 
factual information from companies who have been operating over a period of years. Existing 
PSP companies can also offer training to new incoming companies (LAWMA, 2005; Focus 
group interview, 2007).
9.6.5 Support of Interest groups and politicians
Interest groups and politicians play a vital role in the implementation of policy. The 
political climate of a city can have a direct positive or adverse effect on policy 
implementation. If policy is able to generate public support, then the policy will usually get 
the resources that it requires for implementation (Hanf and Alf-Inge, 1998). Politicians get 
behind the policy and try to ensure that the policy is properly implemented. A lack of 
political support or public opposition to a specific policy could mean the policy sees a 
reduction its funds and could end the policy (Hill and Hupe, 1998). Over time, the need for a 
policy diminishes or ends which would also mean the end of implementation.
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After the transition from military to civilian rule in 1999, the newly democratically 
elected civilian government showed more support for the Programme by creating the 
enabling law to back the Programme (Section 8.5.3) (PSP focus group, 2007). Sabatier, 
(1993) emphasises the importance of political support for any policy to meet implementation 
objectives, as decisions made by the political office holders can affect implementation 
because they control resources and can influence policies and laws which directly or 
indirectly affect implementation (Sabatier, 1993; Jordan, 1999). Phase II of the PSP waste 
collection policy had a much more positive political endorsement than Phase I (PI, 2007; p2, 
2007; P4, 2008).
Phase II also saw an increased resource commitment in the State budget allowing the 
Policy Makers to pay the PSP practitioners directly, making the policy much more efficient in 
delivering the contracted services, and allowing the MoE Policy Makers to begin to see some 
real changes in the PSP Waste Collection Programme meeting policy objectives (PI, 2007; 
P3, 2007; P4, 2008; PSP focus group meeting, 2007).
9.6.6 Changes in the Socio-Economic conditions
Since the PSP Programme started in 1996, there have been three significant fuel price
rises by the central government and numerous fuel scarcities both artificial and real, and fuel
induced strikes from fuel suppliers and fuel transport workers have been reported (Mahtani,
2005; Editorial, 2008). The rise in fuel cost according to the federal government was because
of the deficit in paying fuel importers which arose because all three refineries no longer
function (Editorial, 2008). While the fuel price increases have affected the cost of delivering
the service, it has not fundamentally undermined the service. The service is still being
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delivered with more firms joining the current PSP practitioners with over 200 companies 
participating in 2007 (LAWMA, 2008). The change in fuel price has given rise to a call of the 
review of the remuneration paid to the PSP practitioners for services rendered (PSP/ 
LA WMA meeting, 2007).
9.7 Problems experienced during the Implementation of 
Phase II
9.7.1 Corruption
The major problem faced by the implementation of Phase II is corruption. The 
presence of corrupt practices reduces the investment that can be committed to implementation 
thereby reducing its success rate (Fredriksson and Svensson, 2002; Waziri, 2008). In Phase II 
of the PSP Waste Collection Programme, the Policy Makers realized that in order to 
implement Phase II of the PSP Waste Collection Programme and make it run smoothly, it 
was imperative to include safeguards for fraud within PSP Waste Collection Programme (PI, 
2007; Dept of sanitation, 2005).
Comment Box 4
Lagos state strives to be an exemplary state in terms o f  
good governance. The state aims to develop a transparent 
and accessible government o f the people for the people 
(Lagos state, 2003). ‘Lagos state pledges to promote good 
governance in Lagos state by running a transparent 
government for the people o f the people.’ Gov Bola Tinubu. 
(Lagos state, 2003)
Governor Bola Tinubu is indicted by the EFCC for fraud 
and embezzlement o f  N9 billion o f Lagos state money with 
other state governors. (Ujah and Ovuakporie, 2009).
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Corruption has been a long standing problem, and public services in Nigeria and 
Lagos have struggled with this issue (Ojediran, 2009). It is unclear however if during the 
implementation of either phase of the PSP Waste Collection Programme whether the Policy 
Makers and their departments have engaged in any form of corruption. The corruption 
discussed in Section 9.4 was the only aspects of corruption the researcher was able to 
identify. For the top-down or bottom-up models of implementation to be effective in 
developing country cities like Lagos, it would need to include a method that would tackle the 
issue of corruption and inefficiency. As explained in Section 9.5.2 above, the effects of 
corruption can be a significant constraint on implementation.
9.7.2. Agency clashes
During the data collection period of this thesis, the MoE was in the process of handing 
over the PSP in its entirety to LA WMA as the implementing agency (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P3, 
2007). The transfer of the PSP Waste Collection Programme from the MoE to LA WMA is 
due to a condition levied by the World Bank on Lagos State for a loan/grant for the 
construction of a new sanitary landfill site (PI, 2007; P2, 2007). Unfortunately the World 
Bank condition effectively takes the domestic waste collection and transfer Programme from 
the agency that has been working to make the service viable, and handed it to an agency with 
a long track record of inefficiencies as discussed in Section 8.2 (World Bank, 1994).
The transfer of responsibility for managing the domestic waste PSP service to
LA WMA introduces a conflict of policy. LA WMA actively promotes the use of communal
bins to collect waste centrally as discussed in (Section 3.9.2) (PI, 2007; P3, 2007; LA WMA,
2006). While the use of communal bins in markets and commercial and industrial areas is
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necessary due to the volume of waste and a need to centralize collection, in residential areas 
it is not so effective (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P4, 2008) for two main reasons;
1) As LA WMA had been unable to ensure that collective bins were regularly 
emptied resulting in some of the illegal dumps (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; Informal 
sector group interview, 2008). LA WMA was unable at the time of data collection 
for this research to acquire the equipment for the removal and maintenance of the 
bins (PI, 2007) and often the bins have had to be emptied by the rubbish being 
tipped on to the floor and loaded manually on to a truck for the waste to be 
removed (Participant, structured survey, 2007; PI, 2007).
Comment box 5
Mafoluku resident, age 40, Husband and father o f 2. Long time resident o f  
Mafoluku. ‘I have always disposed o f  my waste myself. I just bum it in the 
back yard. Why do I have to pay the government?
End User (2007)
2) The use of communal bins directly contravenes PSP waste collection and transfer 
principles and fundamentally undermined the policy (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; MoE, 
2007). The use of communal bins means that demanding payments for door-to- 
door collection would not be possible in areas where bins are available, thereby 
reducing the funds that can be generated (PI, 2007; P2, 2007). During the data 
gathering process, it was found that some End Users would go to some lengths to 
avoid paying the PSP bill as seen in box 5 below.
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9.8 Informal Sector
As discussed in previous Sections, the informal sector was the main provider of waste 
collection and transfer services in Lagos when there was a formal provision deficit. And they 
continue to be the main waste service providers in some parts of Lagos (PI, 2007; P2; 2007; 
Informal Sector Participants, 2007, structured survey, 2007). During the collection of the data 
in 2007, it was estimated that approximately 15,000 people were working in the informal 
waste collection sector in Lagos (Dept of Sanitation, 2007; PI, 2007; structured survey,
2007). The informal sector as discussed in Chapter 7 offers employment for some of the 
state’s most marginalized members (Klundert and Lardinois, 1995). Males dominate this 
particular field of informal waste services because of the physical requirements necessary to 
carry out the service on a daily basis (Informal Sector Participants, 2007; Informal Sector 
Participants’ group interview, 2008; Cointreau, 2000). The popularity of this sector grew as 
service providers because of the inefficiencies of formal waste collection and transfer 
services from the State (PI, 2007).
The informal waste collection sector has provided the End Users with an effective 
collection service for a prolonged period of time (Structured Interview, 2007), and served as a 
model for the creation of the PSP Waste Collection Programme Section 8.2 (PI, 2007). 
During Phase II of the PSP Waste Collection Programme, the sector was completely 
dismissed as a viable option due to the lack of waste centres within communities and the 
inability of the implementing agency LA WMA to collect waste from approved waste 
collection points (PI, 2007; P4, 2008; Dept of Sanitation, 2007).
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9.8.1 Effects of the informal waste sector on the State
The informal private sector waste collection service which has provided a much 
needed service in the State has both advantages and disadvantages. These factors will be 
discussed below.
9.8.1.1 Advantages
1) The informal private sector filled the gap created by PSP Waste Collection 
Programme failure and provided a much needed waste collection service 
within the State (Structured interview participants, 2007)
2) The informal private waste collection service is the major supplier of materials 
for the recycling industry within Lagos State. For instance the informal private 
sector recover aluminium and plastics, providing secondary source materials 
for industry and reducing the pressure for new materials (Fahmi, 2005, 
informal sector group interview, 2008).
3) The service provided is tailor-made to each customer’s needs (structured 
interview survey, 2007; PSP group interview, 2007), particularly in low- 
income settlements where the use of large collection trucks is difficult.
4) The informal sector is highly effective at revenue collection from customers 
(PI, 2007; PSP group interview, 2007; informal waste sector participants, 
2008; Fahmi, 2004)
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9.8.1.2 Disadvantages
1) A disadvantage of the informal sector is the difficulty of transporting collected 
waste over long distances to transfer or disposal points (PI, 2007; structured 
interview survey participant, 2007). This led to widespread dumping on 
sidewalks, open plots, and waterways (Jones, 2003). Such illegally disposed 
waste blocks roads causing traffic as motorist swerve to avoid the waste. The 
waste blocks natural and artificial waterways causing floods and spreading 
water borne diseases and the waste remaining within communities poses 
health hazards (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; P4, 2005) Kromfmacher, (1997) states 
that illegal dumped waste in some sub-Saharan cities accounts for some of the 
health hazards found in those areas.
2) A second problem is the monitoring of large numbers of individual operators. 
Although an initiative was made 1996 by LAWMA to encourage the cart- 
pushers to organize into cooperatives or collectives the initiative was not 
welcomed by the cart-pushers (PI, 2007). The main reason was mistrust 
between themselves and an unwillingness to invest in a co-operative run by 
themselves (informal waste sector group interview 1 and 2, 2008).
The aim was that the cart-pushers themselves would act as self assigned monitors 
of their activities, in a sense, they would police themselves. They would monitor each 
other to curb disposal of waste in illegal areas (Informal sector group interview,
2008). This supervision which was claimed by the cart-pushers to be on- going was 
not sufficient to curb the problem of illegal dumping as evidence of illegal dumping
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can still be found throughout the State (see pictures 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 below). Formal 
organization of cart-pushers would aid in the monitoring of their activities and their 
regulation, and might give them some legitimacy (Fahmi, 2005; Klund and Lundert, 
1996).
Picture 9.3: Illegal dumpsite
3) The activity of the private waste collection sector adds to the Policy Makers’ 
annual budget in three ways which are;
i) The bill for clearing the drains,
ii) The bill for the implementing agency to collect waste and
iii) The bill to have the waste mechanically transported from the area (PI, 2007).
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The budgetary allocation for clearing away the waste from illegal dumpsites has 
further discouraged the MoE from allowing the informal waste collection sector to continue 
to operate with Lagos State (PI, 2007; P3, 2007, P4, 2005). Section 9.8. below suggests ways 
that it may be possible to include the informal waste sector as active participants within the 
waste collection and transfer sector.
A table has been created below to summarise the advantages and disadvantages of the 
informal waste sector operations in Lagos waste services.
No Advantage Disadvantage
1 Collect waste from door to door regularly Waste remains largely within the 
community it was collected
2 Very adaptable to consumers needs Dump waste where accessible as most legal 
dumpsites are a distance from their areas o f  
operation
3 The equipment used is low maintenance, 
low cost and durable
Indiscriminate dumping o f  waste leads to 
flooding, polluting water ways and traffic 
congestion depending on where the waste is 
dumped
4 Needs very little direction Difficult to organize and monitor on a large 
scale in Lagos
5 Very efficient at collecting revenue Difficult to hold law breakers in this field 
accountable
6 Recover recyclates
7 Employs approximately 15,000 people, 
many with limited education
Cost the government valuable resources to 
clear illegal dumpsites
The informal private waste collection sector forms the bottom of the waste hierarchy 
in Lagos State. This sector has a proven track record of service delivery and revenue 
collection. This sector’s negative effect on the Lagos State urban environment is also noted, 
but key problems remain poor coordination and poor integration into the wider waste
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management system. The key question therefore is how to integrate the sector, to ensure 
accountability and address some of the problems of its operation?
For the sector to prosper there would have to be fundamental changes to the way it 
currently operates. Informal sector operators are unlikely, even if coordinated, to be able to 
buy trucks and operate contractually (Informal sector group interview, 2008), but inclusion of 
the informal sector in municipal services delivery can often take place through changes in 
how the formal and informal sector relate to each other (Fahmi, 2005).
Picture 9.2: An illegal dump set on fire on open plots of land in Lekki (2008)
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Picture 9.3: A water drain filled with waste
9.8.2 Methods of including the informal Waste Collection Sector
During the fieldwork, the Policy Makers indicated that some methods of including the 
informal waste collection sector were discussed (PI, 2007). Three options were being 
considered as follows;
1) Co-operatives:
The informal private sector were asked by the Policy Makers to create an
association which would become involved in buying vehicles for collecting waste
which would allow them to become formal PSP waste collectors (PI, 2007; P2, 2007;
P4, 2008; MoE, 2007). This would ease the monitoring problem of informal waste
collection services as discussed in Section 9.7.1. It would also ensure the waste did
not end up in illegal dumps but at formal designated disposal sites (PI, 2007). The
informal sector rejected this option outright, because according to them, the issue of
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who to trust with their funds was a problem (Informal group interview 1, 2008; 
Informal sector group interview 2; Informal sector participant 1, 2007). Furthermore, 
the cost of the vehicles is high and the returns from the pooled resources would be 
low, compared to investment per person which would include man power and 
finances. Also the running costs of vehicles are increasing with frequent fuel price 
rises and fuel scarcities (see Section 9.5.2). However, associations registered with the 
MoE or LAWMA could increase accountability for the operation of the informal 
waste collection sector.
2) Collaboration with PSPs:
The second option offered to the informal sector waste collectors by the Policy 
Makers was for them to work for the PSP practitioners as supervisors and loaders, 
with the government negotiating a pay scale on their behalf (PI, 2007; P2, 2007; Dept 
of Sanitation, 2007). This would ensure that the cart-pushers had a guaranteed 
income, and would ease the waste collection and transport (PI, 2007). The 
disadvantage for the cart-pushers would be the loss of their self employed status 
(Informal private sector group interview, 2008).
However, participants in the group interviews claimed that the Informal Sector 
Participants who worked for the PSP practitioners were a not paid their full wages, or 
not paid at all (Informal Sector Participants group interview 1 & 2, 2007). Fahmi 
(2005) observes that in some cases where informal sector waste collectors have gone 
to work for formal waste collection service providers, the informal service providers
299
have witnessed a significant drop in income (Fahmi, 2005). The lack of any kind of 
association or assistance from a formal employment tribunal has meant the Informal 
Sector Participants are not encouraged to join the PSPs (Informal sector group 
interview 1, 2008; Informal sector group interview 2, 2008).
3) Truck hire:
The third option given to the informal sector was for them to hire trucks on a 
daily basis (PI, 2007). The sector would pay the truck owner daily remuneration for 
the service and the truck owner would be allowed to dump the waste at the formal 
designated sites of disposal, without further remuneration from the government (PI, 
2007; P2, 2007). This method had two advantages. First, the informal sector could 
continue operating in its normal fashion while ensuring the waste reaches its 
designated destination (PI, 2007; Dept of Sanitation, 2007). Second, the MoE would 
not have to fund this part of the service (P3, 2007). The main disadvantage of this 
proposal is there could be a repeat of the alleged illegal dumping and fly tipping 
observed by PSP practitioners in Phase I. The informal sector agreed to this proposal, 
but the proposal was not progressed as the informal sector would only agree to pay 
the truck owner N1000 (£4) per truck load, which was not viable for their operations 
(PI, 2007).
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9.8.3 PSP Truckers
This thesis re-proposes the third option for including the informal private sector into 
the PSP Waste Collection Programme - as truckers. The idea of using designated truckers 
should not have been so readily dismissed. It is a viable option for the delivery of waste 
collection and transfer services for the State. The resources flow from this new waste sector 
would be still be collected by the informal waste collectors. The Policy Makers would then 
apply a flat tax directly to the informal waste practitioners, as with the PSP practitioners, to 
ensure the government recovers some of the revenue spent on this sector. The truckers should 
then be paid by the Policy Makers as opposed to the informal private sector for services 
rendered. This service would be available in designated areas, and would also allow the 
formal PSP Contractors to act as truckers as their remuneration would still be guaranteed. 
This proposal has five advantages:
- Waste would reach its designated disposal point owners would not be paid unless 
the vehicles reach the designated formal disposal point;
- MoE bills for collecting illegally dumped waste would be reduced;
- The Policy Makers would retain an effective waste collection operation especially 
in areas difficult to access by vehicle; and
- Monitoring of the sector would be more manageable than previously;
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The groups could be organized in a manner that allows areas (urban and rural 
areas) which are most in need of informal services (i.e. for reasons of poor 
infrastructure like roads) to access waste collection services that removes waste 
from the End Users immediate environment to formal designated disposal points.
The disadvantage of this proposal is there is no guarantee the informal private sector 
will use this service if offered, however, it would allow the Policy Makers to enlist the help 
of households to monitor the service and any informal dumping of waste in their 
neighbourhoods. The proposal would be difficult to organize; trucks would need to have an 
identifier, for example, a colour code especially for the informal private sector use. Collection 
would also be a problem as there are currently no waste collection centres within the State 
and the vehicles would have to meet the informal waste practitioners at specific places and 
specific times to ensure a continuous service.
9.9 Change of the informal sector role
Waste management in Lagos state is changing rapidly on a daily basis. The current 
climate of waste collection is hostile towards the informal sector. The informal sector is a 
necessary part of a developing country city like Lagos with large populations of uneducated 
unemployed working population, but the informal waste collectors role may need to be 
redefined. Physical restraints stop the informal sector from providing a more efficient 
collection service. However, the informal sector is responsible for almost 90% of the 
materials recovery which takes place in Lagos. A forum could be created by the Policy 
Makers to aid the informal waste collectors to materials recovery. Venues across the state
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could be established where members of the manufacturing industry could meet the informal 
materials recovery sector for trade. The waste collected by the informal sector would become 
too valuable to dump which would reduce the problem of monitoring for the Policy Makers 
and the informal sector would remain self reliant.
9.10 Conclusion
In applying implementation debates to Phase II of the PSP waste collection 
programme, some factors begin to emerge in regards to the application of implementation 
debates. It is observed that key factors which are present in some developing country cities 
which affect the implementation of public policy are not present in the countries where the 
implementation debates are formed. This presents a hindrance to the debate applicability. For 
the debates to be applicable, it would be necessary to make modifications to them which 
would contend with the factors found within developing country cities like Lagos.
The change in attitude of the Policy Makers it was observed, from elected dictators to 
elected officials was demonstrated by their willingness to engage with the End Users on a 
policy issue created a feature unseen before in the implementation of policy in Lagos. 
However, factors still remain within the implementation process in Lagos such as corruption 
on a large scale which requires proper measures to remove or mitigate them from the 
implementation process.
The presence of a large informal sector within the service delivery that is better 
known to the End Users than the formal service providers also presents an implementation
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problem. This sector is not catered for either by the top-down school of thought as they are 
not a formal implementation agency or private sector company, or by the bottom-up debate 
for the same reason. But as seen in Chapter 7, 8 and 9 above, they are not only valid service 
providers which cater for large amounts of unskilled worker, they are in many areas of 
developing country cities the only service providers for waste collection.
The current democratic dispensation within cities like Lagos has also meant a more 
active if not necessarily vocal End User group. This group is no longer afraid of the 
government or Policy Makers and exercises its displeasure through non-participation with the 
policy. As urban public policy is usually targeted at this group, it is important that steps are 
taken to include them within the implementation process, as they give the implementation 
process a higher chance of meeting policy goals.
For implementation debates to be relevant to policy implementation in developing 
country cities like Lagos the theoretical framework needs to include a means of 
accommodating these three factors poor governance, large informal sector and corruption. 
Any theory which does not consider these factors will be inapplicable in developing country 
cities like Lagos.
Implementation of Phase II of the PSP Programme has been work in progress for
MoE Policy Makers, with evolving experience of implementation increasing its effectiveness.
While Phase I begun with the military era, where implementation was carried out through
decrees which left no room for outside input. Phase II has been implemented with more
emphasis on flexibility and inclusion in their approach to the implementation of the PSP
Programme. In Phase II of the PSP Programme, the Policy Makers were open to engaging
304
with a wider range of participants. They showed a willingness to learn from their mistakes 
and took proactive steps to improve implementation.
Phase II of the PSP Waste Collection Programme was different to Phase I in one 
critical way which made its implementation and outcome differ from that of Phase I. A key 
difference was the financial organisation of the service, although this was not its only 
defining factor. In Phase II of the PSP Waste Collection Programme, implementation which 
mirrored policy objectives (cleaner urban environment) was the overriding priority for the 
Policy Makers. The investment of capital (manpower and resources) improved the services 
provided by the private formal waste collectors and allowed this section of the economy to 
grow. The PSP Programme while not still functioning at the standard desired by Policy 
Makers is beginning to improve in efficiency and reach.
Phase II of the PSP Programme was more inclusive of the different stakeholders that 
the policy affected, as opposed to Phase I where the policy was made by the Policy Makers to 
be implemented with little input from either implementing party or the End Users who were 
supposed to pay for the service. Phase II included all stakeholders including the informal 
private sector from its inception, so that all stake holders’ identified with and took personal 
ownership of, Phase II of the PSP Programme.
Phase II of the PSP waste collection policy still victimizes the informal waste
collectors, by excluding them from recognised involvement in service provision, with a
significant potential impact on their livelihoods. This is mainly due to the alleged cost of
cleaning up waste that results from their activities. Some changes to the PSP waste collection
policy discussed above may enable the informal sector to continue to function as part of the
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waste services sector within the State. From the evidence gathered while in Lagos, lack of 
investment in this sector either by the MoE or the informal sector themselves is the greatest 
stumbling block to any real progress in integrating the formal and informal sectors. The real 
problem is a lack of willpower on both sides. It is difficult to negotiate with individuals 
unless there is a political imperative for them to work together which in this case seems to be 
lacking. Investment would be needed by the MoE and a transfer infrastructure accessible to 
the informal waste collection sector, and from the informal operators, for example: through 
pooling resources to provide equipment or infrastructure. A preferential micro-finance policy 
would probably have to be agreed to enable this scenario.
Implementation in Phase II of the PSP Programme was better improved compared to 
Phase I of the programme. Some predominant issues presented themselves in governance and 
implementation. The first is when the targeted End Users have a profound distrust of 
government especially after a dictatorship; and this distrust must be addressed before 
implementation can occur. As observed in the implementation of Phase II, the Policy Makers 
and the politicians had to include the End Users before implementation could gain 
momentum.
A second observation is that if implementation debates are to be applicable in a 
setting like Lagos, they must include safeguards for corruption at all levels of implementation 
and engage the End Users. While an increase in resources for implementation is essential, it 
will be pointless if corruption is not reduced or eliminated from the implementation process.
A third observation which was observed during the collection of data on Phase II of
the PSP Programme was availability of very little qualitative data. The reason for this is
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unknown as it was expected that with the measures put into Phase II, this information would 
be more readily available. The missing data would have been able to provide a wider 
perspective on the progress of Phase II of the PSP Programme.
The aim of the PSP Programme is to create efficiencies in services provision to the 
End Users and cost to the Policy Makers. The quantitative data would give an instant idea on 
how much investment has been made by the PSP Contractors into the field of waste 
management and transfer compared to how much the Policy Makers had invested in the past 
into the sector. It would also give the information of how much the End Users themselves 
were investing in the management of their waste. Almost 25% of End Users were paying 
their PSP waste collection bills, the question of which 25% and how much has been invested 
could be answered by the data. Also, the information would help the Policy Makers to know 
what percentage of the End Users need to pay their PSP waste bill for the service to break 
even and for it to make a profit. How much the profit could be and which other sector of 
waste management the waste income could be invested. Finally, adequate quantitative 
records would also help them in better monitoring their finances and reduce the incidence of 
corruption within the PSP Programme.
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10. Conclusions
This dissertation started with a hypothesis that public policy implementation 
debates in developed western countries are not applicable to some developing country cities. 
In order to prove or disprove this hypothesis, this thesis selected the Lagos state Private 
Sector Participation waste collection programme as a test case. The policy was chosen 
because waste management had a long history in Lagos state. This policy had been created to 
revolutionize the collection and transfer of waste within the State. The policy had been 
implemented since 1996 with a review in 2004. Considering the past failures of the State to 
tackle its waste collection problem, it was the ideal test case for the thesis hypothesis.
This thesis looked at the theories put forward by the top-down and bottom-up schools 
of thought on policy implementation. To prove or disprove the thesis hypothesis, it then 
looked at the core factors within the PSP waste collection programme which included 
governance type available in the State, the informal sector operation within the waste 
collection management field in developing country cities, the PPP models adopted by policy­
makers, waste management history in Lagos state and waste management in general. The 
literature on these factors was then discussed within Chapters 3-7 to understand how they 
could affect implementation within Lagos state. Empirical data was then collected from 
different actors within waste management who are directly linked to the PSP waste collection 
programme. This formed the basis of the discussion within the empirical Chapters 8 and 9. 
The findings of this thesis are discussed within Chapter 10.
In researching this thesis, field work had to be carried out in the chosen case study
area. A few problems came up as discussed in Section 2.6 in regards to access to End Users
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(households), which meant the data collection process needed to be modified to 
accommodate this problem. This meant that the data collected from the End Users did not 
fully cover the demographic profile of the State, which restricted the usefulness of the End 
User data collected. Secondly, during the interviews with the key policy makers, there were 
frequent interruptions however; this did not affect the quality of the information collected 
from this group.
As the final Chapter of the thesis, Chapter 10 will look at all that has been learnt in 
the previous Chapters and evaluate how they have informed the hypothesis put forward in 
Section 2.11 which is current implementation debates are not applicable in developing 
country cities.
10.1 Implementation
The research carried out for this thesis found that there are certain characteristics 
within some developing country cities, as illustrated by the case study of Lagos State, which 
affect implementation directly or indirectly. For implementation to be effective in meeting 
policy objectives, these characteristics must be considered within the creation and 
implementation of public policy within these contexts.
In the creation of public policy implementation theory, emphasis is placed on the 
Policy Makers wanting to make a difference in the arena of public need that they aim to 
address. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) emphasize the Policy Makers need ‘for Oakland not 
to riot due to rising ethnic tensions’. The case studied by Pressman and Wildavsky had all the
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elements which many implementation theorists take for granted within the creation of policy 
and its implementation, including adequate resources, skills and capacity; adequate causal 
theory, effective leadership and a dedicated and capable agency to ensure that the policy is 
carried out and implementation can meet policy goals. While the Oakland case study failed to 
achieve policy goals, major lessons were learnt from the study, with Pressman and Wildavsky 
emerging as the founding fathers of implementation studies. In 1986, Mazmanian and 
Sabatier use the same principles to create an applicable framework for top-down 
implementation policy. The bottom-up school of thought uses the same variant but from the 
perspective of the street level bureaucrats to explain implementation within the public policy 
realm.
As implementation studies have developed over time, they have absorbed other 
theories such as game theory (Bardach, 1977), administrative theory (Matland, 1995) and 
network theory (Hjem and Hull, 1982). What is apparent however is implementation theory a 
currently outlined in the literature is not directly applicable to all types of policy 
implementation, even within the countries where the theories were developed. Whilst the 
overarching principles are the same, modifications in practice are required for each policy 
being implemented (O’Toole, 2000).
The constant that can be found within most implementation studies is the similarity of 
geographies and backgrounds. Most implementation studies are carried out in Western 
Europe and Northern America. The area for the case study which was chosen to test 
implementation theory is one which is not just different from it in geography but also in 
governance type and style.
310
This thesis therefore tests the implementation in the very differing context of a 
developing country urban area. The case study of Lagos state had two characteristics which 
made it very suitable for testing the theories. The first is that choosing one of the schools of 
thought to test would not be difficult due to the institutional structure for waste management 
and history of the policy within the State. The second reason was that characteristics existed 
within the chosen policy area and geography that would allow adequate testing of theory 
transfer from one geographic policy arena to another.
10.2 Character differences in chosen geographic area
The main character difference between the geographic areas where implementation is 
usually implemented is governance and leadership. A criticism of the top-down model is that 
it fails to recognize political rhetoric or ambiguity in its creation of policy and 
implementation (Scofield, 2001; Kendal, 2006; Harman, 2005). In the geographic area that 
the policy was tested in, bad governance was apparent especially in Phase I of the PSP 
Programme, the political rhetoric was ambiguous at best, the leadership available for the 
programme lacked the experience to implement the PSP Programme and while there was no 
actual legislation, political power was used to restrict the scale of the PSP Programme 
(Section 8.5.3).
A second criticism of the top-down model is its emphasis on the rational approach to 
policy making and implementation. When certain factors are put in place, then policy 
implementation should mirror policy goals (Winter, 1986). In the area chosen for the study,
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rational approach to policy making is not assured from either the Policy Makers or the 
implementers (Chapter 8).
Thirdly, the top-down theorists are accused of not giving more of a role within the 
policy and implementation to the street level bureaucrats who are usually assumed to have the 
experience to implement policy (Lipsky, 1980). The geographic area chosen, the street level 
bureaucrats in Lagos -  the PSP Contractors - were learning during the provision of the 
service. For this reason, they could not be involved within the policy creation process even if 
they had been invited to participate. In Phase I of the PSP Programme, they found it difficult 
to establish adequate working relationships with the End Users, which further contributed to 
the break down of the service.
Fourth, top-down theorists are accused of an over-dependence on legislation for 
policy implementation while the bottom-upper proponents are accused of down playing or 
even disregarding the role of legislation (Scofield, 2001). In the area being studied, the 
creation of legislation can often be ambiguous and without actually meeting policy needs and 
at other times, can be very difficult to enforce on a large scale especially when the End Users 
choose to ignore policy on a large scale.
Finally, in a developed country setting, many outside factors either at the Policy
Maker level or amongst street level bureaucrats can be identified or controlled within the
policy creation and implementation process. In the chosen area of study, there exists a large
informal sector which had filled the gap of formal provision of waste services left by the
formal provision of waste collection and transfer services. This group in the countries were
implementation debates are developed would be considered illegal. However, informal sector
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providers (the cart-pushers) formed the only source of waste collection and transfer services 
within Lagos over a prolonged period of time. This informal sector had been able to provide 
the End Users prior and during Phase I with a far more effective service than formal 
providers. They were able to set a precedent for the services which the End Users expect to 
receive. Implementation debates for a State like Lagos would have to consider the 
contribution of this sector and its potential role within implementation of public policy.
10.3 What is missing in the theory
The nature of the PSP Programme as a policy is relatively linear from its policy creation 
stage till the service is provided to the End User. The top-down theory of implementation 
should have been sufficient in solving the implementation problems which occurred because 
of the centralized nature of the government in Lagos state. However, for the top-down theory 
of implementation to be directly applicable to the policy in question, and similar policies in 
Lagos state, this research indicates that some additions need to be made to the top-down 
theory set out by Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989). These are discussed below under seven 
headings
1) Leadership
2) Informal sector contribution
3) Clear policy
4) Local factors
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5) End User inclusion
6) Governance type
7) Corruption
10.3.1 Leadership:
Leadership is the strongest factor in the implementation of any policy. Leadership is 
not mentioned anywhere within the Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989) model. The role of 
leadership can be very complex. In the Lagos scenario, the Policy Makers were the 
innovators in the waste collection and transfer arena (Section 8.4). However, at the start of 
the pilot in Phase I of the PSP Programme, they were ill-equipped to deal with the nature of 
the implementation challenges. Perhaps more effective leadership on the part of the Policy 
Makers would have effected the provision of better resources for the implementation of Phase 
I of the PSP Programme.
The lack of clear leadership affected how the End Users perceived the PSP 
Programme, contributing further to the lack of achievement of policy goals. In the context of 
Lagos state, if a type of policy has not been implemented before, it could be pertinent for the 
leaders to receive more training in order to increase their leadership ability. It should 
probably be standard practice in developing country cities such as Lagos that in all areas of 
policy innovation, training prior to the start of implementation should be given to the Policy 
Makers that both equips them for the task, and also continually challenges them to be 
dynamic in their thought process, innovative and pragmatic.
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10.3.2 Clear Policy
It is assumed that within a single institution creating a policy and implementing it, 
there will not be policy clashes as potential clashes are evaluated and removed or mitigated. 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) highlight policy clashes with other agencies as a hindrance 
of policy implementation. However, as discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, LAWMA the 
implementation agency of the MoE, had a conflicting policy to the PSP Programme (Section 
8.5.4-3). The PSP Programme required door-to-door collection of waste, paid for monthly, 
while the LAWMA policy was for the provision of communal bins at central points collected 
weekly and provided free of charge. These two policies conflicted and hindered the progress 
of the PSP Programme. It is necessary for the implementation theory to address possible 
conflict of interest within institutions.
10.3.3 Local factors
The local factors within any city have a very strong influence on how policy is 
implemented and indeed received within it. Local factors are not explicitly mentioned by 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989) it is not known why they have been excluded from the 
conceptual framework. Perhaps it is because the authors expect that local factors will be 
adequately studied prior to the execution of implementation and the result of the study 
included within the implementation of study. As observed in the implementation of Phase I of 
the PSP Programme, local factors were not considered, only the specific problem the policy 
makers were trying to solve.
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Local factors will vary from city to city, and the variance in these local factors will 
also affect how the End Users of policy react to policy or participate within implementation. 
In the Lagos state context, at the start of the policy, there was an almost complete break down 
of formal service provision as discussed in Chapter 8. This breakdown left a void that was 
filled by the informal sector. The informal sector was able to set a standard of service and a 
price which the End Users expected any other service provider (especially formal providers 
with better equipment) to be able to compete or at least provide the same level of service at 
the same price.
Local circumstances can have a clear effect on policy implementation. This requires 
the Policy Makers to be able to engage directly with the End Users as discussed in Chapter 9. 
This ability of the Policy Makers to engage with End Users of policy brings the policy closer 
to the group policy is supposed to affect and can be very effective in transcending local 
factors.
The ability of Policy Makers to mitigate local factors can also increase their ability to 
generate political support for their policy. Policies which are most likely to be popular 
amongst voters will get the most resources for implementation. The Policy Makers in Phase 
II (Section 9.3.2) of the PSP Programme were able to generate local and political support for 
their policy. Their increased participation (lobbying politicians and interests groups) within 
the implementation of the PSP Programme in Phase II from their participation in Phase I 
increased the public acceptability of the programme and increased participation.
The Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989), also takes for granted that if implementation is
carried out directly by the public sector or indirectly through a contracted third party, the
skills and man power are available for policy implementation. As seen in Chapter 8, this is
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not always the case. In the formal provision of waste collection and transfer services in 
Lagos, existing businesses did not have the expertise to deliver waste collection and transfer 
services. The Policy Makers and their implementing agency did not have the expertise to 
implement the policy. These two factors combined to not only make the PSP Programme 
unworkable in many areas, but also unpopular within the areas that the service was provided. 
The lack of experience of the private sector meant for the most part that the service was 
irregular. The lack of experience of the Policy Makers meant there was no monitoring and the 
PSP Contractors were able to engage in fly tipping.
10.3.4 End User inclusion
The Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989) model does not include the End User within its 
model. However, as demonstrated in Chapters 8 and 9, in policies like the PSP Programme 
where End Users are expected to fund policy directly or indirectly, their inclusion in the 
implementation process is critical. It is possibly more important to engage this group in a city 
like Lagos with a weak civil society. This is mainly because their displeasure with the policy 
will be shown through boycotting the policy implementation. If civil society were more 
established, it would be easier and faster for their displeasure to be communicated to the 
Policy Makers who could then take steps to accommodate their complaints. However a lack 
of or weakened civil society or media pressure means slower response to End User 
complaints in regards to the policy.
10.3.5 Governance type
317
In researching for this thesis, it became apparent that both government structures and 
the wider governance context of developing country cities such as Lagos have a significant 
impact on the implementation of public policy. This pattern is more noticeable within some 
Sub-Saharan African States. Cities such as Lagos are at a developmental stage in their 
democratic growth (Baker, 1998) which gives them unique characteristics.
From the literature, it was found that these cities have what is known as pseudo or 
simulated democracies, these are democracies which are nominally freely elected by people 
but with strong undertones of dictatorship (Section 5.3; Section 8.5.3). The trend found 
within the literature was of a change from formal dictatorship governments to single party 
rule - rulers simply changed their titles from dictators to elected leaders -  which meant that 
the power structures within government remained relatively unchanged. The proposed 
devolution which should have occurred with the change to democratically elected 
governments only happened on paper, with power remaining firmly with the centre. They 
also feature strong executive arms with weak or non-existent legislative sections (Section 5.7; 
Olowu and Smoke, 1992).
The form of governance practised by policy makers has a significant impact on the 
way in which it creates policies and how it implements its policies. It was seen within the 
Lagos context in Phase I of the policy that the Policy Makers attempt to lay down laws with 
no input from, or understanding of the needs of, End Users, and without providing End Users 
with any information on their intended laws which meant that the End Users did not 
participate and the policy was ineffective. The change however in Phase II of an open, more 
inclusive form of governance saw increased participation from the End Users and 
implementation beginning to mirror policy goals. The Policy Makers had to change the way
318
in which they interacted with the End Users, and also their relations with PSP Contractors to 
reduce/remove the incidence of corruption during Phase II of the programme.
The trend of dictatorship governments also gave rise to a weakened civil society, as a 
result of embezzlement of funds and legislative bullying (Bratton 1989, Kasfir 1998; Section 
5.4). The weakening of the civil society has meant weakening of the voice of the End Users 
(Bratton 1989, Carbone 2005, Mule 2001).
Nigeria, and by extension Lagos can be classified (during the period of data gathering 
for this research) as a pseudo democracy based on the description in Section 5.6.1, having 
moved from one dictator to an elected ex-dictator. The methods of policy creation within 
pseudo democracies are reflected within their governance types. This usually involves the 
creation of policy, seldom without input from the main actors involved in the implementation 
or receipt of policy (Olowu, 1990; Smith, 1996; Section 5.7). There is a lack of transparency 
which moves from one political regime to the next and over time has built the basis for a lack 
of trust for the governmental by the End Users/civil society.
The implementation school of thought which best suits this form of government is the 
top-down school of thought. The Policy Makers can make their policy efficiently without fear 
of reprisal. They are also able to use their legislative powers to remove any obstacle (Section 
2.3; Bardach, 1977). However, some of the characteristics of this form of 
government/democracy would hinder the implementation of the policy. The predominant 
characteristic of this form of governance is corruption. Corruption has been found to be 
prevalent in most pseudo democracies (Section 5.6). The second characteristic prevalent
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within this form of government is a lack of skilled or committed man power. These two 
characteristics greatly affect the ability of street level bureaucrats to implement public policy 
with pseudo democratic States.
It was found in Chapters 8 and 9, that even though the End Users had no voice in the 
creation and implementation of policy within Lagos State, they are still able to make their 
displeasure felt (Section 8.5.5). It has been found that while dictatorship governments have 
attempted to emancipate this group, the End Users are still able to assert their influence over 
policy implementation. The policy implementation debates rarely include End Users within 
their arguments other than as a measure of implementation or how interactions with End 
Users can be influenced by the street level bureaucrats who interact within them directly. 
Within contexts like Lagos, this group needs to be considered independently as their actions 
can have a significant influence on the outcome of public policy.
10.3.6 Corruption
Corruption is not featured in either the top-down or bottom-up debates on policy 
implementation. It is however, a prevailing factor within policy creation and implementation 
in developing country cities like Lagos. It should be said that corruption is a variable factor 
that might not necessarily affect all policy spheres in a city like Lagos. However because of 
its prevalence within policy and implementation, it would be pertinent for the implementation 
schools of thought to include the issue of corruption, and consider how to combat it or reduce 
its occurrence in cities such as Lagos. As seen in Chapters 8 and 9, the occurrence of 
corruption within policy implementation costs scarce resources and hinders the progress of 
implementation.
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10.3.7 Informal sector
Implementation debates do not mention the informal sector. This is mainly because 
this sector is largely illegal in developed western countries. As discussed in Chapters 7, 8 and 
9, they form a significant part of services delivery in some developing country cities. The 
implementation debates need to include this sector of service providers within their debates in 
the context of developing country cities. As seen in Chapter 8, they could be the most skilled 
practitioners within the arena o f service provision. Another reason to include them is that 
they also form part of the fabric of the urban society in developing country cities and their 
needs also need to be taken into consideration by policy makers. As seen in Section 7.5.2 
when the Policy Makers included the Coopamare in their policy, they were able to empower 
the group and negotiate a higher level of service delivery from them. As seen in Section 
7.5.3, the group can also provide a more cost effective service for the policy makers if they 
are given the opportunity compared to formal delivery channels. This group usually form part 
of the most disadvantaged members of society and should be considered during the policy 
making process.
10.4 Implications for the thesis hypothesis
This thesis started out with the hypothesis that;
Current debates on implementation take insufficient account o f  the complexity o f policy 
implementation in developing country cities and the complex interactions between state, 
society and the private sector, particularly in contexts where large informal sector service
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delivery is common.
The hypothesis above put forward by this thesis has been largely verified. The current 
theories as they are formulated do not address the complexity of developing country cities. 
That is not to say however that they are completely inapplicable to developing country cities. 
As has been observed within the empirical Chapters, the top-down models of implementation 
are currently the most applicable debates to developing country city contexts. However, as 
discussed above, significant inclusions have to be made to the current theories and debates in 
order to make them directly applicable to developing country cities.
The case study, undertaken, has shown within the waste collection and transfer policy 
arena that Policy Makers are the innovators of change. The top-down model as discussed 
above however does not take into consideration the potential fallibility of the innovators 
themselves, nor the governance structures in which they operate and their skill level in 
implementing policies such as the PSP Programme. The top-down models also fail to allow 
for a possible lack of resources in implementing policies for essential public services which 
include and are not limited to financial, material and man power resources.
The End Users have a strong practical veto on policies implemented on their behalf,
and their needs and views must be included for their participation within policy. They are
currently not included within the top-down models of implementation. The End Users were
largely the determining factor in how Phase II of the Programme was structured. Regardless
of the type of service that PSP Contractors provided, the End Users would not have been
willing to pay for the new service without their involvement in policy development,
incentives and a major public awareness programme, because previous State provision had
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been free and because the cost of the new service was much higher charged by the informal 
sector.
As observed within the case study in Lagos State, leadership is the most important 
factor within policy implementation. Strong leadership coupled with good governance 
practices will improve the ability of implementation to meet policy goals. While success is 
still not guaranteed within the implementation process, a better outcome of the process can be 
achieved compared to what was formerly available.
The implementation challenges in developing countries which are not normally found 
in developed countries include poor governance, inadequate leadership skills, a large 
informal sector, inadequate resources, skilled man power and a weakened civil society. These 
challenges continue to impact on the Policy Makers and street level bureaucrats’ ability to 
effectively implement public policy. These challenges do not however mean that the 
implementation of policy is impossible; it does however mean that the approach to the 
implementation of policy will need to be modified to achieve a favourable result in the 
implementation of policy.
10.5 Conclusion
To finalize, this thesis has found that the integration of issues of leadership and 
culture within implementation debates would go further in the applicability of debates on 
policy implementation to developing country cities such as Lagos. Issues such as the poverty
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context, leadership characteristics, End User behaviour, and types of services common in 
developing country cities need to be further researched to enhance understanding of their role 
in hindering effective policy implementation.
For there to be a claim of success in the case study, the policy would need to be 
working efficiently in most areas designated for the policy to be implemented. A further 
study is required to understand the different levels of actors who affect implementation 
especially the leaders who create policy and implement it. The question of how do leaders 
implement a policy on an essential public policy that they have never implemented before? 
How do they know they can meet End User demands and how quickly does policy have to be 
reviewed to stop it from failing?
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Appendix 1
Questionnaire
Lagos state End User questionnaire
Rola Ekundayo
Lagos state End User questionnaire
Research Aim:
Understanding implementation in sub-Saharan African countries especially within the waste 
management/collection sector.
Objectives of Household questionnaires
1) Establish house hold types
2) Identify service suppliers to different types of households
3) Compare if possible services pre and after 1999
4) Identify different (if any) in services to different areas
Work Plan
1) Interview policy makers
2) Interview PSP participants
3) Interview monitoring institution
4) Administer questionnaire
Support needed:
1) Students to administer questionnaire
2) Tape recorders
3) Transcribers
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Household Questionnaire
1. Household Description
Area Household
Size
Waste Collector 
Formal (F) 
Informal (I)
Self (S)
Disposal 
Taken away 
by collector 
(T) Buried 
(B) Burned 
(A)
Number of
containers/bags
daily
Cost
2. Household Profile
Age
Sex f/m
Marital Status Single
Married
Divorced
Number of Children in the household
Nationality
Tribe
Number of household income earners
House Type Room
Flat
House
Income (optional) 5,000,001 -  Above
1,000,001-5,000,000
500,001- 1,000,000
100,001-500,000
Below -  100,000
Religion Christian
Muslim
Other
None
4. Current Service Satisfaction
Rate of collection Daily Bi-weekly Weekly Bi­
monthly
Monthly
Time of collection Morning Afternoon Evening
Satisfaction with 
rate of collection
Excellent Good Average Poor Very Poor
Cost of service
5. Pre-1999 Satisfaction (Formal/Informal)
Rate of collection Daily Bi-weekly Weekly Bi- Monthly
359
monthly
Time of collection Morning Afternoon Evening
6. Awareness
a) Were you aware of the new policy to charge for waste and bring in private 
collectors? Yes / No
b) Are you happy with the new charges? Yes / No
c) Were you aware that the policy for the collection of waste was changing? Yes 
/N o
d) Would you have participated in the policy change were you made aware of it? 
Yes/No
e) Were you given written notification of the changes being made? Yes/No
f) Were you made aware of the collection times and frequencies? Yes/No
g) Did your waste collector tell you what time they are coming for your waste? 
Yes/No
h) Do they come at the specified time? Yes / No
i) Do you have your waste ready for the time they say they are coming? Yes / No 
j) If No to question i, why do you not have it ready?
k) Have you ever had your waste collected by an informal collector? Yes / No 
1) If yes to question k), how effective was the service (excellent, good, average, 
poor, very poor) 
m) How much did it cost? 
n) Was it value for money?
o) If you are now served by the government PSP, whom do you prefer? 
p) Which do you feel is more value for money?
360
q) Who do you feel should pay for waste collection? you / government 
r) How do you feel waste collection can be improved? More waste pick ups/
More regular pick ups/ Pick up is on time/ Pay more 
7. Service Comparison
Excellent Good Average Poor
Very
poor
Overall satisfaction pre- 
1999
Overall satisfaction 
present service
Informal Sector
PSP provision
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PSP price list
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LAGOS STATE GOVERNMENT
MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
APPROVED WASTE DISPOSAL SERVICE CHARGE
In realization o f  effective and efficient waste disposal service 
delivery as an indicative o f  good governance, the Administration after 
wide consultation has approved the follow ing under listed service
charges.
(i) Tenement Type
• Roomy house (between 1 0 - 2 0  Rooms)
•  Lock -  up shops within tenements
• Block o f  6 — 8 flats
•  Block o f  8 Flats and above in all Low  
Cost Housing Fslales
• Block o f  4 - 6  Flats in all Medium  
Income Areas
•  Block o f  6 Flats and above in Medium  
Income Areas
• Block o f  Flats in High Income 
Rstate Area
•  W hole house in Low Income Areas
• Whole house in Medium Income Areas
• W hole house in I ligh Income Areas
•  Block o f  8 Flats and above within 
Armed Forces. Police, Immigration. 
Customs, Prisons Barracks and 
Government Rstates
•  W hole house within .Armed Forces. 
Police. Immigration. Customs. Prisons 
Barracks and Go\ eminent Lstaie
• .All Police Stations 
(ii) C ommercial Type
• Lock -  up shops o ff high street
• Lock -  up shops ol'lices on high street
•  l o t t e r i e s  R e s t a u r a n t  C l u b  I l o u s e s
Rate
NSOO/House 
N500/Shop  
N i 000/B lock  
N o000/Block
N 2000 Block
N40< 10 'Block
N 2500/L u\ur\ 
Flat 
N 1000/H ouse  
N 2000. Flo use 
N3 000/H ouse 
N4000/BIock
N 1000 House
NIOOO/Lach
N 500 Shop 
N 1000; Shop. 
Office- Business 
N 30.000 Facli
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•  Small and Medium Hotels
•  3 - 5  Star Hotels
• Small traditional markets
•  Medium traditional markets
•  B ig traditional markets
•  Extra large traditional market (M ile 12)
•  Small modern shopping / plaza / market 
com plex
• Medium modern shopping / plaza / 
market com plex
•  B ig modern shopping / plaza i market 
(i.e. A lade, Tejuosho etc)
•  Super Big Modern Shopping / plaza / 
market com plex (ASPA M D A , Alaba 
International Market, Ladipo etc)
•  Sm all motor luxurious bus parks and 
garages
•  Medium motor luxurious parks and
garages
• Big motor luxurious parks and garages
•  Small mechanic workshops and villages
•  Medium mechanic workshops and 
villages
• Big mechanic workshops and villages 
Corporate Types
•  Telecom m  facilities (M TN, Vmobile, 
G lobacom , Mtel etc) to cover all 
branches
• W ireless (M ultilinks. Starcomm. Rcltel. 
GTE etc) to cover all branches
• Big Financial Institutions (First Bank, 
U BN , UBA, Standard Trust, Afribank, 
Zenith to cover all branches)
•  All other Financial and Insurance 
Institutions
Rate
$420,000/Each  
M 250,000/0utlet 
MI 0,000/Each  
M 25,000/Each 
M 45,000/Each  
Ml 50,000/Each  
M 50,000/Each
Ml 0 0 ,000 /Each
Ml 50,000/Each
M l,000,000/Each
M l5,000/ Each
M 35,000/Each
MOO,000/ Each 
Ml 0 ,0 0 0 /Each 
M20,000/Each
M 30,000/Each
M 2,500,000/Each
M l,500,000/Each  
M 2,000,000, Each
M l,000,000/Each
•  Oil companies high-rise office  
com plexes (Oando, Exxon-M obile, 
Tolal, Conoil etc)
•  All Petrol Stations excluding eateries
(iv) Industrial / Manufacturing Types
• Small Industrial Premises
• Medium Industrial Premises (Cadbury, 
Unilever, NESTLE)
•  Big Industrial Premises (Flower Mills, 
PZ)
•  Extra Big Industrial Premises (NBE, 
Nigerian Bottling Co, Guinness, 
Nichem tex, Churchgate etc)
(v) Institutions Types
•  Private Schools
•  Public Schools (by direct deduction 
from Ministry o f  Education )
• All Private Hospitals with 25 beds and 
below
• All Private Hospitals with 25 beds and 
above
•  All C linics i Traditional / Maternity 
Homes with no admission beds
• Al) Religious premises
(vi) Public Tertiary Institution Types
•  University o f  Lagos
•  Yaba C ollege o f  Technology
•  Lagos State University
• Lagos State Polytechnics
•  Lagos State University reaching 
Hospital (LASUTH)
•  Lagos University Teaching Hospital 
(LUTH)
• National Art Theatre
• Federal Secretariat
•  C olleges o f  Education
Rate
142,500,000/Each
145,000/ Each
(425,000/Each 
(4250 ,000- 
(4500,000/Each  
(4 1,000,000/Each
W2,500,000/Each
(45000/Each 
H 1000/Each
(425000/Each
(4250,000/Each
(45000/Each
(41000/Each
14250,000/Each 
(4250,000/Each 
(4250,000/Each 
(4250,000/Each  
14250,000/Each
*4250,000/Each
(4250,000/Each  
(45 00 .000 /Each 
(4250,000/Each
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• Federal Government Colleges
•  State M odel C olleges
• National Stadium
• Nigeria Railway Cooperation
•  State Stadia
•  Nigeria Ports Authority (NPA)
•  National Electric Power Authority 
(NEPA)
•  Federal Aviation Airport Authority 
(FA AN)
(vii) High C om m ission  T ypes
• American Embassy
•  British Embassy
•  All other Embassy and High 
Commission
• All others as assessed and negotiated
(Initialed) Tunji Bello 
Honourable Commissioner
23rd July 2004
R ate
14250.000/Each 
14250,000/Each 
14250,000/Each  
14500,000/ Each 
14250,000/Each  
145,000,000/Each 
W2,500,000/Each
142,500,000
N 2,500,000/Each  
141,500,000/Each  
14500,000/Each
4
ALBA NIGERIA LIMITED LAGOS STATE GOVERNMENT
YOUR WASTE BILL
r t  C o d e  N o: Res
Property No: S>c*j*TdJZ A-htt^rrName: Pis Indicate your name— .--------   L *
Category: Housing
Group/Street
Address: Pis Indicate your address..!.............7.1 cf
Bill No:
Afca Nig. Ltd. woridng to protect 
the Nigerian Environment for
present & future generation
MAY 2009 1 2.800
Total W c 2.500 l
TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NAIRA
Remaining Balance: 1 2.500
Due date: Rve(6) working days, before the end of every month
MESSAGE
_  PV«W cat ALBA WGCMA UWTEO 0*01-2783895, 0702802^1.0TO»ra«»4
Please pay waste service* bfli on behalf of LAWMA to H J H H  4J ^  ^  a l
Alia Nig. Ltd. Acct No. 01490030001743 UBA Admiralty Way Letid Phase i only. Thank you for your co-operation.
q  C ode No: Res
Name*^ N°  Pis Indicate your name..i^..T.’^ .....!^ .l^X .[:........
Category: Housing
Address: Pis indicate your address.. X .../ . i ' . ....SXX.!.!.l  ^ e  c  /
Bill No:
MAY 2009 I 2.500 i
Total 4* C 2.500 |
TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NAIRA
Remaining Balance: | 2.500
Due date: Five (5) working days, before the end of every month
This bill Is Issued by LAWMA on behalf of the Lagos State Government by virtue of section 18 of the Lagos 
Waste Management Authority Law No. 27. Vol 40. Laws of Lagos State 2007. any person who fails or 
neglects to pay the tariffs, fees or charges prescribed by the Lagos Waste Management Authority shall be 
deemed to commit an offence and is liable to conviction to a  fine or imprisonment
U B A #Please pay waste services WU on behalf of LAWMA to Alba Nig. Ltd. Acct No. 01490030001743 UBA MMHHM AdmiraJty Way Lekki Phase i only. Thank you for your co-operation.
t / J l o U  I*'* U. y L ' m  csv*i<r ckA * - g
Appendix 3
M ap o f  L a g o s  sh o w in g  PS P  c o v e r a g e  a r e a s
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L A G O S
IBM PSP Covered Areas 
Non-PSP Areas 
|  Industrial Areas 
I '1 Airport 
I I Water Bodies
 Roads/M otorways
I I Empty Space
